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permanent platform of discussion and comparison, experimentation 
and dissemination, promoting the achievement of methodological 
action-research goals, in order to enforce the development of the 
territories and of the local and European identities, starting from 
the cultural heritage and from the Mediterranean Area. All the 
research work revolves around three key topics: 
Mediterranean: The knowledge and cultural values of southern 
Europe and the Mediterranean Area may represent the strategic 
elements to overcome the current crisis in Europe, to the point of 
becoming a stimulus for the review of policies. 
Knowledge: Language, history, tradition and art have always 
conveyed dialogic relations and interpersonal relationships within 
societies, founding on otherness the peculiarities understood as 
knowledge development, processes, sedimentation and 
transformation. What becomes peculiar is the "knowledge" as the 
achievement of an advantage derived from the possession of 
unique and inimitable knowledge.  
Culture and Heritage: Culture, understood as its cultural heritage, is 
proposed as one of the privileged areas of the "new economy". In 
fact, the encounter between culture and territory represents one of 
the most valuable opportunities for development.  
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What Perspective for the Mediterranean? 
 
This book inaugurates the new ICSR Mediterranean Knoweldge 
book series on Mediterranean, Knowledge, Culture and Heritage. As 
the firstborn, this text has to accomplish the difficult task of tracing 
the coordinates for our intellectual journey. 
The aim of the series is to publish innovative studies in the field 
of socio-economic sciences and humanities, about the broad subject 
of the Mediterranean. About the most recent events, think to some 
phenomena – the Arab spring, the migration from Africa and Middle 
East toward Europe, the economic crisis of the Eurozone, which af-
fects mostly the Southern Europe – which, although developing on 
the Mediterranean, have a global impact and, therefore, raise the in-
terest of scholars living in the whole world.  
This book, resulted from a rich collaboration between sociologists 
of different nationalities, is, in a certain sense, a programmatic vol-
ume focusing on some aspects of these phenomena within societies. 
In it the authors reflect on the Mediterranean as a strategic element to 
overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming a stimulus for the 
review of European policies and providing a solid foundation for the 
growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowledge (Man-
gone, 2015). 
This book represents an attempt to rethink the “boundaries” and 
rethinking the boundaries means rethinking the current idea of Medi-
terranean between cultures, migrations and life-world (the concepts 
compared with the Mediterranean in the three parts of the book). Be-
cause the Mediterranean legacy is a complex ensemble of ideas, im-
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ages and feelings which have been cultivated for centuries and are 
still cultivated in this “sea amidst the lands”; which was called mare 
nostrum by the ancient Romans and to which the same name could 
be attributed again if, as Franco Cassano argued (Cassano & Zolo, 
2007), we understand the word nostrum as referring to each and 
every one of us, as human beings. 
Knowledge and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the 
driving force to overcome the impasse of which Europe cannot free 
itself.  
This book brings the focus on the borders in the sociological pro-
spective and we expect this reflection to produce a refreshing outlook 
on the Mediterranean.  
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From Knowledge to the “Life-world” 
 
The development of humanity must be rethought by shifting the 
focus from the traditional elements of competitive advantage to new 
knowledge-based elements. What matters now is the so-called 
“knowledge resource” (Liebowitz, 1999), because the achievement 
of a benefit comes from the possession of knowledge.  
Indeed, to know means: a) to participate in the construction of 
meanings of social and cultural reality in order to transform it in 
symbolic representation (by activating knowledge structures); b) to 
attribute “sense” and “meaning” to events, objects or persons on the 
basis of knowledge, expectations and assumptions; c) to develop in a 
complex and dynamic way the information that people can gather 
and turn them into knowledge. 
Every interaction with objects or with humans, every act of com-
munication, implies a transmission of skills and knowledge: an ex-
change that becomes a process of integration of the differences – un-
derstood as collective wealth in which everyone is recognized – 
without limitations in the learning paths of each person or prejudices 
on “expert” and “profane” knowledge. 
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Knowledge is the future and we have to invest on it because it 
remains the main strategic development factor not only industry-
wise, but also from a social and cultural perspective. The process of 
knowledge-based human development is facilitated by constant 
“knowledge creation” aimed at “continuous innovation” in the indus-
trial, social, and cultural field. The new challenge in order to keep up 
with the process of globalization is to be able to learn more quickly 
in order to better anticipate changes, and to do that we need to be 
able to activate mechanisms of acquisition, creation, diffusion, and 
incorporation of the “key” resource: knowledge. In that, the inability 
to gain access to the tools and forms of knowledge dissemination, 
will make even more stagnant those backward situations that are al-
ready crossing the decency limit. Moreover, it will further hinder the 
acquisition of those entitlements (Sen, 1981; Daherendorf, 1988), 
that a protection system should guarantee its citizens in order to en-
able them, on the one hand, to express their own needs and, on the 
other hand, to fulfil them, namely the possession of those titles that 
allow someone to enjoy the civil and social rights. 
However the investment in the knowledge vector requires impli-
cation and engagement tools such as educative system and structures 
that have a direct or indirect connection with the formation. 
In light of this, the very role of researchers is to generate “knowl-
edge” through which society can observe the phenomena it produces 
and continuously improve as in its daily unfolding. As Bourdieu had 
said in his acceptance speech for the CNRS Gold Medal, the task of 
sociology is “the critical unhinging of the manoeuvring and manipu-
lation of citizens and of consumers that rely on perverse usages of 
science” (Bourdieu, 2013, p. 12) going beyond the questions posed 
by common sense or by the media as they are often induced and not 
real. 
The work of researchers and the resulting knowledge produced 
are to be intended, as Bourdieu stated over twenty years ago, in a 
dual manner: on the one hand, they allow for an “institutional sup-
port” (public service) that does not mean meeting all the needs of so-
ciety, but giving scientific answers to actual problems, not with the 
“solution”, but by suggesting possible routes for the improvement of 
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the need concerned. On the other hand, they allow the development 
of a “critical and active citizen” very close to the ideal type of 
Schütz‟s “well-informed citizen” (Schütz, 1946) which, revised ac-
cording to the present society (Mangone, 2014), appears to be advo-
cating the establishment of a modern citizenship amounting not 
merely to rights but also to duties. For this newly forged citizenship, 
the establishment of a socially approved knowledge based on the 
principle of responsibility (Jonas, 1979) becomes a priority, revealed 
through social reflexivity (Donati, 2011), an aspect of individual re-
flexivity that is neither subjective nor structural but related to the re-
ality of social relations. 
From the above stems the problem related to the relationship be-
tween knowledge and society, both in terms of equal access to 
knowledge and in terms of use of the knowledge resource. Globaliza-
tion, whose effects impacted on the economic and socio-cultural as-
pects of society, increased instead of reducing interdependence rela-
tionships as well as conditionings in social relations. This is particu-
larly true for what concerns financial relations between richer coun-
tries, while it does not hold for “imbalanced” relations between rich 
and poor countries. 
At this point it would be useful and beneficial to mobilize all vec-
tors (novel, theater, cinema, etc.) that promote and spread in depth 
these tolerance values of respect and listening. 
As it is highlighted within this book, it is necessary to trigger a 
reciprocal logic to equal exchanges and shares in cooperation proc-
esses in order to achieve mutual benefits. However, this political ob-
jective presupposes look at the countries of the South with a new 
look through the application of innovative theoretical and ideological 
foundations. 
In pursuing this logic, the Mediterranean Knowledge acquires a 
fundamental importance in promoting pluralism, diversity, and free-
dom. If Europe and the Europeans want to build their future, they 
will have to review their relationship with the Mediterranean to-
gether with the other political and cultural actors bordering on the 
Mediterranean, starting with the Arab peoples. 
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This sea, unfamiliar with juxtapositions like North / South, East / 
West, Islam / Christianity, and which saw the flourishing of cultures, 
arts, religions, philosophies, today is no longer a „hotbed‟ of dia-
logue, but has become a battlefield for a war fought not with weap-
ons but with “ideologies” and where opponents are identified in Us 
and Them: We, the civilized (Europeans), the modern ones, those 
who live in prosperity; Them, foreigners (non- Europeans), refugees, 
those who have been deprived of the opportunity to choose to remain 
in their country of origin because of conflicts, famine, and epidem-
ics. 
Echoing Dahrendorf (1988) we can say that life chances, under-
stood as the possibility to choose between alternatives, are never 
equally distributed: there is no society in which all people have the 
same entitlements and enjoy the same provisions (set of choices and 
tangible assets). However, if choosing between possibilities is itself 
seen as a major element in leading of a decent life, then it is our duty 
(the above mentioned We of the clash) to offer a set of choices by 
basing policies not only on the principle of responsibility, but also on 
the principles of fairness and freedom. 
This sea, that was once “dialogue and freedom” has now become 
“closure and death”: today there are tens of thousands dead drowned 
in the Mediterranean, due to the increase of migration flows from Af-
rica and the Middle East to the shores of Europe (UNHCR 2015) - as 
very well expressed in the Part II of the book. This mare nostrum – 
where the “our” is related to humans (Cassano & Zolo, 2007) – once 
a meeting place for knowledge as the meeting place of strangers, has 
now become a “border insurmountable” for many desperate. 
Humanity as a whole – especially Atlantic Europeans – seems to 
have forgotten that knowledge is produced by comparison with the 
xenos. 
It is desirable, therefore, for the “Mediterranean knowledge” 
(both tangible and intangible) to becomes a thoughtful knowledge 
promoting relationship building both between subjects and within 
their living environment, facilitating an encounter with the Other 
with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open to the 
re-composition of cultural differences and the specific features of 
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every culture. As stated in the contribution of Donati – in this book – 
it requires a “relational semantics” to the needs of multicultural citi-
zenship. 
If otherness is a dimension that cannot be ignored, being, now as 
ten, fundamental for the processes of identification and recognition, 
we must ponder the fact that the other (the difference) is not only a 
place of conflict and recrimination, but also a foundation on which to 
build a culture of tolerance and respect – an issue currently much de-
bated. Said culture should instil, particularly into younger genera-
tions, the desire to know each other, to open up towards the other as 
a person from whom to learn not only new customs, habits, and new 
ways of being, but also as a way to re-discover ourselves, to recon-
sider ourselves, our values and behaviours. The cultural dimension 
becomes therefore crucial, as it can provide the basis on which to es-
tablish a society not merely focused on respecting “otherness”, but 
which also allows to explore the mechanisms created at different lev-
els (individual, social, and cultural ones) whenever we relate to the 
“other” (Mangone & Masullo, 2015). We can thus affirm that musing 
on the Mediterranean implies, on the one hand, the comparison with 
otherness as a matter leading to the real encounter between Us and 
Them, the social and psychological mechanisms involved in prepar-
ing people positively or, on the contrary, negatively towards the 
other (Mangone & Marsico, 2011). On the other hand, it implies a 
reflection on the policies, that is, on the forms of recognition and 
protection of every person as equal and to whom equal opportunity 
of expression and self-realization, self-fulfilment should therefore be 
guaranteed. 
The thoughts expressed within the debate on interculturalism and 
multiculturalism are based on cultural and identity issues: the great 
challenge faced with difficulty by society and social systems (among 
which we can find the European Union), is whether they should be 
seen as closed systems (non-welcoming) or as open systems (wel-
coming) towards “other cultures”; what Baumann (1999) called “the 
multicultural enigma”.  
Laying the foundations for the construction of a real and effective 
multicultural identity that crosses Europe – that part of the West de-
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fining itself as the “cradle of democracy”, in contrast to Sen‟s state-
ments (2003) – cannot be separated from what happened in the past, 
to what is happening and what will happen even in the Mediterra-
nean. 
The weight of the Mediterranean component is impressive in sev-
eral respects throughout southern Europe resulting in great differ-
ences in comparison with the rest of Europe: European society is 
crossed by deep interwoven cleavages, in some cases overlapping 
and adding up, transforming difference into conflict (Catholics and 
Protestants, church and state, North and South, etc.). European iden-
tity, therefore, and its geographic map, correspond not only to the in-
stitutional divisions, but also to these complex differences (as relig-
ion, economy, politics, literacy, draw another Europe than the offi-
cial one) that constitute true lines of separation, often even within the 
borders of the nation state (Eder & Giesen, 2001). Due to the inter-
play of a number of factors, a common destiny connects the entire 
Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Golden Horn, causing the per-
ception of a clear civil inferiority to form / stir in the collective con-
sciousness. 
The social role of territories has changed. Not only can people 
move and travel in much easier and more inexpensive ways, but a 
growing number of persons can build their identities with multiple 
senses of belonging: travel and at the same time long for their home-
land. The word “geo” has returned, and geo-politics has regained its 
importance, as well as geo-culture and geo-communication. All these 
changes have paved the way to new opportunities for multi-polarities 
and provide new possibilities for territories that have been con-
demned to marginality, as might be the case of the Mediterranean 
towards Europe. 
The Mediterranean legacy is a complex ensemble of ideas, images 
and feelings which have been cultivated for centuries and are still 
cultivated in this “sea (not ocean) amidst the lands”; which was 
called mare nostrum by the ancient Romans and which the same 
name could be attributed again if, as Franco Cassano argued (Cas-
sano & Zolo, 2007), we understand the word nostrum as referring to 
each and every one of us, as human beings. 
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A new concept of territoriality can be built with the help of an ap-
proach that goes beyond the classical oppositions Europe/ Mediterra-
nean, North/South, East/West, etc., which can set up a new dimen-
sion of social space that as a “container” is transformed into an 
“arena” where people carry out their everyday lives and construct a 
social reality and own “life-world”. 
 
 
Beyond the Borders 
 
This book resulted from a rich collaboration between sociologists 
of different nationalities and reflects on Mediterranean as a strategic 
element to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming stimuli 
for the review of European policies and providing a solid foundation 
for the growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowledge, 
then passing it on to future generations. This book represent an at-
tempt to rethinking the “boundaries” and rethinking the boundaries 
means rethinking the current idea of Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Only from such a rethinking can the foundations for the construction 
of a real and different European identity be laid. The knowledge and 
cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to over-
come the impasse of which Europe cannot free itself.  
So, while some chapters strive to formulate more general catego-
ries, others deal with the concrete situated reality. We expect this re-
flection to produce a refreshing outlook on Mediterranean.  
The book is organized into three parts, which dialogue with each 
other. However, the first chapter, “Adult Age of Cooperation: Ele-
ments for a Debate”, written by Mohamed Benguerna, has not been 
included here because it addresses an issue of general policy on co-
operation between the northern and southern countries. Based on the 
professional experience of the author, it reflects on cooperation in the 
field of scientific research, particularly between Algeria and the 
European countries and specifically with France. The chapter em-
phasizes the application of a logic of reciprocity, since the Southern 
countries (including Algeria) have accumulated scientific training 
and sufficient and substantial technique that allows them to claim 
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and be part of this logic of reciprocity. This policy objective, how-
ever, requires the emergence of a new look on the South, and this can 
happen only if it is supported by an innovative effort in terms of 
theoretical and ideological assumptions. 
The first part, “Mediterranean and Cultures”, is composed of 
three chapters. The first chapter “The Us/Them Encounter. The 
Mediterranean between Land and Sea Borders”, written by Emiliana 
Mangone, reflects on the theme of “otherness” to explore the mecha-
nisms created at different levels (individual, social, and cultural 
ones) whenever we relate to the “other”, stretching from feelings of 
openness and curiosity – underpinning reception and integration 
policies – to evident feelings of intolerance, urging, even manifestly, 
to discriminate against the other, perceived as different, or as one 
who belongs to what is “unfamiliar” and this within the land e sea 
borders of the Mediterranean.  
The idea that the political inclusion of minorities into a common 
citizenship needs a new cultural approach in order to avoid the falla-
cies of what has been understood and practiced as “multiculturalism” 
so far is proposed by Pierpaolo Donati. In this chapter titled “Multi-
cultural Citizenship Needs a Relational Semantics of Borders”, Do-
nati argues that there are three semantics theorized as possible solu-
tions to manage cultural borders: dialectical, binary and relational. It 
depends on the choice among these semantics what kind of ideal 
model is followed in order to include people into a common citizen-
ship. To put it bluntly, the latter can be configured as a culturally 
neutral public sphere (based upon the neutralization of cultural bor-
ders) or as a morally qualified public sphere, which defines the bor-
ders of citizenship as mutual relations between different cultures so 
to avoid any form of exclusion, discrimination or segregation. 
In the next chapter, written by Andrea A.S. Barbieri, titled “The 
Mediterranean Legacy for the Future of Europe” argues on building 
of a new idea about what can be called “The Mediterranean 
approach” or the “Mediterranean mind”. In order to move in the this 
direction, understanding what it could mean, the author reflecs 
around 3 main ideas: a) the open concept of Mediterranean that has 
been cultivated by prominent intellectuals of the past (for exemple, 
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Albert Camus); b) the “long durée” approach to the history of hu-
mana civilitas: putting apart ideas like western and eastern; and re-
thinking the ideas of modernity and secularization; c) the new con-
cept of territoriality that can be built with the help of the geo-
sociological approach to most recent changes in geo-politics and in-
ternational relations. 
This book represents a renewed effort to discuss the migration 
flows crossing the Mediterranean trying to go beyond the numerical 
dimension. For this reason the second part of the book is entitled 
“Mediterranean and Migrations”: Cortinovis‟ chapter focuses on re-
cent developments in the so-called external dimension of migration 
policy, which includes a number of initiatives adopted by the EU to 
ensure cooperation with countries of origin and transit of migrants. 
Because, the management of migration flows across the Mediterra-
nean represents a crucial testing ground for the European Union (EU) 
migration and asylum policy. 
The chapter written by Folco Cimagalli, “Mediterranean, Migra-
tions and Communities. What Challenges for Social Policies?”, fo-
cuses on the key role that communities can play today in new poli-
cies, more efficient and effective. The community, both the ethnic 
and the host, in this light, is a laver to build far-reaching policies, in 
which the center of gravity of the interventions is not the primary 
time of acceptance, but one of integration, in a development perspec-
tive. In this sense, a relationship with the community and among the 
communities becomes unavoidable challenge for integration policies 
to be really innovative.  
The third part of this book, “Mediterranean and Life-world”, is 
composed of three chapters that offer several reflections on aspects 
of social reality and life-world: the gender, the public space and edu-
cation. Giuseppe Masullo in his chapter (“Boundaries among Gen-
ders in the Mediterranean Area: Between Reality and Imagination”), 
highlights how Western countries help in drawing the outlines of the 
debate on gender differences in the Mediterranean area, through a 
perspective that often reveals a certain degree of ethnocentrism, 
given its failure to take into account alternative models that emerge 
in other Mediterranean contexts – particularly those with an Islamic 
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tradition – often branded as backward with regard to women‟s rights 
and the plight of LGBT individuals.  
“Museum Displays and their Contemporary Sociological Reso-
nance” is the title of the chapter written by Carmel Borg and Peter 
Mayo. This chapter focuses on the Museum as a public space and a 
reinterpretation of a selection of its holdings in light of contemporary 
preoccupation and issues. The authors propose a non-conventional 
approach to reading and appreciating artefacts in a museum, one that 
allows for a less hierarchical reading, and valorises communal, social 
class, religious identity and environmental perspectives. It represents 
an attempt at enabling works to “speak” to contemporary concerns 
without giving these works any false sense of “universality”. 
The last chapter of the book, “Tactics or Strategies? The Govern-
ance of Early School Leaving in Naples and Albacete”, written by 
Anna Milione, offers a reflection on early school leaving. In this 
chapter the author contrasts two ways of dealing with early school 
leaving: a tactical approach aiming at “harm reduction” and a stra-
tegic approach that assumes a holistic view on transforming the 
school and the ecology of education practice. To describe these prac-
tices author will move “in the middle of things” to illustrate two 
ways of tackling with early school leaving emerging in a program 
funded by Comenius Regio Project “A care for every child”, aimed 
at reducing high risk school leaving children living in highly de-
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One thing that disturbs me and even despair me: It is the radical inability of 
the Christians to speak of another place of history and the historicity and the 
Christ’s irreducible truth. I don’t say that this attitude is false, therefore to 
reject ; I only ask the Christian to make the only charity worthy in my opi-
nion: to accept every time that it is about a knowledge act to speak of a neu-
tral place, that is to comment every time collects it, instead indefinitely to 
comment again according to the data of the tradition… 
 
 Letter from Mohamed Arkoun to Maurice Borrmans 




The aim of our contribution is to have a debate, a series of reflec-
tions around the experiences of cooperation between the countries of 
the North and those of the South. It is more especially about an illu-
stration in Algeria and the European countries and, in particular, 
                                           
 M. Benguerna () 
Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD)  
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The case that I discuss concerns the experiences of cooperation in 
the domain of the scientific research. From my professional expe-
rience, I interrogate the scientific cooperation convention model. It 
will be about knowing why and how this type of unilateral collabora-
tion subsists after several years of exchanges. 




Three Notions (Age, Adult, Cooperation): Why? 
 
The notion of age backs to the question of the periodization of 
this cooperation experience between Algeria and France in the do-
main of the scientific research. We can distinguish, outline, three big 
phases. The first begin with the independence of Algeria and its 
enormous needs of formation of the managers and more especially 
the higher teachers. France occupied and always occupied a very im-
portant role to this level. 
However, from the years 1980, with the substantial development 
of the Algerian academic structures, an offensive politics is started 
by the political authorities of the country in order to strengthen and 
to enrich the management of the universities and centers of research. 
This new orientation of the scientific cooperation is going to be of 
a certain contribution for the funding of the Algerian academic sys-
tem especially as a massive return of teachers is recorded after a 
formation in various and multiple geographical areas. 
Finally, with the years 1990, it is the third phase that reveals an 
action in depth in terms of production and reproduction of the aca-
demic system whose ambition is to want to offer itself to the interna-
tional. It is this trajectory and its political context that justify our title 
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Of what Places, I Intervene? 
 
My questioning is the fruit of the teachings, fruit of a series of 
experiences that stakes out my professional course. 
First, my double experience of teaching and research with differ-
ent practice of collaboration with colleagues and foreign partners.  
Then, the one of the coordination and the scientific animation of 
research projects; finally, the manipulation and the involvement to 
assessments and scientific appraisal. 
At the time of all these places of intervention, I was very attentive 
to the reflections of my foreign colleagues; I was very attentive to the 
reflections of my foreign colleagues about various themes landed in 
the collaborations. 
The protocols of agreement and the conventions constitute some 
examples rich in teachings to seize and to understand the logics, and 
the theoretical and ideological foundations. 
As such, we will present, in manner of illustration, two (02) ar-
ticles extracted of a convention draft between two (02) organisms of 




Illustration: A Convention and the Questionings 
 
Article 1: The present contract has for objective to define the modes 
of collaboration between ......  and ...... In view of the realization in 
common of research on the thematic.  
 
Article 41:  Obligation of the parts 
The organism (X) (France) gets involved to: 
‒ To mobilize the expertise of its managements, make them availa-
ble and send in mission, according to the possibilities, the scien-
tific staff required by the program of research. 
‒ To contribute to the acquirement of the necessary facilities for the 
land activities planned for the program of the survey. 
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‒ To achieve on time, except in case of force majeure and in con-
formity with the curriculum, the tasks of which his collaborators 
are responsible. 
‒ To contribute to provide seminaries of methods or continuous 
training registered to the program. 
 
Article 42:  The Algerian organism gets involved to: 
‒ To provide, according to the possibilities, the infrastructures ne-
cessary to the optimal realization of the curriculum. 
‒ To facilitate the relations of collaboration with the other public or 
private Algerian organisms. 
‒ To achieve on time, except in case of force majeure and in con-
formity with the curriculum, the tasks of which his collaborators 
are responsible. 
 
Therefore, we can make three comments of these two (02) articles: 
 
First, the distribution of the tasks and the roles of every part are 
clearly defined and denote scientific stakes of this convention 
project. 
Secondly, these two (02) articles characterize the part producer 
bearer of the knowledge and the expertise. As they delimit the statute 
of support, of accompaniment of the beneficiary part of this conven-
tion. 
Thirdly, the mission of appraisal is clearly localized and devolved 
to the convention part. 
 
Such a comment brings me to interrogate myself on this notion of 
“cooperation” to examine what are the nature and the content of this 
expertise mission to the profit of a partner of the convention. 
These articles represent the existence of a certain conception of 
cooperation that finds its anchorage in the historic course of these 
two countries and more particularly the trajectory of the scientific 
cooperation. Our worry is not to cast doubt on this capacity of exper-
tise and its possessors but it is about the conditions of its mobiliza-
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tion of the politics, cultural and economic contexts of the two socie-
ties and, in this case, the Algerian society. 
It is around this observation that I am going to tempt to deliver 




North / South. South / North: Foundations of a Scientific Hierarchy 
 
It will be difficult, within the context of this contribution, to depth 
examination of the foundations of such an equation that requires a 
more intensive mobilization of the historic and statistical data. 
In this context, we submit to the discussion points that seem re-
vealing to us of this hierarchy. First, we found this practice, that lasts 
and persists, to make societies of the South, and in our case Algeria, 
of the objects and study opportunities. 
It is a rich observation in teachings that we can raise on several 
domains of this scientific cooperation. For example, a historic re-
search on the objects and the topics of the Algerian doctorants that 
stay in France, indicate us that, in the big majority, the Algerian so-
ciety remained their study opportunities. In the same sense, we note 
that a very reduced number of Algerian doctorants intends to think 
on the objects of lands of the residence society. It is why an investi-
gating and an exploitation of the files of the theses presented in 
France would be necessary to reinforce and to clarify such a report. 
The same for most foreign doctorants and, in particular the 
French, that do scientific residences in Algeria, invest the thematic 
historic and cultural of this country. 
Very often, the comparative perspective is absent of these docto-
rants research. We can reduce the domains of cooperation interven-
tion in order to refine this type of observation. 
The approaches, the theoretical basis and these specific objects of 
the South as well as the instruments of investigating are going to 
come from the societies of the North and thus French. 
To this level, we are in presence of an equation bearer of a pro-
ducer of theoretical and methodological (the North) instruments and 
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a pole consumer as object and land of application and analysis (the 
South). 
It is this questioning that is submitted, today, to the new contin-
gencies politico-cultural and economic of the societies of the South 
that require an innovative exam. 
By way of conclusion of this contribution, we propose some data 
and questionings able to contribute to renewal of a cooperation strat-
egy beyond the borders. 
 
 
Conclusion: Elements for Exchanges Reciprocity without Borders 
 
Several authors (Sahli, 1965; Shayegan, 1988; Le Pichon, 1991; 
Benguerna, 1992; Kadri & Benguerna, 2014) tempted to think on this 
problematic of cooperation in order to seize and to understand the 
stakes and the foundations. So, it would be useful to examine with a 
historic perspective the historic and cultural anchorages of the trajec-
tory of these cooperation experiences. 
In fact, an orientation of the investigating will be able to argue 
our following thesis that a successful cooperation process, require its 
insertion in a logic of the reciprocity. 
It seems that the societies of the south, in particular, Algeria ac-
cumulated a sufficient and substantial scientific and technical train-
ing allowing them to claim and to enroll in this logic of the reciproci-
ty. But such objective depends on a political will of sharing, ex-
change and equity in the processes of collaboration. 
To listen, to recognize and to accept the other is inescapable lev-
ers to cooperate in serenity and the mutual profit. Such a political ob-
jective supposes the emergence of a new look on the countries of the 
South. This look will not be able only if it is sustained accompanied 
by an innovative effort of theoretical and ideological assumptions. It 
is a movement in depth that is required and that is going to upset the 
attitudes, the behaviors, the analyses carried by a historic accumula-
tion, forged by cultural practices and a repetitive reducing perception 
of the actors of the South. Such a vision does not take account of the 
evolutions and the progressions of the countries of the South. They 
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are always considered in the statute of losers. Also, the task is im-
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The Discovery of Otherness 
 
Networks characterizing contemporary society are based on 
communicative events that constitute communicative relations (Gili 
& Colombo, 2012) or as a communicative dimension of social 
relations, even if social relations can not be reduced only to their 
communicative dimension as this is only one of the dimensions 
constituting the social relation. 
Showing aspects of ambiguity, any form of relation fluctuates 
between the exchange of information and symbolic action on the 
other: implemented and fulfilled relations are, therefore, problematic 
actions that most often does not allow reciprocity between the 
subjects. For this reason cultures and identities are forced to get 
moving, to get in touch with the other and with each other, so that 
                                                          
 E. Mangone () 
Department of Human, Philosophical and Education Sciences (DISUFF)  
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the challenge is to be able to be themselves without closing oneself 
to others and to be open to others without denying oneself. The 
person building her life plan recognizes herself and also the other as 
different from oneself, but when this process does not reach the end 
point of mutual recognition, it can produce conditions so as to cause 
discomfort or conflict situations. 
This is because the attitudes and actions of people are influenced 
by many multidimensional factors among which stand out, on the 
one hand, the culture, and, on the other, the indissoluble bond with 
the very biography of the person herself. In this way the transition 
was made from an approach to the study of social phenomena 
oriented towards the search for the cause (causality) to an approach 
focusing on the overall interaction between the individual, social, 
and environmental variables (relationality). 
In the relational perspective (Donati, 2011a; Donati & Archer, 
2015), indeed, social relations are not seen as a constraint for the 
individual, but rather as the element promoting her self-
determination on the ground of reflexivity (Donati, 2011b ). In other 
words, the people, through a relational reflexivity, must orient 
themselves towards the reality emerging from the interactions and 
falling back on the subjects themselves, as it is beyond the powers of 
individuals and groups. 
If social relations connect Ego and Alter, it is precisely through 
the relation that the discovery of the Other originates. The idea of 
otherness, which usually leads to the concept of “unfamiliar” or 
“foreign”, depends on the recognition or not of the other within the 
cognitive order established by society or reference groups (Gutmann, 
1992; Mangone & Masullo, 2015): the “other” as a “foreigner”, in 
Bauman‟s (1995) reading of contemporary society, is defined by the 
distance, perceived as an element of “strangeness” in the other, 
separating what we need to know and what we know, or we think we 
know, about the potential or actual attitudes that others assume. 
The idea of otherness is almost always therefore reduced to that 
of alienation and thus to the stranger, but it should be noted that 
every society has its own “foreigners”: indeed, if we consider 
Simmel‟s work on the stranger (1908) we find that this category is 
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characterized by dichotomies (near / far, same / different, inside / 
outside the community) that today no longer apply only to the 
category of the “foreigner” per se – understood as someone coming 
from far away and with her specific symbolic dimension – but also to 
the one (other) that is among us and that creates ambiguity or 
undermines the degree of certainty as she can not be easily ascribed 
to a precise category. In this way the Ego / Alter relationship is no 
longer based on inequality issues – in what – but on differentiating 
aspects – for whom. The focus should be placed on Ego‟s attitudes 
that perceives herself as similar to / different from Alter in a given 
symbolic sphere, as well as on Alter‟s answers within a relational 
framework built on expectations that may influence the 
determination of closeness / distance and openness / closure. 
The Ego / Alter relationship is embodied in the construction of 
identity, as this is based on the process of recognition (of the self and 
the other). Identity is, therefore, a system of representations on which 
each individual establishes: a) its existence as a person; b) the 
recognition and acceptance of others, of the group and their culture. 
It follows that identity is “in motion”: the construction of identity 
takes place over time through processes of differentiation and 
integration, which makes it subject to changes precisely because of 
the relational situations that the person experiences in her everyday 
life. 
The person building her own identity, as it is a matter of social 
construction, recognizes herself, but she also recognizes the other as 
different from herself and recognizes herself as an-other; the existing 
differences, however, should not represent a limit to the action; on 
the contrary, they should be an incentive towards the integration of 
skills and everyday experiences. The individual as a subject is 
located in the social system and is in turn socially identified – 
through the categorization process – and this is true not only for the 
individual, but also for groups: indeed, each group has an identity 
corresponding to its definition and allowing it to place itself into the 
social whole. Identity is both inclusion and exclusion: it identifies the 
group and distinguishes it from other groups (Cuche, 1996); in this 
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perspective, identity appears as a way for categorising the us / them 
distinction based on cultural difference. 
 Contemporary society is lacking a linear path of development for 
people‟s life course, due to the increase in uncertainties, no longer 
allowing the allocation and consequently the clear belonging of 
individuals to a single social circle (Bauman, 2001) within which to 
hold a well-defined position. In other words the identity under 
construction arises as the intersection of multiple social circles with 
the simultaneous presence of several provinces of meaning (Schütz, 
1932), and then the simultaneous presence of different definitions of 
the same reality. The multiplication of life worlds puts the person in 
contact with poorly integrated systems of meaning, often in contrast 
between them (Festinger, 1962) and this results in an increase in the 
complexity of the recognition process, and thus of the Ego / Alter 
relationship. 
The attitudes and actions toward others depend on the idea we 
builds of ourselves from the interpretations of our past and present 
actions, and the predictions of what we will do in the future (Berger 
& Luckmann, 1969). It can be argued therefore that attitudes 
(defined as positive or negative orientation) are oriented towards 
someone from the perception that one has of them through the 
assignment of a judgement (Hewstone, 1983): indeed, the social 
reality of individuals derives not only from the social significance 
but also from the products of their subjective world. Individuals 
builds their action schemes on the basis of the significance they 
attribute to their daily existence, they finds a world of meanings and 
events that become real for them just because they are conscious and 
perceiving social beings. These representations, which are social 
representations (Farr & Moscovici, 1984), can be considered a set of 
cognitive matrices aimed at coordinating words, ideas, images, and 
perceptions that are related to and are shared by a large mutually 
identifying category of people. Social representations are considered 
as actual interpretation systems for our social environment: in short, 
social representations constitute social reality because they determine 
the meaning and significance of actions and events, as well as define 
the experience of reality by identifying the limits, meanings, and 
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types of interactions by reducing the information ambiguity (turning 
the unfamiliar into familiar) make meanings of actions unequivocal. 
Social representations, therefore, are a descriptive tool for 
understanding the processes and functioning and construction 
mechanisms of the “other” category: indeed, when a person or group 
attaches a value judgement (positively or negatively oriented) to 
another person or group, they build shared social representations that 
in case of negative orientation lead to the allocation of 
responsibilities that may go as far as the establishment of prejudice 
and exclusion of these individuals since they are often considered 
“enemies” (Mangone & Marsico, 2011); this is often the case in 
particular with immigrants. 
If we try to further analyse this process on the basis of 
representations as cognitive-descriptive processes leading to the 
construction of the “foreigner” construct, we find that people do not 
attribute strangeness to the “Other” only to foreigners as immigrants, 
but rather the strangeness they build and consequently the 
recognition of otherness refers to a broader and more complex 
categorization process leading to the visibility of the Us-Other link 
(foundation of social identification) and making apparent at the same 
time the close-far dimension. Basically, the Us strengthens and 
unfolds positively thus negatively defining the Other; this process is 
particularly significant when the person is already aimed at 
“defending her own world”. The risk arisen by the strengthening of 
this process, therefore, is to witness the reproduction of a cultural 
bias – that in its exasperation becomes racial prejudice – which is in 
fact “defence of one‟s own world” and “competitive approach” to the 
“Other”. Indeed, prejudice is nothing but a form of categorization 
bestowing social implications on its victims (Allport, 1954), but it is 
quite a normal cognitive process for those who produce it: is not 
negative in itself, but in its effects. In everyday life prejudice is a 
preconceived opinion, socially learned, shared by the in-group, and 
assuming a negative value towards the prejudiced category (the 
“Other”), thus directing attitudes (Taguieff, 1999). As already 
recognized by many, prejudice defines a certain kind of orientation 
towards comprehensive categories of people rather than towards 
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individuals considered not as single units, but as members of a 
category. On the basis of this definition we can say that people create 
prejudices against the “Other” not for being different, but rather 
because it is classified in the broader category of “immigrant”, 
“homosexual”, “differently able” “foreigner”, etc. 
 
 
Towards an Inclusive or an Exclusive Society? 
 
In the history of mankind, pluralism – and especially ethno-
cultural pluralism (Savidan, 2009) – is not new, and it is precisely on 
cultural aspects that reflections about the processes of identification 
and recognition first involved in the integration of “Others” are 
focused. In particular, it is paramount the debate on multiculturalism 
(Taylor, 1992; Baumann, 1999) as a new way of thinking about 
culture and its dynamics, even though multiculturalism, in many 
countries, has generated negative effects such as the further 
fragmentation of society (see Donati, 2013) and a cultural relativism 
leading to further separation between different cultures. 
The discussion, still ongoing, is thus based on the search for a 
new way of living able to ensure justice and equality for all groups 
(differentiated by race, sex, religion, etc.) even if some of them may 
be defined, according to common sense, as belonging to a “different 
culture” than where they live. Multiculturalism is not the concept of 
culture multiplied by the number of these groups, rather it is a new 
way of understanding the cultural dynamics that should not be 
applied only to “Others”, but also to oneself. Indeed, culture is the 
set of elements allowing us to enhance the sense of belonging to the 
group and the identity, but identity is not possible without 
“recognition” (Mangone, 2015). When we invoke the concept of 
“recognition”, however, we do not mean the “politics of recognition” 
as proposed by Taylor (1992) – in agreement with Baumann (1999) – 
because, if we were to analyse this conceptualization, its limit would 
unequivocally stand out. Indeed, multiculturalism, from which 
interculturality then follows, can not be based on the attribution of 
equal dignity and value only to “selected” cultures which have been 
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recognized for a long time (as Taylor says), but such dignity and 
value should be attributed to all cultures, otherwise we would be 
guilty, anyway, of forms of ethnocentrism, with the distinction of 
them being more refined and intellectualized, but not really differing 
in their substance from violent forms of ethnocentrism. Such dissent 
is justified by the fact that the recognition of oneself as an object 
(self-recognition) is obtained only by participating in the experiences 
of others and thus in the experiences shared with others in a social 
context with its cultural peculiarities. This may be derived only from 
knowledge and signification processes that create the necessary 
conditions so that everyone can have an equal chance to choose life 
chances (Dahrendorf, 1988) for their own life plan. In other words, 
we return to Sen‟s concepts of “functioning” and “capabilities” (Sen, 
1982; 1987): the former are “states of being and doing” allowing for 
the achievement of welfare, while the latter permit to acquire 
“relevant functionings” (well-being) enabling one to choose between 
different options. 
Starting from these assumptions and Simmel‟s idea (Simmel, 
1908) that social action involves interaction and can not be 
understood except as a transaction between those who act and those 
who classify such action1, we can outline “openness” or “closure” 
attitudes, often assigning marginalized positions to those who are 
considered “different” from Us, meaning the “Other”. Of course, 
there are various forms of disapproval: they represent the factors 
influencing the growth or decline of “diversity”; in other words, 
disapproval is the aspect / form that diversity will take. In Lemert‟s 
labelling theory (1951) this is very clear: for example, the social 
reaction to the “madman” can be expressed as a function through the 
concept of tolerance quotient, intended as the ratio between the 
objective behaviour and the community‟s willingness to tolerate it. 
The tolerance quotient is well illustrated and explained in Jodelet‟s 
study on madness (1989): the citizens‟ reactions, in the case study, 
are tolerant because they perceive the benefit deriving from the 
acceptance of mental patients, since these are still confined within a 
                                                          
1 Specific status positions, stigmatized and negatively valued, are assigned to 
acts by the reactions they cause, rather than determined by the acts themselves.  
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part of the community (and this is true not only metaphorically but 
also physically). In the specific case of the mentally ill, they are not 
strangers to the community (Simmel, 1908) but rather foreigners 
(Schütz, 1932) because despite having interacted with the group, 
they live with it only a temporary relationship, and thus destined to 
end. Similarly, this cognitive processing can be carried out for all 
those categories that we consider “other than us”; however this kind 
of signification process also leads to another concept that in everyday 
interaction becomes a kind of “defence” of one‟s self, and it is an 
attitude of closure or of increasing the distance then leading to the 
exclusion of the “Other”. 
This processes reiterate once again that the self assumes a key 
role in the Me/Us-Other/s relationship; and by referring to Goffman 
(1968) we may further clarify two aspects of this identity component: 
the actor, who represents the free and independent component of the 
subject, and the character, who represents instead the set of 
characteristics needed each and every time we relate to the “Other” 
in the world of life. The Self is the result of a situation, a frame 
(Goffman, 1987) that is born and experienced emanating precisely 
from the meaning attributed to the situation around which the 
relationship is organized on the basis of a kind of negotiation. In 
practice people adapt to situations and try to adapt them to their 
needs, they build their own behaviour on the basis of role 
expectations given by the outside world and, in this way, try to 
control and guide their actions on the basis of the idea that others 
have of them. These are the dynamics usually found in the 
construction and strengthening of identity and the Self. Goffman has 
clearly defined these processes by stating that everyone needs their 
own identity kit, divided into personal identity and social identity. 
The latter, in turn, must be divided into virtual, attributed to the 
person on the basis of her appearance, that is, of what others imagine 
and according to which it is possible to get just an approximate and 
presumed categorization, and actual, i.e. real since it enables us to 
pinpoint with a large degree of certainty the category the person 
belongs to. When someone is in front of us we may have the 
evidence that she possesses an attribute marking her as different from 
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the others, from the members of the category of which she should 
presumably belong to, a less desirable attribute. So that we can, at 
best, get to judge her as a bad person, or dangerous, or weak. In our 
mind, she is thus downgraded from complete person, to which we are 
commonly used, to a marked, discredited person. This attribute is a 
stigma especially when it produces deep disrepute (Goffman, 1963). 
The constant oscillation of social identity between virtual and actual, 
due to continuous change of situations, compels the subject to 
redefine her social identity when undergoing a process of 
stigmatization. The stigma is a personal attribute (whether physical 
or cultural) such as mental illness, homosexuality, skin colour, 
disability, or religion, the examination of which gives rise in other 
people to a strong doubt about the identity of the subject, thus 
determining the predominance of the virtual component on the actual 
component. For its part, the stigmatized person always tries to 
control the difference between the two components of her identity, or 
she tends to hide the characteristics liable to produce the stigma, thus 
stopping any action which may provoke social disapproval. 
The identity of a subject is then redefined through the interaction 
systems and techniques carried out within the society. Indeed, in 
contemporary society, it happens that the “marginal man” (Park, 
1950) – who lives in two worlds in each of which he is more or less 
foreign (double absence) – is no longer the subject able to observe in 
a detached manner and to look with a broader horizon at his own 
cultural context, because the “other”, but also “We Others” 
implement all the strategies in order to preserve our identity and 
social status (social order), as well as to maintain links with the 
surrounding world to which we actually have to be accountable for 
our own attitudes (structuring of roles). In practice, it is the real 
barrier “We” erect against “Others” that unbalances the identity and 
forces the person to redefine it. This situation causes a progressive 
deconstruction of the Self, since raising the barrier forgoes the 
possibility of using the strategies with which the person usually tries 
to escape the dynamics of exclusion. 
In the light of this description, implementing support and 
knowledge actions around the “Other”, means educating and training 
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citizens to adopt a new role within the society and not to build 
barriers, but rather to tear them down in order to reduce deviations 
between virtual social identity and actual social identity. The hope is 
that they do not build ideological bridges, but rather – given the 
dramatic nature of what is happening in the Mediterranean with 
migration flows – humanitarian corridors able to promote welcome 
in terms of public and social security by reducing the state of 
emergency and discomfort of populations already severely battered 
by various social disasters (wars, famines, epidemics, etc.). 
 
 
The Us/Them Encounter: The Mediterranean between Land and Sea 
Borders 
 
The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in 
the history of many societies. The long traditions of encouraging and 
protecting public debates on political, social, and cultural matters in, say, 
India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and many parts of 
Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas. 
This global heritage is ground enough to question the frequently reiterated 
view that democracy is just a Western idea, and that democracy is therefore 
just a form of Westernization. The recognition of this history has direct 
relevance in contemporary politics in pointing to the global legacy of 
protecting and promoting social deliberation and pluralist interactions, which 
cannot be any less important today than they were in the past when they 
were championed (Sen, 2003, pp. 29-30). 
 
This passage by Sen seems to be the most sensible starting point 
to try and explain why the “Mediterranean” acquires a fundamental 
importance in promoting pluralism, diversity, and freedom. If Europe 
and the Europeans want to build their future, they will have to review 
their relationship with the Mediterranean together with the other 
political and cultural actors bordering on the Mediterranean, starting 
with the Arab peoples. 
Before getting to the heart of the argument, however, a 
clarification is needed: knowledge is related to the social worlds in 
which people live and objectified knowledge is nothing more than 
the translation of this into political and social action. What turns a 
group of people into a society is what they think, the way they think 
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and their wealth of knowledge (what they know); indeed, knowing 
means relating with things and facts, but also with rules, laws, and 
programs by “taking possession” of them. And through this 
“appropriation of knowledge” this sea  
 
that has often been set ablaze, but has also always been able to put out its 
fires, turning the clash into an encounter, the war-front into comparison and 
discussion, the pólemos in diálogos, to see, at the height of the tensest 
conflict, the invisible and powerful harmony that, at the bottom of each 
contrast, holds back the contenders (Resta, 2012, p. 17),  
 
can find an answer to the crisis of the European identity. 
The Mediterranean Sea was called Mare Nostrum by the Romans, 
because the land washed by this sea – or the sea that bathed this land 
– was indeed almost entirely part of the Empire. Nevertheless, the 
Mediterranean area witnessed the development and diffusion not 
only of the Roman civilization, but also of the greatest civilizations, 
religions, and arts that stretch far beyond the fall of the Roman 
Empire and long before its birth. 
This sea, unfamiliar with juxtapositions like North / South, East / 
West, Islam / Christianity, and which saw the flourishing of cultures, 
arts, religions, philosophies, today is no longer a „hotbed‟ of 
dialogue, but has become a battlefield for a war fought not with 
weapons but with „ideologies‟ and where opponents are identified in 
Us and Them: We, the civilized, the modern ones, those who live in 
prosperity; Them, foreigners, refugees, those who have been 
deprived of the opportunity to choose to remain in their country of 
origin because of conflicts, famine, and epidemics. Echoing 
Dahrendorf (1988) we can say that life chances, understood as the 
possibility to choose between alternatives, are never equally 
distributed: there is no society in which all people have the same 
entitlements (access to – and legitimate control on – things) and 
enjoy the same provisions (set of choices and tangible assets). 
However, if choosing between possibilities is itself seen as a major 
element in leading of a decent life, then it is our duty (the above 
mentioned We of the clash) to offer a set of choices by basing 
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policies not only on the principle of responsibility, but also on the 
principles of fairness and freedom. 
 This sea, that was once “dialogue and freedom” has now become 
“closure and death”: today there are tens of thousands dead drowned 
in the Mediterranean, became an “open-air graveyard”. This mare 
nostrum – where the “our” is related to humans (Cassano & Zolo, 
2007) – once a meeting place for knowledge as the meeting place of 
strangers, has now become a border demarcating good from evil: in 
the mind of migrants, the Mediterranean is the quest for freedom and 
a safe harbour (good), but from salvation that sea turned into a death-
trap (evil). 
Humanity as a whole – especially Atlantic Europeans – seems to 
have forgotten that knowledge is produced  
 
by comparison with the xenos, the stranger. In this sense, the coasts lapped 
by the Mediterranean and the Aegean were the perfect cradle of the so-called 
civilization, areas of encounter / clash between „xenoi‟, whose vitality in 
thinking was also awakened to the realization that any attempt of self-
consideration and identity building was dynamically stimulated by an 
external reality that did not fit perfectly (Calabrò, 2015, p. 81). 
 
It is desirable, therefore, for the “Mediterranean knowledge” 
(both tangible and intangible) to becomes a thoughtful knowledge 
promoting relationship building both between subjects and within 
their living environment, facilitating an encounter with the Other 
with the awareness that only dialogue can make society open to the 
re-composition of cultural differences and the specific features of 
every culture. Difference is the result of a social process 
(differentiation) rather than a given reality; therefore it is a rather 
normal feature of complex societies. Thus the problem is not the 
difference itself, that cannot be eliminated, but lies in the meanings 
associated to it in a particular social context, in the risk to make the 
dangerous equation difference = social inequality come true. 
If otherness is a dimension that cannot be ignored, being, now as 
ten, fundamental for the processes of identification and recognition, 
we must ponder the fact that the other (the difference) is not only a 
place of conflict and recrimination, but also a foundation on which to 
build a culture of tolerance and respect – an issue currently much 
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debated. Said culture should instil, particularly into younger 
generations, the desire to know each other, to open up towards the 
other as a person from whom to learn not only new customs, habits, 
and new ways of being, but also as a way to re-discover ourselves, to 
reconsider ourselves, our values and behaviours. The cultural 
dimension becomes therefore crucial, as it can provide the basis on 
which to establish a society not merely focused on respecting 
“otherness”, but which also allows to explore the mechanisms 
created at different levels (individual, social, and cultural ones) 
whenever we relate to the “other”, stretching from feelings of 
openness and curiosity – underpinning reception and integration 
policies – to evident feelings of intolerance, urging, even manifestly, 
to discriminate against the other, perceived as different, or as one 
who belongs to what is “unfamiliar” (Farr & Moscovici, 1984). 
Researchers have the task of holding together the reflections by 
means of an intellectual action going beyond “ideological” points of 
view, through a perspective focused not only on macro-social 
phenomena (concerning social systems and their organization forms), 
but includes also micro-social phenomena (concerning the 
relationship between individual and society and social actions) and 
meso-social ones (concerning the relationship between social system 
and life-world, the latter understood as the set of meanings and 
representations of culture). In this perspective, we will have to 
criticize the representations of society, not only those built by the 
media, but also those scientifically developed, especially by 
economics and political science. 
We can thus affirm that musing on the Mediterranean implies, on 
the one hand, the comparison with otherness as a matter leading to 
the real encounter between Us and Them, the social and 
psychological mechanisms involved in preparing people positively 
or, on the contrary, negatively towards the other (Mangone & 
Marsico, 2011) [with]in the meso- or intersubjective dimension. On 
the other hand, it implies a reflection on the policies, that is, on the 
forms of recognition and protection of every person as equal and to 
whom equal opportunity of expression and self-realization, self-
fulfilment should therefore be guaranteed. 
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It is necessary to activate processes transforming the individual‟s 
cognitive system, so that everyone‟s experience is actualized as 
synthetic-reinterpretative participation in various, different cultures. 
Indeed, the co-presence of different cultures encourages the 
construction of new, multivalent, trans-ethnic cultural identities. 
Similarly, intercultural communication (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 
1988) – in the context we have outlined – is a multidimensional 
process of interaction between people of different cultural identities, 
who, through the encounter of cultures, live a deep and complex 
conflict/reception experience as a valuable opportunity for personal 
growth for everyone, in order to change everything representing an 
obstacle to the construction of a new civil society. The thoughts 
expressed within the debate on interculturalism and multiculturalism 
are based on cultural and identity issues: the great challenge faced 
with difficulty by society and social systems (among which we can 
find the European Union), is whether they should be seen as closed 
systems (non-welcoming) or as open systems (welcoming) towards 
“other cultures”; what Baumann (1999) called “the multicultural 
enigma”. Culture is not an absolute and the same goes for identity; 
both are dynamic: the benefits derived from culture depend on its 
very process of reconstruction, and the dominant discourse of culture 
as an immutable inheritance is just a subcomponent (often a 
conservative one) of a process. It follows that multiculturalism is a 
new way of understanding cultural dynamics: multiculturalism does 
not mean the concept of culture multiplied by the number of “other 
cultures” in a given area, but rather a new approach for managing the 
cultural diversity (simultaneous presence of various cultures) 
introduced in everyday life by individuals coming from different 
areas (Hannerz, 1996).   
Laying the foundations for the construction of a real and effective 
multicultural identity that crosses Europe – that part of the West 
defining itself as the “cradle of democracy”, in contrast to Sen‟s 
statements (2003) – cannot be separated from knowledge and its 
circulation in the Mediterranean countries (be it born within this area 
or of a later date of arrival). Indeed, this knowledge plays a key role 
in providing a precise and distinct sense of belonging to Europe, as 
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well as a sense of European citizenship which must include the 
Mediterranean instead of considering it as a “border”. In recent 
years, with the process of Europeanization touching the economic 
sphere, many grievances have been raised against Southern Europe, 
often hastily identified with the Mediterranean area, even though 
debt problems and ruinous economic situations do not concern only 
the Mediterranean countries (such as the Greek crisis, or that of Italy 
and Spain).  
The weight of the Mediterranean component is impressive in 
several respects throughout southern Europe resulting in great 
differences in comparison with the rest of Europe: European society 
is crossed by deep interwoven cleavages, in some cases overlapping 
and adding up, transforming difference into conflict (Catholics and 
Protestants, church and state, North and South, etc.). European 
identity, therefore, and its geographic map, correspond not only to 
the institutional divisions, but also to these complex differences (as 
religion, economy, politics, literacy, draw another Europe than the 
official one) that constitute true lines of separation, often even within 
the borders of the nation state (Eder & Giesen, 2001). Due to the 
interplay of a number of factors, a common destiny connects the 
entire Mediterranean, from Gibraltar to the Golden Horn, causing the 
perception of a clear civil inferiority to form / stir in the collective 
consciousness. 
The problem of a cosmopolitan Europe (Beck & Grande, 2004) is 
not the Mediterranean – not least because in this area the most 
significant civilizations, religions, and philosophies, legal codes and 
political regiments were born, including democracy and even the 
sciences. All these different kinds of knowledge and cultural values 
born in the Mediterranean basin (southern Europe, North Africa and 
East) can represent strategic elements to overcome the current crisis 
in Europe, becoming a stimulus for the review of policies and 
providing a solid foundation for the growth of a genuine common 
euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage and knowledge, then passing it 
on to future generations.  
In a society that is constantly changing and where even national 
borders are easily overcome, development must be rethought by 
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shifting the focus from the traditional elements of competitive 
advantage to the new ones are based on objectified knowledge – as 
mentioned above. What becomes peculiar is the “knowledge” and in 
this case the “Mediterranean knowledge” produced within in the past 
centuries and that still find fertile ground (or, better, fertile sea!) for 
further developing knowledge and circulating it within the basin and 
out of it – history teaches us that cultures, arts, philosophies and 
many ideas in it developed have influenced the history of all 
humanity, and in many cases still do.  
Every interaction with objects or with human beings (the meeting 
and / or confrontation with the xenos) implies a transmission of skills 
and knowledge, thus an exchange that becomes an integration 
process for the differences – understood as collective wealth in 
which everyone is recognized and recognizes – without limitations in 
learning paths for each person or prejudices concerning “expert” and 
“profane” knowledge.  
 In this society that differentiates among development processes 
and where the advent of new information technologies has enabled to 
remotely manage highly complex processes, competitive advantage 
is basically in the defence and growth of knowledge. The future is in 
knowledge that remains the main strategic factor of development not 
only for what concerns industry, but also for humanity in its multiple 
dimensions (personal, social and cultural). Knowledge in the form of 
culture and heritage is also one of the privileged areas of the “new 
economy”, the meeting place between culture and territory is one of 
the most valuable opportunities for human and economic 
development.  
The social space is constantly changing and it shows increasing 
complexity, thus raising the need to start thinking about modernizing 
innovation forms with the ability to provide social responses to the 
real needs of citizens and that are moreover capable of combining all 
the resources. The key word is therefore innovation, which goes after 
experimentation and is opposed to conservation; the latter, however, 
should not be understood as a process for maintaining knowledge, 
but rather for maintaining the status quo. However, in order to 
trigger innovation processes rather than conservation ones, we need 
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experimentation, that is the unit of measure of actions, projects, and 
interventions. The best chance of achieving the goals of the said 
actions, projects, and interventions is given by their flexibility and 
adaptability. However, their ultimate success will be mainly a result 
of their sharing and their encompassing of all social actors. This kind 
of process allows the birth of new knowledge from the one already 
established (and from this point of view the Mediterranean is like a 
safe full of treasures!), directing action towards social innovation, 
which in turn enables the establishment of a civil society not 
intended as a mere right but also as a duty, for the establishment of a 
shared knowledge founded on socially approved forms of responsible 
freedom oriented towards common welfare becomes a priority. 
From the starting point of the ancient knowledge of the 
Mediterranean, through different forms of “reflexivity” (at once 
personal, social and cultural), we obtain a new and specific 
knowledge that direct actions towards innovating the relationship 
between man and land, no longer considered as only a right but also 
as a duty, founded every action on the principle of responsibility 
(Jonas, 1979). This knowledge is constructed through learning and 
activation processes (construction of reference models and 
experimentation) orienting actions towards social innovation 
(Murray, Caulier-Grice & Mulgan, 2010), that is, towards new ideas 
(products, services, and models) that meet social needs (more 
effectively than their alternatives) and at the same time create new 
social relationships or new collaborations. 
Social innovation does not mean innovation per se, but rather 
consists of innovation processes triggered by the replacement of 
mechanisms or processes to achieve the same goal, so that people are 
encouraged to organize themselves in order to fulfil old and new 
needs and ensure not only an improving the of quality of life but also 
the protection of the common goods. Social innovation responds to 
certain needs of the citizens, and at the same time it also offers new 
decision and action processes by bringing together the “formal” with 
the “informal” (networking,) supporting and promoting all those 




The higher the level of inclusivity of the process involving all 
members of society, the more innovative practices have a positive 
outcome on the social context. There are indeed no actors and sectors 
more suitable of these for developing social innovation practices. 
Social innovation has a collective and social character: it does not 
result from the imagination of an individual but from activities 
within communities of practice (Manville, 1996) – groups of 
individuals characterized by spontaneous aggregation, both social 
and professional, integrated into learning processes and dealing with 
shared issues with the same requirements (communities are the 
active subject promoting the exchange of experiences and 
encourages actions) – or learning cooperatives (Sharan, 1994) given 
that the need to share information and research projects, to 
coordinate efforts and debate different viewpoints in order to go on is 
quite clear. 
Innovation starts from the “Mediterranean knowledge”, and 
develops until it becomes common practice. These new ideas 
(products, services, and models) make it then possible to meet social 
needs (more effectively than their alternatives) and at the same time 
create new social relationships or new collaborations. Moreover, they 
enable us to rethink the current idea of Europe and the 
Mediterranean. Such reconsideration is the only possible starting 
point on which to lay the foundations for the construction of a real 
and different European identity. The knowledge and cultural values 
of the Mediterranean “must” provide the driving force to overcome 
the impasse impeding the whole of Europe. They can become the 
fruitful stimulus for reviewing European policies (in particular 
integration ones) and provide a solid foundation for the protection 
and promotion of effective cultural heritage and knowledge matching 
up with our times, able to bring out a new future by the legacy of the 
different cultures. 
 
Only Europe able to recognize the Mediterranean its cradle and to return to 
its forgotten suburbs could really its „natural‟ (in geo-historical terms) centre 
of gravity, that sea in which to gaze only with nostalgic regret for the lost 
centrality in world history, but with the proud knowledge to be a „great 
space‟ able to exercise its role of neutralizing conflicts avoiding the danger 
of a clash of civilizations (Resta, 2012: 104). 




However, given that the social actions leading to the exclusion of 
the “Others” can not be eliminated (and this applies to any class of 
subject: foreigners, homosexuals, the disabled, etc.) for both 
relational and socio-cultural factors and without prejudice to the need 
to reduce the effects of exclusion from society, in concluding this 
contribution we must clarify some aspects. 
The relation with “Them”, opposing de-personalization and de-
individualization, allows for the redefinition of information by 
generating a new assessment of the person outside of the 
membership category causing prejudice (Allport, 1954). This does 
not mean that the categories are eliminated, but simply that with the 
onset of a new, less stereotyped categorization process, we overcome 
the rigidity with which we judge (positively or negatively) someone. 
From what said above, it is clear that cultural diversity (Hannerz, 
1996), permeate all social processes and not only because, in 
different contexts, we make contact with people from other 
countries, but more generally on the grounds that the act of the 
relationship, which is a communicative relationship, must take into 
account different roles and cultural levels, and, so communication 
becomes intercultural communication (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 
1988), understood as the negotiation of meanings between “Us” and 
“Them”. 
Today one can not but think of intercultural communication 
(politically correct, to say the least) because it is the only alternative 
to conflict, as it is a dialogic interaction designed to add value to all 
the instances in play and to achieve equilibrium points they are 
recognized by the parties involved – “Us” and “Them”. 
Interculturalism does not happen in society, nor it happens at school 
or in textbooks, but the transformation of the cognitive system of the 
subject can be started by educational processes, so that her reality is 
fulfilled as a synthetic-reinterpretative experience of differences. 
It is a multidimensional process of interaction between subjects 
with different identities, that through their meeting live a deep and 
complex experience, of conflict / hospitality, as a valuable 
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opportunity for the growth of their personal culture, with a view to 
change all that is obstacle to the construction of a new civil society 
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Multicultural Citizenship Needs a  















We Need a ‘Relational Reason’ to Make Different Cultures Meet and 
Build a Common Civic Sphere 
 
1.1. Since being adopted as official policy in several countries, 
the political doctrine of multiculturalism has generated more 
negative than positive effects (social fragmentation, separateness of 
minority groups, and cultural relativism in the public sphere). Today, 
in its place, we speak of inter-culturalism. But this expression too 
seems more or less vague and uncertain. We need to debate the 
possible alternatives to multiculturalism. Interculturalism today is 
subject to many deficiencies because it lacks a proper reflexivity 
within each culture so that it is unable to see and manage the 
relations between cultures. In short, it lacks a relational interface 
between cultures (between the subjects that are bearers of different 
cultures). To get beyond multiculturalism‟s shortcomings and the 
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fragilities of interculturalism, a secular approach to the question of 
coexistence between cultures is needed – one that is capable of 
restoring life to reason through a new semantics of inter-human 
difference/diversity. Making reason more relational could be the best 
way to imagine a new configuration of society that will be able to 
humanize the processes of globalization and the growing migrations. 
 
1.2. How can we approach the growing cultural differences and 
diversity that can be seen in society as a result of globalization? In 
other words: how can we treat those people who are bearers of 
relevant cultural differences or diversity? 
The doctrine of multiculturalism is the answer that has gained the 
biggest foothold in the West, albeit in a variety of forms, for the 
simple fact that it seems to be the most consistent with the liberal 
premises of western democracies. The doctrine of multiculturalism 
was, in fact, born to favor respect, tolerance, and the defense of 
different (minority) cultures. It later morphed into an imaginary 
collective, under which we would be “all different, all equal,” in the 
sense that our differences/diversity are all placed on the same level 
and treated under rules which render them in-different – that is, in 
such a way as to maintain that the meaning and relevance of those 
differences make no difference. From this viewpoint, the doctrine of 
multiculturalism is a coherent consequence of pure neofunctionalism 
– as alleged „scientific approach‟ – when applied to cultural 
dynamics. Differently from classic functionalism (e.g. Durkheim 
conceived of culture as a „moral fact‟), neofunctionalism (e.g. 
Luhmann, 1990) legitimizes cultural anomie in a systemic way (it 
claims that „everything that is possible is allowed‟; in other words, 
ethics and morality are wholly relativized). 
This multiculturalism produces a society characterized by a 
growing pluralization of all cultures, generated not only by 
migrations, but also by the internal dynamics of individual native 
cultures (national, regional or local). In particular, multiculturalism 
erodes the very modern western culture that gave rise to it, which 
loses the rational bases that assured it a certain homogeneity for 
many centuries. Indeed, multicultural ideology justifies new, so-
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called post-modern cultures and lifestyles. The multiplication 
(systematic production) of cultural differences nourishes a social 
order in which the individuals individualize themselves by means of 
the search for an identity that refers to particular social circles that 
privatize the public sphere. 
Since being adopted as official policy in several countries, the 
ideology of multiculturalism has generated more negative than 
positive effects (social fragmentation, separateness of minority 
groups, and cultural relativism in the public sphere). As a political 
doctrine it seems ever more difficult to put into practice. Today, in its 
place, we speak of inter-culturalism. But this expression too seems 
more or less vague and uncertain. In this chapter I will discuss the 
possible alternatives to multiculturalism. We hear speak of 
interculturalism, but interculturalism today is subject to 
insurmountable deficiencies because it presents an insufficient 
internal reflectiveness to individual cultures and it lacks a relational 
interface between cultures (between the subjects that are bearers of 
culture). 
To get beyond multiculturalism‟s shortcomings and the fragilities 
of interculturalism, a secular approach to the question of coexistence 
between cultures is needed – one that is capable of restoring life to 
reason through a new semantics of inter-human difference/diversity. 
Making reason more relational could be the best way to imagine a 
new configuration of society that will be able to humanize the 
processes of globalization and the growing migrations. 
1.3. Multiculturalism is a theory that is reductive of encounter and 
recognition (Gutmann, 1992). At the root of its reasoning, 
multiculturalism expresses the need to find new avenues for the 
recognition of the dignity of the human person when we meet each 
other and perceive the differences/diversity that exist between us. In 
this, multiculturalism reflects what is surely a good thing. The 
assertion that we must recognize the value and the dignity of all 
citizens, independent of their race, ethnicity, language, or religion 
recalls us to the Christian view of secularism in the early days of 
Christianity: that is, the original dignity of every person, prior to and 
apart from every ethnic and cultural belonging, including the fact 
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that the Christian is a citizen like the others. However, even if it is 
true that multiculturalism represents a motive to rethink the 
character, quality, and characteristics of recognition of what is truly 
human, on the other hand it does not provide a sufficient answer to 
these questions. The multicultural solution is lacking because it does 
not succeed in filling the gap between citoyen (citizen) and homme 
(person). To assert that the citizen achieves self-fulfillment in the 
public sphere by means of the policy of human dignity and the 
corresponding legal rights (the policy of universalism), while the 
person achieves fulfillment in his or her own cultural community (the 
policy of difference), leaves empty what exists between these two 
spheres. 
Multiculturalism is ambiguous and ambivalent because, if on the 
one hand it underlines the uniqueness of the human person, on the 
other it renders the person incommunicable from the cultural point of 
view. Certainly its insistence on the radical otherness of the Other, 
which pushes toward a better understanding of what about 
recognition between human beings is different from the recognition 
that a human can give to a non-human entity. The point, however, is 
that multiculturalism promises a recognition that cannot be realized 
because it has a reduced and restricted conception of encounter and 
recognition. Multicultural recognition, in fact, is conceived as the 
unilateral act of a collective mentality that attributes an identity on 
the basis of an self-certification or an identity claim that satisfies 
neither a veritative criterion nor a criterion of recognition 
(appreciation). In social practices, on the other hand, we see that 
recognizing the Other (as an individual, but also as of another 
culture), is a human act if, and only if, it is an act of validation (that 
sees the truth of the Other) inscribed in a circuit of symbolic 
exchanges (gifts). 
Multiculturalism fails to satisfy either of these two requirements. 
In multiculturalism, the act of recognition of an identity does not 
seek out the reasons that legitimate the difference, and does not 
establish that circuit of reciprocal gifts that is necessary to produce 
human civilization. To take this step, multiculturalism must adopt the 
reflectiveness necessary to the processes of recognition. To go 
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beyond the limits of multiculturalism requires the development of a 
reflexive reasoning that is not the technical or scientific reasoning 
that we have inherited from modernity. After deifying reason, the 
Enlightenment ran aground on the shoals of anti-humanism, in which 
reason appears mutilated and twisted. There are two alternatives: 
either we abandon reason as a veritative criterion (of recognition), or 
we make an effort to „widen the range of reason‟. I propose that we 
follow this second course. 
 
 
Widening the Range of Reason in Order to Understand and Manage 
the Borders 
 
2.1. We need to expand the range of reason with (what I call) 
„relational reason‟, as an alternative to multiculturalism and as a way 
of achieving a new common world. 
Which reason should be used to address differences/diversity? 
The search for a new rationality appropriate to encounter and 
recognition between different/diverse people/groups requires 
semantics adequate to understanding and dealing with what makes 
difference and diversity. It is a fact that difference/diversity is, in 
general a mix of faith and reason, of motives of faith and rational 
motives, woven together. In ancient societies, which continue to be 
the benchmark for what is called „classic culture‟, this interweaving 
had a solidity, which materialized in a common ethos (and from here 
the natural law, and the doctrine of a common ethic, which was 
dispelled by the modern public ethic, which is no longer based on a 
shared ethos). Joseph Ratzinger (2003) wrote that: “the original 
relational unity between reason and faith – although never 
unchallenged - has been torn […] Farewell to truth can never be 
definitive […].” In this expression is contained – in my view – the 
keystone of the issue. Nevertheless it must be noted that we are still 
very far from having understood what it means. I cannot pause here 
to discuss whether the laceration was produced (before or after, more 
or less) on the part of reason or on the part of faith. The question on 
which I focus my inquiry is this: what is meant by relational unity 
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between faith and reason, and also between religion and culture? 
Certainly it is the unity of a difference. But how do we understand 
difference? 
I suggest to distinguish three semantics of difference: dialectical, 
binary and relational (see table 1). We must come up with a new 
theory of difference (in personal and social identity) which allows us 
to understand and handle it in a relational way. Since the distinction 
is a reflexive operation, we are directed back to the ways in which 
reflexivity removes and judges differences. I will make three 
fundamental distinctions: dialogical reflexivity, binary reflexivity, 
and relational (triangular) reflexivity. 
(I) The dialectic and dialogical semantics: conceives of difference 
as a margin, a distance, as a point of continuous conflict and 
negotiation, which can find an agreement or not. The cultural 
encounter between Ego and Alter is represented as a relationship at 
the border of their identities where they meet, discuss and try to 
accommodate their differences. The border is a real space, where 
negotiations can take place between Ego and Alter (differently from 
a binary semantics in which the border is conceived as a sharp 
separation, without any chance of successful communication). What 
is „in between‟ the people who meet is a sort of externality for one 
another. At the point of conflict, Ego and Alter remain estranged one 
from the other. The border is polemogenous by definition (i.e. it is 
susceptible to generate war, or, if not war, at least moral strife), 
because it is the object of the will to appropriate it by one or the 
other, the field where one tries to assimilate the other. It has to do 
with seeing which of the two can take possession of it, or, 
alternatively, in what way they can share it or at least turn it into a 
place of exchanges that are the outputs and inputs of one to the other. 
Between Ego and Alter there is no real mutual exchange; rather, 
there is assertion of two identities that stand each facing the other. 
The two may dialogue, but the agreement they may reach is entirely 
fleeting (in sociological terms, it is highly contingent, which means 
that it depends on many variables and can be always possible 
otherwise, i.e. possible in many different ways, including not to be). 
Here, reciprocity does not require the recognition of a common 
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identity. A clear example of this semantics is given by Habermas 
(2002), according to which the common border is defined 
(„constituted‟) by civic values and a dialogue around them (what he 
calls „constitutional patriotism‟). 
 
 
Table 1 - Three semantics of the difference/distinction between Ego and Alter (or 
different cultures) 
 
(II) The binary semantics: conceives of difference as 
discrimination and incommunicability. The border between Ego and 
Alter is a sharp distinction (division), is a separation, an 
irreconcilability, an impossibility of exchanging reciprocal inputs and 
outputs. This semantics stems from the theory of autopoietic and 
autoreferential systems, of mechanical, functional, and automatic 
character (Luhmann, 1995). According to it, culture is a mere by-
product of the communication among people, which consists of 
messages which are disturbances (noise) the one for the other. There 
is no possibility for a common world. What is common is the pure 
and simple common problematization of the world (to love one 
another simply means to recognize that the problems of ego are also 
the problems of alter, and vice versa), seeking to confront the 
paradoxes generated by the functional rationality of the system (in 
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which Ego and Alter act without any chance to influence its 
operating structures). Society here is a paradox because becoming 
fellow (socius) does not mean to share something, but, on the 
contrary, it means to draw binary distinctions that divide some 
people (the in-group) from and against other people (the out-group). 
 (III) The relational semantics: understands difference (the 
distance that separates Ego from Alter) as a social relationship 
(neither a simple border, nor a slash). The relationship is never just 
any, generic relationship, but is always qualified in some way 
(Donati, 2011). It is not a free interaction in the void. Nor is it a mere 
communication. It emerges from a context, and it has a structure 
whose shape is based upon the terms of the relationship, and can 
only come from it. Always under determinate conditions. The 
relationship is constitutive of Ego and Alter’s identities, in the sense 
that the identity of Ego is formed through the relationship with Alter, 
and the identity of Alter is formed through the relationship with Ego. 
The border is an area of conflict, struggle, negotiation, but also of a 
reciprocal belonging, which is constitutive of them both. The unity of 
the difference is a relational unity, that is, it is the unity of a real 
differentiation that exists because of reciprocal reference to a 
common belonging with respect to which Ego and Alter differentiate 
their own Selves. From here begins the recognition of a real 
otherness (and not - as many scholars claim – the recognition of an 
Alter-Ego, which is in fact an Alter as imagined, represented, 
depicted by Ego). 
The recognition of authentic otherness does not coincide with 
total strangeness toward the other, because relationship bespeaks 
distance, and even separation in some respects, but at the same time 
bespeaks sharing. The sharing is not between two mirror images, but 
between two distinct, unique entities. These entities, while they 
maintain their impenetrability without synthesis, reveal themselves 
by reference to a reality that joins them, their humanity, for example. 
The otherness is not irreconcilable contradiction, in the degree to 
which the Other is perceived as another Self and “Oneself (is 
perceived) as Another” (Ricoeur, 1992). But this other Self is not the 
same (idem); rather it is unique (ipse). If Ego and Alter coincided and 
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could be assimilated one with the other (idem), the relationship 
would vanish. If, on the other hand, the relationship was entirely 
external to Ego and Alter, the result would fall into the two prior 
cases (semantics I and II). Cultural confrontation must therefore look 
at the relationship that is constitutive of Ego and Alter, though 
differently for each. The cultural difference can and must be seen as 
a different way to understand and configure this relationship, without 
being able to conceive of it as destined to a dialectical synthesis after 
the manner of Hegel.  
 
2.2. Sociology has still to understand the emergence of a 
relational semantics in the complex of citizenship (Donati, 2016). 
western culture has, until today, used the first two semantics 
(dialectical and binary), oscillating between the two. My conviction 
is that, in the climate of globalization, and in the wake of the flawed 
experience of multiculturalism, the third semantics is emerging. The 
third semantics, that of relational difference, interprets and 
understands cultural differences insofar as they are generated in 
reference to a common world (that which includes both Ego and 
Alter). The common world differentiates itself and is re-generated 
(re-differentiated) through forms of „relational differentiation,‟ that 
is, of differences that are generated by different ways of articulating 
the founding relationships shared by the people involved in a context 
(not the functions, the roles – that which is institutionally prescribed, 
as a specialization of actors and performances). 
Secularism is the motive that justifies cultural pluralism, when it 
springs from the social relationships amongst human beings. 
Properly speaking, the secularity of the state does not consist in the 
fact that the state authorizes religious freedom, let alone rules based 
on political principles, like that of the juridical equality of religious 
denominations (this is entirely different from the equality of persons 
under the law, which is a fundamental principle). The state can be 
called secular in so far as it limits itself to recognizing the original 
liberty of persons in professing their faith, and it claims for its own 
those values and rules that emerge in a shared way from the public 
debated between the religions on the basis of rational argument. To 
P. Donati 
54 
go deeper into this point it is necessary to recall the relational 
semantics that allows us to see the unexplored aspects of human 
rationality: relational reason. What does it consist of? 
 
 
Relational Reason: Expanding Reason through Social Relationships 
 
Relational rationality is the faculty by which the human person 
sees the reasons (the good motives) inherent to inter-human social 
relationships (not to individuals as individuals, nor to social or 
cultural systems). Certainly the being-together of different cultures 
stimulates the deepening of rational (axiological) individual choices, 
within individual reflexivity. But this does not suffice to configure 
the „inter‟ (what lies in between different cultures) as a social 
relationship. To turn the inter into a common world, the public 
sphere requires a rationality that takes into account the differentiation 
between cultures as a relational differentiation (Donati, 2011). In 
other words, cultural identities are different for the different ways in 
which they interpret and live their relationship to values that are 
common to the human beings. The way refers to the instrumental and 
normative dimensions of reason, as well as concrete aims, while the 
values refer to the axiological (or teleological) dimensions of reason. 
The so-called policies of equality of differences, that neutralize 
relationships or render them indifferent, can only generate new 
differences, which find no rational solution, but only new forms of 
dialectic or separation. 
The example of the inter-ethnic relationship speaks very well to 
this. If ethnicity is considered from the perspective of equality of 
individual opportunities, cultural identities are rendered indifferent, 
because their relationship has no reasons of its own to affirm and 
foster. It no longer makes sense to speak of different ethnic cultures, 
because their relationship has been cancelled out. From the relational 
perspective, on the other hand, only if we assert rights to differences 
(of relationships!) can we find human values (and rights). 
To make social relationships indifferent, canceling out the discrete 
reasons that inhere in the identity of each specific kind of 
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relationship, is to annihilate the value of relationships as sui generis 
reality. It is to nullify the principle of appreciation that the 
relationship contains. 
Relationship is what – at the same time – joins, differentiates, and 
diversifies. For example, the relationship of friendship joins two 
persons in a circle of symbolic exchanges, while it differentiates 
them with respect to what they can reciprocally give themselves to, 
and it diversifies them with regard to the quality of the friendship.  
The reasons that are inherent to human relationships correspond 
to the dignity of the human person. They are latent and have 
morphogenetic potential. To sustain an interculturalism capable of 
creating consensus on fundamental human values it is necessary to 
adopt a relational paradigm able to see and articulate the reasons that 
give shape to the inter-human, to that which is „between‟ individuals. 
The right to life, the right of a child to a family, the right to an 
education worthy of a human being, the right to work, to a healthy 
environment, and so on, are all relational rights, because they are 
rights to relationships (rather than to things or performances). 
Relationships have their own reasons, which the individuals involved 
may not even be explicitly (linguistically, conversationally) aware of, 
but which they comprehend to the extent of the type and degree of 
reflexivity they have; that is, to the extent to which they manage to 
see the reasons behind the relationships that human realities imply. 
The cultural mediation which is often talked about can only 
overcome the obstacles of prejudice and intolerance if people 
succeed in reasonably bringing values together, and giving them 
relational rationales.  
Relational reason validates, rather than hides, differences. 
Precisely in this way it is capable of moving beyond the ancient 
configurations of relations between cultures (that is, the segmented 
differentiation in primitive societies, the stratified differentiation of 
cultures in premodern societies, and the functional differentiation of 
early modernity), which are all forms of differentiation incapable of 
arriving at shared public reason in a globalized society. 
Relational reason gives us an alternative to relational 
differentiation, which in application signifies the creation of a public 
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sphere that is religiously qualified, in that religions have a role in 
defining public reason, because they orient people toward a reflexive 
understanding of their cultural elaborations in their life-worlds.  
This reflexive understanding supports and nourishes an expansion 
of reason. It is a way to get beyond modern western rationality, 
which stopped at the threshold of the distinction between 
instrumental and substantial reasoning. According to this distinction, 
the relationship to value (Wertbeziehung in Max Weber‟s theory) is 
non-rational, because values themselves are non-rational (from the 
Weberian viewpoint). Relational reason tells us the opposite. It 
indicates the different ways in which it is possible for Ego to relate to 
values, as it relates to the Other, not on the basis of purely subjective 
factors (sentiments, mood, emotions, irrational preferences) or 
acquired habits, but on that of reasons that are neither things, nor 
rules of exchange, but are goods (values) connected to the quality of 
present and future relationships. These are what I call „relational 
goods‟ (Donati, 2015). I propose that we take a new and radical look 
at the theory of rationality proposed by Max Weber, which 
profoundly (and negatively) conditioned the social thought of the 
twentieth century. 
Rationality cannot be reduced to the two modalities put forward 
by Max Weber – that is means-end, or instrumental rationality 
(Zweckrationalität) and value/belief-oriented rationality 
(Wertrationalität). To reduce human rationality to these two concepts 
is an operation dense with ambiguity and can be a source of great 
confusion. Zweckrationalität deals with the calculation of means to 
achieve an end, but ends can also become means, until it is no longer 
possible to distinguish what is a means and what is an end. The 
concept is unusable. Wertrationalität refers to a value subjectively 
understood by the social actor, but that value may be a good in itself, 
or a personal taste/preference. The reformulation of the Weberian 
distinction between instrumental and value-oriented rationality 
undertaken by various authors - for example Parsons (1951) and 
Alexander (1995) which translated them respectively as instrumental 
and normative rationality -, has been unsatisfying and insufficient. 
I propose a redefinition of rationality as a faculty of human 
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behavior that has four components or modalities.  
(I) First, instrumental rationality deals with efficiency, and involves 
the means, therefore the adaptive dimension of thinking and acting 
(rationality of efficiency); its analytic counterpart is the economic 
sphere, and its empirical, macrostructural counterpart is the market.  
(II) Second, goal-oriented rationality refers to situated objectives, 
and regards the achievement of defined goals and goal-attainment 
(rationality of efficacy); its analytic counterpart is the sphere of 
power, and its empirical, macrostructural counterpart is the political 
system (the state).  
(III) Third, the properly values-oriented dimension of reason, which 
corresponds to the distinction-guideline that points toward what is 
good in itself, what is an end in itself, what has worth in itself (that 
which lies at the depths of the ultimate concerns of the actor, which 
some call ultimate values in the sense of ultimate realities). That is, 
the rationality of value as good in itself; the rationality of that which 
has a dignity that is neither instrumental nor goal-oriented (value 
rationality or axiological rationality, or W.r derationalität, or the 
rationality of dignity). It is important here to understand clearly that, 
in what I call value-oriented rationality, the value is not a situated 
goal that has a price, but is a good without price, that no money can 
buy. Value-oriented rationality is not dependent upon the situation. It 
is inherent to the dignity of all which deserves respect and 
recognition, because it is distinctively human (as opposed to the non-
human or in-human). Therefore, it regards in the first place the 
human person as such (and not because an individual behaves in a 
particular way). As an analytic counterpart it has the sphere of good 
in itself or for itself, the symbolic reference – and what is non-
negotiable – to that which characterizes the good or a person and 
distinguishes that person from all the others. The empirical, 
macrostructural correlate of value-oriented rationality is the religious 
system – religion understood as a cultural fact distinct from faith 
(which transcends culture).  
(IV) Fourth, the integrative dimension of reason, which integrates 
among themselves the other dimensions of rationality (value, goal-
attainment, and means) through ethical and moral normativity, and 
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assures the autonomy of rationality against other kinds of actions and 
social relationships; I call this relational rationality (or 
Beziehungsrationalität), or nomic rationality (what is rational in the 
nomos, that is) in the norms of division and distribution, which at the 
same time divide and connect the parts in relation. Social 
relationships have reasons that belong neither to individuals nor to 
social systems. Reasons which the individuals and the systems may 
not know about, and in fact do not possess. As an analytic correlate, 
this dimension takes the sphere of social bonds, and as an empirical, 
macrostructural correlate, civil society inasmuch as it is an 
associational world. 
The four dimensions of reason (instrumental, goal-oriented, 
values-oriented, and relational) make up a complex of reason, or 
human reason as a complex faculty. From this angle, every 
component is essential so that human reason emerges in its fullness, 
be it as a theoretical faculty or a practical one. The actions of 
recognizing, understanding, explaining and seeking what is rational 
are all needs of the complex faculty of human reason, as seen from 
the relational perspective. 
From the sociological perspective, reason is a faculty that exists 
as an emerging social phenomenon. There is no such thing as a 
purely individual rationality, in the sense of a faculty cut off from 
social relationships. Reason is a faculty that emerges from the 
workings of its constitutive elements, each of which has its own 
characteristics. The faculty which we call human reason is generated 
as an emergent effect of the togetherness, interaction, and 
interchange between the four fundamental dimensions that comprise 
it. Encounter and recognition are relational goods not because, as 
some believe, they carry with them a particular human warmth, or a 
feeling of good will, or a special pathos (elements that in any event 
have their own weight and importance), but because they realize a 
relationship upon which depend the goods of those who participate in 
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Rethinking the Issue of a Multicultural Citizenship in a Relational 
Framework 
 
4.1. The contemporary challenge of multiculturalism is different 
from the past and therefore must be thought of in a different context 
and under different historical circumstances. The context is marked 
by the systemic processes of globalization. Conditions are marked by 
the problematization of every civilization. 
In this scenario, also migrations are assuming a cultural meaning 
different from the past. Migrations do not mean any more the transfer 
of individuals and social groups from a relatively stable culture to 
another culture endowed with a stable identity. Generally speaking, 
just the opposite is true. Migration is more and more a risky process 
which spreads from the uprooting in the place of departure and the 
uprooting in the place of arrival.  
If one wants to produce a meaningful multicultural society, one 
should be well aware that cultures do not share the same capabilities 
in producing an inter-cultural dialogue. We should at least distin-
guish between two forms: 
a)  traditional pre-modern cultures, which are unable - or have 
scarce resources - to confront themselves with other cultures; it can 
be a matter of cultures which consider themselves as unique and/or 
superior, or cultures which have no idea of cultures others than them-
selves; here the concept of ethnicity prevails over that of race, which 
is in fact a later construction. 
b)  modernizing cultures, which do have in themselves a principle of 
distinction from other cultures (and in general among cultures); since 
they rely upon such a distinction, they elaborate a particular dialectic 
universalism/particularism or cosmopolitism/localism; this is pre-
cisely the case of cultures stemming from Jewish and Christian roots; 
but, even in these cultures, today the concept of ethnicity meets an 
increasing erosion and is replaced by other concepts, like social cate-
gory (instead of race), which are used in a rational and strategic 
manner in order to produce further distinctions. 
 
4.2. Western culture is nowadays characterized by not by a proc-
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ess of rationalization, as Max Weber has suggested, but by the fact 
that it brings the dialectic of cultural differences to the maximum of 
paroxysm. The entrance into after(or trans)-modernity is marked by 
the following traits: (i) the crisis of the universalism typical of west-
ern modernity, and (ii) the emphasis on new distinctions which are 
used to re-elaborate (i.e. manipulate) cultural differences, irrespec-
tive of their traditional meanings.  
It is at this point that we ask ourselves: is modernity only an un-
finished project or is it an utopian project which cannot be accom-
plished? In the latter case what will take on the project of modernity?  
Since the XVIII century (Montesquieu, Kant, Rousseau) the at-
tempts to reconcile the tears generated by the process of moderniza-
tion have heavily relied on citizenship. These efforts have been based 
upon two kinds of operations: 1. the opening of a public sphere, and 
at the same time 2. the attempt to free the human subject by using the 
distinction citoyen/homme so to permit a wide range of subjective 
choices (the human subject has been put into fluctuation while the 
citizen has been more and more restrained). 
Today we are still witnessing the same trend. Mainstream politi-
cal ideas try to solve the issues of a multicultural society by means of 
state citizenship, i.e. through processes of progressive inclusion in 
the system of social guarantees geared by the state. This happens at 
the very moment in which such practices show increasing failures.  
In order to look for a new universalism, perhaps it could be more 
convenient to recall the problem of the relationship between homme 
and citoyen. 
Is it plausible that this distinction - and the relations it contains - 
can be brought again on to the historical scene?  
Certainly the kind of universalism we are looking for can be nei-
ther naïfe nor idealistic, as it has been in the past. It can be supposed 
to spring neither as a natural drift nor as a spontaneous generation of 
value patterns (eigen-values). There is no alternative to a cultural 
elaboration of what is and should be universal in social life of human 
beings. For this purpose, it can be helpful to think that, contrary to 
the major strand of modernity, „the universal‟ can be differentiated, 
i.e. we can produce new distinctions within and between the same 
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universal symbols, such as citizenship, family, human identity, or 
whatever. But, in order to do that, we need a relational approach 
which can be able to avoid both the separation and the conflation be-
tween and within the different forms of „the universal‟. In particular, 
such an approach is needed when we must cope with the issue of re-
lating the citizen and the human person to each other. 
 
4.3. All the forms of universalism which we know up today show 
serious shortcomings in contributing to the solution of multicultural 
issues: 
-  what we call substantive or comprehensive universalism runs the 
risk of imposing a particularistic (i.e. western) version of human 
rights; 
-  universalism practiced as a mere convention or contract is not a 
solution, for those who adopt it end up with forms of cultural regres-
sion; 
-  functional universalism is more and more revealing itself as a 
technology, not as a cultural solution, since it finds itself lacking a 
value pattern which shall give meaning and legitimation to the social 
system; 
-  deliberative universalism appears to be dependent upon condi-
tions and stipulations which presuppose value patterns. 
We need to pursue a new road to a possible human universalism. 
Personally I would call this road relational universalism, which is 
characterized by the fact that it puts its directive distinction neither in 
the individual as such (with the request of some change in the „self‟), 
nor in the social structure as such (with the formulation of some pro-
ject of social engineering), but in the management of social relations 
as such. The assumption is that social relationships constitute human 
persons as well as social institutions. It is in the social relationship - 
with its human requisites - that we can look for, and find out, „the 
universal‟. 
Such an universalism must be conceived of as an adequate man-
agement of cultural differences understood as memberships which, 
contrary to modern citizenship, are meaningful and relevant to the 
new complex of societal (not nation-state) citizenship. Instead of re-
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lying upon the habitus of coining labels (as P. Bourdieu does), it 
must look at the capabilities of people to act reflexively upon each 
other through the activation of a discourse on what is human (Archer, 
2000). It must delegitimize the concept of race as a representation 
useful to and meaningful for the handling of social relations, i.e. for 
the recognition of what is human. 
Relational universalism is not a form of syncretism. It is neither a 
bridge, nor a mixture. It requires to put oneself on such a level of 
discourse as to produce a different observation: how to find the uni-
versal not in the abstract, but in the particular (a place, a single per-
son) and vice versa, so not to reduce anything to something else. It is 
precisely the opposite of reduction and colonization. 
Now, the challenge of the postmodern age is that, differently from 
the modern, it includes the possibility to differentiate the universal: 
human beings can be similar by being different. At the political level, 
this perspective is not far from the idea of „complex equality‟ (or 
complex citizenship) put forward by Walzer (1983). At the cultural 
level, the idea of relational universalism emphasizes the detachment 
from what has been called the neutral power of modernity, i.e. the 
tendency to neutralize „coloured‟ identities. 
Relational universalism is not very far from the idea of a multiple 
citizenship, as a political arrangement which can recognize multiple 
loyalties. It can be a substitute for an abstract idea of citizenship 
(„universal‟ in so far as it is thought of as worldwide or suprana-
tional) as it is envisaged in the Kantian ethics and in many contem-
porary authors (such as Eder, 1993; Habermas, 2002 and others): the 
universality (and solidity) of the ‘universal’ can and must be exer-
cised in the multiplicity of the loyalties which define a situation (uni-
tas multiplex). 
We need a complex of citizenship which can be able to produce a 
high degree of social differentiation and integration both in the inter-
nal and external relationships of each human person. 
 
4.4. The idea that citizenship (or a political order) can solve the 
problems of cultural conflicts - and in particular racist attitudes and 
behaviours - through the inclusion of people into the welfare state 
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can stand or collapse. It depends on the chances that citizenship has 
to get a cultural elaboration able to produce empathic forms of cul-
tural differentiation, having in mind what is properly human in social 
relations. 
Only if our society will succeed in putting its cultural focus on in-
ter-human relations, neither on individuals nor social structures as 
such, we can hope to avoid the dramatic clashes of civilizations 
which are brought about by false universalisms. 
Today the search for a new citizenship is more and more pursued 
through the request of a new „politics of difference‟. This request 
emphasizes the process of differentiation, but puts in danger the inte-
grative forces of society. It can become useful only to the extent that 
it can be managed in a relational way (this means for instance that a 
quota system should be excluded, since it leads to segmentation and 
segregation). 
As an example we can look at educational policies in Sweden in 
the area of minorities and immigrants, by referring both to formal 
decisions and their implementation. Swedish educational policies 
have met three distinctive periods. The first period (roughly in be-
tween the early 30‟s and the late 60‟s) was characterized by the as-
sumption that school mainly serves state interest and therefore loy-
alty to the state should be imposed on citizens irrespective of their 
ethnic membership. In the second period (1970-1989), school policy 
was assumed to serve individual rights within the context of state 
regulation and participatory democratic procedures; this has involved 
conflicts both between state and local school authorities and between 
these authorities and immigrant groups. Cultural and linguistic diver-
sity were still conceived as possible only within a general context of 
individual solidarity to state citizenship. In the third period, begin-
ning with the 90‟s, a new approach has been adopted, which is char-
acterized by free choice within a context of group initiative and mar-
ket mechanisms under democratic rule (in what is expected to be-
come later on an ethnic democracy) (Peled, 1993). This approach al-
lows a greater recognition of minorities and ethnic diversity, particu-
larly in schools (for instance the teaching of many languages instead 
of one language - the home language -). Within and through this new 
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approach, which is also a politics of recognition, the citizenship of 
multiple loyalties become a possible alternative pattern in many ar-
eas of social life.. 
 
 
To Conclude  
 
The inclusion of ethnic minorities into the complex of state citi-
zenship, even when policies of affirmative discrimination are consid-
ered, has come to its limits. Ethnic groups need a model of mobilisa-
tion which must go well beyond the ideology of „participation‟. New 
forms of ethnic mobilisation are an essential requirement for a multi-
cultural society. They can be addressed towards many different goals 
and can adopt many different styles of social, economic and cultural 
policies, including forms of class mobilisation and/or forms of lob-
bysm or poly-corporatism. All these forms have their own rationale 
as to what it means to strive for a „possible universalism‟. 
To me, there is another chance, which I would like to call the mo-
bilisation for a relational society. It implies peculiar association 
styles among individuals and social groups within and between eth-
nic identities, under the heading of what I call relational universal-
ism. The latter is based upon what connects (relates) the citizen and 
the human being, as well as the public and the private sphere, in a 
complex of societal citizenship where intermediary social networks 
are developed as sources of a new societal community, producing a 
normative pluralism together with relational goods. The rationale for 
such a perspective basically consists in the opening of new chances 
able to avoid all kinds of hegemonic universalism as well as all kinds 
of relativism. It can help us to learn what it is like - in poet Emily 
Dickinson‟s words – “to dwell in possibility”, i.e. the possibility to 
have migrations without all the human hardship stemming from na-
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Il Mediterraneo non è solo geografia. 
I suoi confini non sono definiti né nello spazio né nel tempo. Non sappiamo 
come fare a determinarli e in che modo: sono irriducibili alla sovranità o al-
la storia, non sono né statali né nazionali: somigliano al cerchio di gesso 
che continua ad essere descritto e cancellato, che le onde e i venti, le impre-
se e le ispirazioni allargano o restringono. Lungo le coste di questo mare 
passava la via della seta, s‟incrociavano le vie del sale e delle spezie, degli 
olii e dei profumi, dell‟ambra e degli ornamenti, degli attrezzi e delle armi, 
della sapienza e della conoscenza, dell‟arte e della scienza. Gli empori elle-
nici erano a un tempo mercati e ambasciate. Lungo le strade romane si dif-
fondevano il potere e la civiltà. Dal territorio asiatico sono giunti i profeti e 
le religioni. Sul Mediterraneo è stata concepita l‟Europa (Matvejevic, 2007, 
p. 18). 
 
Se gli europei vorranno costruire il proprio futuro, dovranno cessare di 
pensarsi come il fianco orientale dell‟impero atlantico. Ma per fare questo 
essi devono rivedere il proprio rapporto con il Mediterraneo. Devono farlo 
in modo del tutto nuovo, pensando non da soli, ma insieme a tutti gli altri 
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soggetti politici e culturali che si affacciano sulle rive di questo mare, a co-
minciare dai popoli arabi (Cassano, 2007a, p. 31). 
 
Un‟analisi che colloca il Mediterraneo di nuovo al centro di una civiltà che, 
via via ramificandosi, assorbe i contributi di altre civiltà e restituisce 
all‟umanità le ragioni di un nuovo equilibrio internazionale. Il Mediterra-
neo non più bacino secondario, superato e messo in disparte dall‟evoluzione 
del mondo o dal declino dei popoli rivieraschi, bensì ancora snodo determi-
nante di una nuova civilizzazione fondata sugli scambi globali e 
sull‟integrazione fra Occidente e Oriente (Folli, 2008, p. VII). 
 
In ordinary times as well, institutional thinking holds great value on a vari-
ety of fronts. It injects a concern for something more than the claims of per-
sonal power and temporary advantage. With at least some people around 
you who are thinking institutionally, there is a greater chance of being told 
what you need to hear ragher than simply what you want to hear. Institu-
tional thinking also helps protect against the willful ignorance called pre-
sentism – the arrogant privileging of one‟s own little moment in time. Insitu-
tional thinking transforms the past into memory, which is a way of keeping 
alive what is meaningful in the qualitative significance of our experiences. 
Because it is attentive to rule-following rather than personal strategies to 
achieve personal ends, thinking institutionally enhances predictability in 
conduct. Predictability in turn can enhance trust, which can enhance recip-
rocating loyalty, which can facilitate bargaining, compromise, and fiduciary 
relationships. All this is a chain of relationships that amounts to a civilized 
way for people to live together (Heclo, 2008, p. 188). 
 
Nous pensons... que, par sa place dans l‟histoire de la philosophie et par les 
focalisations qui sont les siennes, Strauss offre des perspectives étonnement 
nouvelles pour penser la crise de notre temps (Pelluchon, 2005, p. 9) 
 
Il faut reconnaitre que Strauss est plus originel et plus intempestif que ne le 
disent à la fois ses détracteurs et ceux qui se réclament de lui pour justifier 
une politique qui prétend imposer le meilleur régime. Loin d‟aboutir à la 
condamnation des Lumières, sa critique de la modernité conduit à d‟autres 
Lumières. Mais pour voir en quel sens Strauss est un philosophe éclairé et 
comprendre son invitation à réactualiser le pensée classique, il convient de 
mettre l‟accent sur la véritable ligne de démarcation entre les Anciennes et 
les Modernes et de considérer les ruptures qui ont eu lieu à un certain mo-
ment de l‟histoire d‟Occident. Cette radicalité du questionnement philoso-
phique fait défaut aux successeurs de Strauss et à la plupart de ses contem-
porains... il s‟agit de revenir au coeur du problème, au rationalisme (Pellu-
chon 2005, p. 277). 
 




When I was a student of the Faculty to Political Sciences in the 
late Sixsties of last Century I have been, for some years, a militant of 
the European Federalist Movement created by Altiero Spinelli. In 
those days we were quarelling with others who were more radical: 
they were followers of Albertini (the editor of a journal called “il 
Federalista [the Federalist]). Both those groups were in favour of a 
new Europe to be build beyond the National States: a Political Union 
of a new kind (Spinelli) or a Federal State modelled on the U.S.A. 
(Albertini). 
Que reste-t-il of those ideas and projects? I must admit: practi-
cally nothing! 
In the last 20 years I have been very active in promoting various 
forms of scientific cooperation: european ones and, as well, interna-
tional ones. While young researcher are, generally, very pleased to 
participate to those projects (specially at the beginning of their ca-
reer, in the first years, when the best researcher were active in asking 
to participate), scientists are less interested and most of them tend to 
think that the best countries where to go, for spending some time for 
research or teaching activities, are the U.S. and Canada. 
Working hard, as we have done in the last five years – in the con-
text of the Erasmus Mundus programme – to foster the Bologna and 
the Lesbon processes of universities’ reform and change I must admit 
that it is not easy to convince Colleagues in activating the “good 
practices” which are needed. Why? 
Laziness, could be one answer. National proud another answer, 
for some. But in most cases real reasons are others: burocratic rigid-
ity, which nowadays it is called “governance of the system” is an 
important one. Another is the spreading at large – not only in Europe 
but, as well, all over the world - of what could be called the new cul-
ture for higher education studies. This new culture – which has its 
origin during the Sixties in the U.S., see the Allan Bloom’s book, 
The Closing of the American Mind (1987) – has three interconnected 




Students are becoming – more and more – customers and as such 
are treated (and kept at a distance!); they are not anymore learning 
young people; that’s why dormitories are beginning to be more im-
portant than classrooms. 
In this context there is a small place for European-ness. There is 
a small place for thinking and working on new ideas, new institu-
tional process to go beyond national stereotypes, to create something 
new which could be not only European Union but a Federal Europe. 
Stereotypes between North and South, West and East are still very 
strong and rooted: they do not come out openly because political cor-
rectness is becoming stronger and stronger. 
So, from my “observatory” much southern and much Mediterra-
nean, I can say that nowadays not only they have practically disap-
peared those small but influential political groups or mouvements 
who were actively working for the Unification of Europe. Conceiv-
ing a new and original political model: a federal democracy able to 
overcome the imperial conceptions which had been cultivated and 
practiced not only by the U.S. but also by European Countries like 
England and France, Belgium and the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain, Denmark and Sweden (and, at last, also by Germany and It-
aly). 
Not only there are no more those avantgardes, but there is little 
left of what it has been, for quite a long time at least in countries like 
Italy, of that pro-Europe sentiment which, in a sense, has been the 
premise for thinking a new innovative role of Europe in the interna-
tional arena: as a pole for better intercultural communication policies 
or for the convergence of cultures, the hybridization of ethnic groups, 
the integration of migrants. 
 
 
The Mediterranean Legacy 
 
The Mediterranean legacy is a complex ensemble of ideas, im-
ages, feelings which have been cultivted for centuries and are still 
cultivated in this “sea (not ocean) in between the earths”; which has 
been called by the ancient Romans mare nostrum and which could be 
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called again in that way if – as Franco Cassano (Cassano, 2007a; 
2007b) has argued – we understand nostrum with a totally different 
meaning: as referred to us, the humans. 
Evoking and thinking of the Mediterranean legacy means begin-
ning to think alternatives to the actual state of the things of the world 
and of Europe. 
Going back to the disasters produced in the XIX century, by gi-
acobinism and colonialism, by the ideologies of science and pro-
gress; and, in the XX century the disasters produced by the European 
civil war (1914-1945) and by the “cold war” (1948-1989), by the 
ideologies of the “end of history” and the “clash of civilizations”. 
And beginning to think at the “historical existence” of humans in 
a totally different way. Reinventing new categories in the place of 
the dominant ones: like the given for granted dualism between open 
and closed societies, simple and complex societies, or antiques and 
modern times; or North and South or East and West civilizations. 
In order to do this kind of work – this new way of thinking the 
world – we can use the researches and the intellectual work made by 
prominent scholars which are quoted in my bibliography: like Gino 
Germani (1991), Jack Goody (2006), Remi Brague (1999; 2005) and 
Franco Cassano (2007b). They are my starting points. 
 
 
ANNEX 1 - Applied Knowledge and the Social Relevance of Sociol-
ogy in the Mediterranean 
 
THE OPENING OF MEDITERRANEAN MINDS 
Towards a geo-sociological approach for Mediterranean Studies 
 
“My argument, then, is the product of an anthropologist‟s (or 
comparative sociologist‟s) reaction to „modern‟ history [..] . 
But what is required is more careful comparison, not a crude 
contrast of East and West, which always finally turns in favour 
of the latter” (Goody, 2006, pp. 3-4). 
 
Time has come, for us as comparative sociologists, to start think-
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ing “The Mediterranean Mind” as a more comprehensive way of 
conceiving and understanding Modernity and Post-Modernity. An 
alternative to the dominant way of thinking globalization and the so-
called “information society”: the once called European and now 
called western, but, in reality: anglo-saxons in the XIX century and 
nowdays North-American and North-European. 
The Mediterranean Mind is a new idea with ancient, long and 
large, roots. An idea which connects, or could connect persons and 
peoples who have in common places and cultures which have been 
called western or eastern, northern or southern but are components, 
nothwithstanding their differences, of one civilization which has 
been called, many, many years before the modern times, humana 
civilitas. 
Since the end of the so-called second world war many things have 
changed and as humans we are not yet totally aware of conse-
quences for our future. 
The social role of territories has changed dramatically. Not only 
people can move and travell in much easiest and unexspensive ways, 
but a growing number of persons can build their identities with mul-
tiple sens of belonging: travelling and, at the same time, longing to a 
homeland. The word “geo” came back, and geo-politics is important 
again, and geo-culture or geo-communication as well. All these 
changes have open the road to new opportunities for multipolarity 
and gives again chances to territories which have been condemned to 
marginality. 
It is in a general context of unexpected consequences coming 
from epocal changes that the Mediterranean gaze is back with us and 
the opening of new Mediterranean minds becomes possible. 
Thinking to Mediterranean minds means opening eyes and ears to 
many directions across space and time: from ancient and southern 
cultures and peoples who arrived in the Mediterranean 3.000 years 
ago to the 5 or 6 main linguistic and geo-cultural groups that created 
that way of looking around and thinking things of the world that 
most of us, as comparative sociologists, are able to identifie as 
“mediterranean”. And, then, we should think to those people and cul-
tures who, more recently, by travelling and migrating, found them-
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selves in many other countries of the world: not only in Brazil and 
Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela (and in all other countries in Latin 
America) but also in Asia and Africa, in Australia and Canada, in the 
United States and Northern Europe. 
In a certain sense all the world is implicated and interested in the 
possible meanings connected with the Mediterranean gaze. (Like 
italian sociologists who are doing research around the world trying to 
understand ways of living and thinking of italian origin persons – the 
so-called Italics – have learned in recent years.) The kernel is obvi-
ously in the geo-space which includes Southern Europe, the Balcans, 





1. Since the end of the so-called “Second World War” many became 
aware of the possibility of extinction for human life in the world. Not 
only because of the “invention” of nuclear, chemical and other mass 
destroying weapons but also for what it looks to some of us the in-
creasing inhability of humans to rule themselves (starting from 
prominent sociologist Norbert Elias). 
2. After the end of the so-called “Cold War” and the collapse of 
communism in the Soviet Union misleading “theories”, and mislead-
ing readings of them, began to circulate in the world creating a lot of 
confusion: from the Fukuyama’s (1992) optimistic “end of history” 
theory to Huntington’s (1993) pessimistic “clash of civilizations” 
theory. 
3. Others suggested recently the need for strong reaction (Girard 
2008) to what has been called (Delpech 2005) the risk of the western 
world going back to the old “barbarian” way of thinking (before the 
invention of culture and communication): looking the other way and 
pretending not to understand what is going on: closing eyes and ears. 
Others suggested for Europe “the Roman way” (Brague 1999; 2005) 
while others are quarreling dividing themselves (unilateralists vs 
multilaterists, neoconservatives vs neorealists…) on the way to fight 
the so-called “war on terrorism” which has been considered by some 
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the “IV world war” and by others not even a war being “the terrorist” 
a new incarnation of “the partisan” (Schmitt, 1963). 
 
 
B. Ipothesis for Discussion 
 
1. The starting point is the building of a new idea about what can be 
called “The Mediterranean approach” or the “Mediterranean mind”. 
Sociology could be the starting point of the process needed; the kind 
of sociology that Pierre Bourdieu (2006; 2008) had in mind in the 
last period of his life: not only “a sport de combat” but also a “new 
unified science”, apt to keep together - with a strong epistemological 
break, a kind of “conversion du regard” - not only the social sciences 
and the humanities but also the physical and biological sciences. A 
“new science” which has something to share with the ideas of the 
Neapolitan XVIII century philosopher Giambattista Vico when he 
postulated, in opposition to Cartesio, a “scienza nova”. 
2. In order to move in the above sketched direction, understanding 
what it could mean, it is important to start thinking around 3 main 
ideas: 
2.1. the open concept of Mediterranean that has been cultivated by 
prominent people of the past, one of them has been Albert Camus 
(Judt, 2008); 
2.2. the “long durée” approach to the history of humana civilitas: 
putting apart ideas like western and eastern; and re-thinking the ideas 
of modernity and secularization; 
2.3. the new concept of territoriality that can be built with the help of 
the geo-sociological approach to most recent changes in geo-politics 
and international relations. 
3. Going through the above lines of thinking. I reach these 3 main 
conclusions: 
3.1. The Mediterranean world has not been the cradle of western 
civilization but a place where – for more than 2000 years – people 
coming from different places of the world (who did not call them-
selves neither “nations” neither “races”) met and hybridized. Build-
ing a human civilization in ways that although were different in some 
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aspects in relations to other human civilizations located in central 
and eastern Asia or in Southern Africa were not opposed to them. 
Nor the unified aspects of the so-called “Roman Empire” or “Helle-
nistic Age” or, latter on, the “Christian World” nor the conflicts or 
wars that existed (even for long periods of time) were able to cancel 
cultural specificities of different towns and places, traditions and re-
ligions. For centuries and centuries wars had nothing to do with the 
kind of wars which aroused after the XVI century. 
3.2. The concept of the West as opposed to the East is quite new in 
history and is mainly connected with the two main historical changes 
that occurred in human history: two turning points which are well 
known but need to be understand in the light of the third turning 
point which occurred in recent years (of which we are not yet well 
awarded). The first two turning points to which I am referring to are 
related: first) to the CONQUEST of the Ocean and the birth of a cer-
tain number of sea empires: Portugal, mainly England and Spain, 
Holland but also Sweden and Denmark… (XV and XVI centuries) 
and second) to the birth of the United States of America (1776), who 
became, after the Monroe doctrine (1823) “The dangerous nation” 
(Kagan, 2006), and the consolidation of the larger sea empire of the 
world: the English who defeated Napoleon. The conquest of the seas 
is connected to: 
-  the conquest of the New World of the Americas (“The Eldorado”) 
-  the introduction of new war technologies of gun’s powder which 
totally changed the way of making war (like it become evident with 
the invasion of Italy in 1494 by the powerful army of Charles the 
VIII – see M. Boot 2006) 
-  the strategic decisions of both eastern countries: China (destroy-
ing the huge fleet of boats), Japan (forbidding the use of guns) 
-  the Protestant Reform 
-  the consolidation of international commerce 
-  the cradle for the new modernity, the new capitalism and indus-
trial revolution. 
It is during this span of five centuries (XVI-XX centuries) that a 
new and strong ideology has been created (with the contributions of 
Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza) which broke dramatically with 
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previous times, with the so called old, traditional, antique time. A 
new, brave new, world was invented and erected. It was called mod-
ernity. The West as the cradle of new times began to exist, the war 
changed its nature: it become war between religious and ideologies. 
Passions and sentiments become more important than before. In the 
name of science, reason and truth, people were killed and burned like 
witches, heretics and traitors. The National State began to exist as the 
new institution, creator of law and justice (cuius Regio eius Religio). 
The Communities of people with their links with ancestor and de-
scendants, the Gods who made the divine and were connected with 
nature (the same land and territory, the same sky) all ancient tradi-
tions connecting religions to peoples were considered against moder-
nity and the State. The triumph of modernity came during the XIX 
century: the National State, Colonialism, Science and Progress, Posi-
tivism, the West are the central key words of the new era of uninter-
rupted progress and secularization. No more wars. Nobody wanted to 
hear from the very few who were aware of what was going to happen 
during the XX century. The “wars of extermination” in the colonial 
lands and the “wars of religions” in Europe (XVI-XVII centuries), 
which had transformed themselves into what they looked at first (af-
ter Westfalia) regulated and limited form of wars become, in the 
Americas (with the “Indian” troops recruited both by the French and 
the English in Canada and the USA) and in Europe (with the new 
forms of guerrilla war in Spain and in Russia and of “civil war” in 
Paris and all over France), during the French Revolution and Napo-
leon campaigns, the most cruel form of wars: the ideological and na-
tionalistic kind of wars. 
The conquest of the “New World” of Americas, the birth of the 
western empires of the sea, the closing of the Asiatic empires of 
China and Japan, the opening to the West of Russia: all these geo-
political events contribute strongly to reduce the strategic, economi-
cal and political, cultural and religious roles of the Mediterranean 
World of Cities (like Genoa and Venice, Rome and Barcelona) and 
Empires (like the Islamic and the Turkish). 
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But nothing of what happened during most of the XX century had 
ever happened before: civil wars everywhere. Also if the name “civil 
wars” has been rarely used. 
A “European civil war” has been the “great war”, the so-called 
“first world war” (1914-1918). 
A “Russian civil war “has been the so-called “Russian revolution” 
(1917-1922). Those two civil wars contributed to: the semi-legal as-
cent to power of Fascism in Italy (1922) and of National-Socialism 
in Germany (1933), the “civil war” in Spain (1936-1939) and the 
Sino-Japanese war (1937-38). Which brought Europe and the World 
to the so-called Second World War (1939-1945) which has been ei-
ther a continuation (and an ending) of the “European civil war” and, 
at the same time, a war between the two major empires of the sea the 
USA and Japan. 
In the after war begins the process which brings to the third turn-
ing point of the world history. 
3.3.Apparently only two superpowers were left at the end of the 
war with the economical, technological and political resources to 
play a strategic imperial role in the world: the USA and URSS. 
The USA was left as the only empire of the sea; the Japan had 
been defeated in the war; the British and what it was left of the others 
European empires: the French, the Dutch, the Belgium and the Por-
tuguese were exhausted and the end of colonialism will put them out. 
The Soviet Union was left as the most important continental em-
pire with no rivals. 
Both empires, at the end of the war, were more strong, rich and 
united they had been before the war. They were ready to become the 
leading champions of two new coalitions having at their disposal two 
new kinds of weapons: the nuclear bombs and two different kinds of 
propaganda weapons they had both used during the twenties and 
thirties: for nowadays, for present times “here and now”, the mass 
media and the Hollywood fabric of dreams on one side; and the 
communist utopia of the socialist society as sort of paradise an earth 
to be build for the next generations with the contribution of every-
body and the leading and convincing talks and images about peace 
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coming from thousands of European and Third World antifascism 
artists and intellectuals. 
The point is that what it has been called the “cold war” was 
mainly a social construction of opposed propaganda hiding the fact 
that the cold war was in reality the continuation of a civil war. What 
is terrible with civil wars (in their different possible declination as 
“religious” or “ideological”) is that participants to this kind of wars 
do not consider themselves as enemies who are enemies because they 
are fighting for something they do not have (e.g territory) that the 
enemy has. The fighters of a civil war they each think of themselves 
they are “good” while the others are “bad” (“reason”, “science”, 
“god”, “civilization” is with us and not with the others who are “bar-
barians”, “criminals” “bad guys” and so on). The aim of a civil war 
is not only to win the enemy but to “eliminate” – physically or mor-
ally – the enemy, to destroying him, to convince him that he is wrong 
and so on. In other words civil wars as “total wars”. 
Thus, what happened during the “cold war” (1948-1989) re-
mained till now relatively not openly spoken; with the consequence, 
for example, that many people have drawn from those years many 
wrong or negative ideas that are still with us. One of those ideas, is 
the concept of western civilization which has been reinforced during 
all those years with ideological and cultural contents who come from 
the quite long span of time which goes from the XVI century to 
nowadays. We can say today that this concept is mainly “american” 
(“northamerican”), it was built on the basis of a previous concept 
which has been mainly “Anglo-Saxons”. In the concept of western 
civilization there is not much of what has been European or Mediter-
ranean before the XVI century; or of what has been European in the 
thinking of the founding fathers of the unification of Europe before, 
during and right after the Europeans civil wars. 
But, there is much more to consider. Because of the many new 
facts and processes that came into being in those years a turning 
point has arrived. The invention of new weapons, the technological 
revolution connected to informatics (the computers, the internet…), 
the building of new kinds of aircrafts (the big and fast jet) totally 
changed the relations between territories and between the earth and 
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the sea with a totally new place in our human world of the sky. 
Globalization is a poor and misleading concept for describing and 
conceptualizing what has happened. We are facing a new phase, a 
new stage in the historical existence of humans. The sea has lost the 
huge, central importance it has had from the XVI century to the Sec-
ond World War. As a consequence the only empire of the sea, the 
USA, is less powerful than it used to be till few years ago. 
Air conditioning and water new treatment are other important in-
ventions that have totally changed the place in the world of desert 
territories located in to hot sites. People and things are moving from 
place to place much more and more quickly and less expensively that 
used to be. All these technological and economical inventions are 
powerfully contributing to change the social role of territories. Terri-
toriality is back with us and can give new senses of belonging to 
more people. And this is one important reason that gives strategic 
relevance to once marginal and poor territories. Last but not least 
other territories become suddenly important and rich because of gas 
and petrol that give energy to the multiple assets of modern world. 
What is at stake with this yet not well perceived turning point is 
that, to the contrary of what has been said in the last few years, we 
are not facing a world where only one superpower (or few others) 
have the possibility to lead the world. Nor is possible to conceive the 
collapse of soviet Communism (1989-91) like a victory of the West 
and the end of history. 
What can be said, instead, is that we are facing a process that’s 
taking the world to an increasing multipolarity. What it lacks is the 
awareness of this kind of process and the energy to take the lead of 
new story to play. 
 
 
C. The Possible Role of the Mediterranean World 
 
I am totally aware that what I am trying to discover analyzing, 
from a geo-sociological point of view, the state of the world may be 
perceived as a sort of utopian thinking. Maybe somebody can see in 
the steps I am taking a sort of wishful thinking. It is not the case. I 
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am aware that to get in new places one has to cultivate a vision, but I 
also think that the vision I am cultivating, although furnished with 
generosity and hope, is or could be well grounded in thoughtfull 
analysis. So when I began thinking about this idea of “the opening of 
the Mediterranean mind” I knew that I was not talking of something 
that is already with us but of something that could come if we begin 
to call attention to those facts or process which could be the pre-
conditions for possibilities of the kind I am thinking to come into ex-
istence and grow. 
 
 
ANNEX 2 - Open Societies and Southern Europe 
 
BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM.  
TOWARDS INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION 
 
Learning how to perceive and understand the Mediterranean An-
cient Worlds as Open Societies. The contribution of Etruscans, Ital-
ics and Romans to the building of modernity 
 
“I love those historians who support the idea – against every-
thing and everyone – that Rome has not disappeared during 
the V century under the attack of the barbarians” (Braudel, 
1985, p. 105). 
 
“L‟histoire de la première internationale où le socialisme al-
lemand lutte sans arret contre la pensée libertaire des Fran-
çais, des Espagnols et des Italiens, est l‟histoire des luttes 
entre l‟idéologie allemande et l‟esprit méditerranéen” (Ca-
mus, 1951, p. 373) 
 
 
A. My Thesis 
 
The first modernity has its roots and beginnings in two places: 1) 
the Mediterranean Rome of Cicero; 2) the Asiatic China of Sun Tzu. 
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In both cases it was clear to people of those ancient times (that I call 
the first modernity), that the meanings of the things of the world 
were strictly connected to contexts: without knowledge of the con-
text it is not possible to understand, to capture meanings. 
The first modernity is still with us in some parts of the worlds and 
among some cultures, but it is not called modernity. 
The second modernity was born much later in the northern re-
gions of Europe and is connected to German and Scandinavian cul-
tures and traditions, and to the Reformation, the culture of the book 
and the culture of the individual. 
 
 
B. Three Starting Points 
 
1) Damnatio Memoriae. History is always (in most cases) written by 
the winners. That means that the holders of hard power tend to use 
their soft power…. 
2) Collective memory is not built by historians and intellectuals but 
by inter-generational communication through ways of living, ways of 
doing things, ways of telling stories…It goes beyond centuries, in the 
very long duration, in the long lasting span of time…In the long 
processes of time things can change their names, while keeping their 
meanings. 
3) As a consequence of 1) and 2) it may happen that public ideas or 
public knowledge about the past are manipulated, biased by ideology, 
ignorance, stereotypes, political correctness…and one of the conse-
quences is that many people think that “past is past”, “no use looking 
at the past”, “too much thinking about the past is an obstacle for the 
building of the future”. 
Therefore, instead of living with real knowledge (it is worth men-
tioning in this connection that the contemporary society is called 
“knowledge society”), we live with stereotypes and we accept wish-
ful thinking. The idea of multiculturalism is the consequence of this 
very common way of thinking. 
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The same goes with other ideas connected with globalization, 
capitalism, democracy, modernity and modernization, western cul-
tures and eastern cultures, clash of civilization… 
My ipothesis is that we have to learn how to re-brand ourselves 
and look with different eyes at our historical existence; by our, I 
mean what belongs to us as humans, going in the direction of what 
K.A. Appiah (2006) understands as cosmopolitanism. 
My research has started a few years ago from the idea that we 
should look at the past using what I have called the communicative 
gaze, understanding the past with the sensibility of the humans who 
were living there (like the new archeology tries to do). And with the 
awareness of the present time (feeding the need, that we can all 
share, to build a peaceful future); selecting from past times what we 
need in order to understand and meet the Other. 
 
 
C. The Concept of Italicity and the Idea of two Modernities and two 
Modernization Processes 
 
Migrations and hybridizations have been, and still are, the two 
main driving forces for the historical existence of humans in those 
places of the world where things began to move in the direction of 
creating civilization (in the Braudel’s conception): ancient China and 
the Mediterranean (3/4 thousands years ago). And those ancient so-
cieties were, since the beginning “open societies”. And when agricol-
ture was invented and cities began to grow, and with them writing 
and division of labour, complex societies came into being. And when 
Rome, with the contributions of Etruscans and Greeks and of many 
other peoples coming from East and South – began to be the center 
of a new world (around the second and third century B.C.) in the 
middle of the mediterranean sea, modernity began to exist. And af-
terwards, in different ways, Athens, Jerusalem, and Rome, became, 
in the midst of the Ellenistic flavour, the craddle of a new modernity 
which grew in different directions with Second Rome (Costantinopo-
lis) and Third Rome (Russia), with the Italian Cities, with German 
Sacred Empire, with Portugal and Spain Empires… But, the word 
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modernity was not invented and was not used to describe what the 
historical existence of human had built in about two thousands years. 
My idea – which is not only mine – is that we should give the name 
of First Modernity to this long period of time during which humans 
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Dynamics of Migration flows in the Mediterranean  
 
Migration across the Mediterranean Sea is not a recent phenomenon. 
Italy, for example, experienced massive arrivals of Albanian mi-
grants during the 90s as a consequence of the collapse of the com-
munist regime in that country. In the same period, the Spanish gov-
ernment introduced visa requirements in order to halt migration from 
North African countries, a phenomenon dating back to the 1960s 
(Fargues & Bonfanti, 2014). A recent study collecting the statistical 
data provided by the European countries overlooking the Mediterra-
nean Sea estimates a yearly average of about 44.000 landings on 
European southern shores from 1998 to 2013 (Fargues & Bonfanti, 
2014). The situation unfolding during 2014 and 2015 represents, 
however, an unprecedented increase of trans-Mediterranean flows: 
216.000 landings occurred in 2014 according to the UN High Com-
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missioner for Refugees. That is a number three times higher than the 
previous peak recorded in 2011 in conjunction with the Arab Spring 
events (UNHCR, 2015a). The data regarding 2015 show a further 
steep increase in sea arrivals, which reached the impressive figure of 
more than one million at the end of the year (Ibid). 
When focusing on the evolution of migratory routes across the 
Mediterranean during the past two years, we can observe the strong 
pressure experienced along the Central Mediterranean route, which 
originates in Libya and ends on the Italian shores, and the East Medi-
terranean route, which starts from Turkey and reaches the Greek is-
lands in the Aegean. 
The Central Mediterranean route, in particular, was the main 
channel used by migrants to reach Europe in 2014, with over 
170.000 arrivals on Italian shores recorded during the year. In 2015, 
some 153.000 migrants landed on the Italian coast, mainly nationals 
of Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. The Central Mediterranean 
route proved to be also the most tragic in terms of number of people 
who perished at sea, with 2.892 deaths in 2015 (against 806 deaths 
recorded on the Eastern Mediterranean route) (IOM, 2015).  
At the same time, the Eastern Mediterranean route gained in-
creased relevance over 2015. While during 2014 about 44.000 mi-
grants landed in Greece via sea from Turkey, over 850.000 arrivals 
were recorded in 2015. These figures highlight the centrality ac-
quired by this route as a privileged access to Europe for migrants that 
come from the Middle East and Central Asia, mainly Syrians, Af-
ghan, Pakistani, and Iraqis (UNHCR, 2015a).  
 
 
Political and Socio-economic Variables 
 
According to Monzini (2007, p. 180), there are three interdependent 
variables that play a key role in determining migration dynamics in 
the Mediterranean: the migration pressure originating in the countries 
of origin of migrants; the management and control policies adopted 
by transit and destination countries; and the strategies operated by 
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organisations involved in migrant smuggling (which are, in turn, in-
fluenced by the effects produced by the first two variables).  
Regarding the first variable, the perpetuation and worsening of 
the conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as well as conflicts in 
sub-Saharan Africa, such as those unfolding in Somalia and Nigeria, 
have caused a massive increase of “forced” migration towards 
Europe. In fact, the increase of flows across the Mediterranean has 
been accompanied by a parallel increase in asylum applications in 
the European Union: in 2014, 626.960 asylum requests were lodged 
in the EU Member States, a 43% increase compared to 2013, when 
431.090 demands were presented. In 2015, the surge in asylum de-
mands continued unabated: at the time of writing, provisional data 
from Eurostat report a total number well beyond on million applica-
tions (Eurostat, 2015). Looking at the nationality of asylum seekers 
in the EU, the nexus with Mediterranean flows becomes clear: Syri-
ans, Iraqis, Afghans, and Eritreans are prevalent among asylum ap-
plicants in the EU as well as among migrants smuggled on the Italian 
and Greek coasts (Eurostat, 2015; UNHCR, 2015a). 
The Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, can be singled out as 
the event that produced the most relevant impact on the dynamics of 
migration flows across the Mediterranean. According to the 
UNHCR, the number of people who need humanitarian aid because 
of the conflict reached 12,2 million in 2015, out of which 7.6 million 
are internally displaced within Syria and more than 4 million are 
refugees hosted in the neighbouring countries, mainly Turkey, Leba-
non, and Jordan. Compared to the magnitude of the phenomenon, it 
is important to remember that EU States have welcomed so far only a 
limited quota of Syrian refugees: about 532.000 by November 2015 
according to official data (UNHCR, 2015b).  
The Central Mediterranean route was one of the main channels 
chosen by Syrians in 2014, when 42.000 arrivals were recorded. 
However, in the last part of 2014 and during 2015, increasing insecu-
rity experienced by migrants in Libya, along with visa restrictions 
adopted by neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Algeria, forced 
an increasing number of Syrians to shift to the Eastern Mediterranean 
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route, where they became by far the most represented nationality 
among smuggled migrants (UNHCR, 2015a)1.   
The case of Libya mentioned above draws attention to the second 
variable taken into consideration to understand the dynamics of 
flows, which is the role of policies implemented by transit and desti-
nation States in order to prevent migration. Because of the military 
and political disorder that occurred in Libya after the fall of the Gad-
dafi‟s regime in 2011 and the consequent absence of an effective 
state authority able to control the borders, Libya became a main hub 
for migrants coming from the Middle East and the sub-Saharan Af-
rica who want to reach Europe (Toaldo, 2015).  
Although the instability that arose in the post-revolutionary phase 
created the conditions for a further increase in migration flows from 
and towards the country, the centrality of Libya as a hub for African 
flows grounds its roots in a set of factors that predated the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime. The „open door‟ policy that Libya adopted towards 
migrants in the 90s, together with the work opportunities created by 
the oil economy, determined a constant flow of migrants into the 
country, in particular coming from sub-Saharan Africa. The activity 
of smuggling networks into Libya, sustained by long-standing demo-
graphic and socio-economic factors in neighbouring countries, was 
not stopped even when the Libyan regime, under increasing pressure 
from European States and in particular Italy, shifted to restrictive 
migration policies from 2007 onwards (Toaldo, 2015, p. 8). When 
observing in detail the geography of migration in the African conti-
nent, it is possible to observe the consolidation of some centres, such 
as Agadez and Dirkou in Niger, Tamanrasset in Algeria, Omdurman 
in Sudan, Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, and Sabha and Kufra in Libya, 
which acquired new relevance after the end of the regime. These 
“hubs” connect the „African‟ migrant routes to Libya: the western 
                                                      
1 The trends relative to 2015 indicate that most of the migrants that arrive in 
Greece from Turkey continue their journey along the „western Balkan „ route, 
through Macedonia and Serbia, and then re-enter the EU via the Hungarian border. 
The following data show the entity of the phenomenon: about 760.000 migrants 
transited along this route in 2015, many of whom of Syrian and Afghan nationality 
(Frontex, 2015). In the majority of cases, the final destination of those migrants was 
a Northern European country, especially Germany and Sweden. 
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route, used by migrants coming from Mali, Gambia and Senegal; the 
Central route, used by Nigerians and Ghanaians; and last, the Eastern 
route, used by migrants coming from Eritrea, Somalia, and South 
Sudan (Altai Consulting, 2013, p. 31).  
The evolution of African routes used by immigrants is strictly 
connected to the third variable mentioned above, which points to the 
activity of the smuggling organisations that operate along these 
routes2. This aspect acquired central relevance in the agenda of the 
European leaders in 2015, as testified by the launch of the military 
operation „Eunavfor Med‟, whose objective is to disrupt the „busi-
ness model‟ connected to the human smuggling and trafficking in the 
South Mediterranean Sea (Mananashvili, 2015). However, empirical 
evidence gathered so far demonstrates that the organisations that fa-
vour irregular immigration are part of a complex social and eco-
nomic phenomenon that requires a deeper understanding of the 
causes that lie behind it. In particular, studies that have explored in 
depth the business model operated by the traffickers have shown that 
smuggling organisations are fluid and hierarchically unstructured and 
rely on informal and flexible networks that are embedded in the local 
economies of countries involved (Monzini, Pastore, & Abdel Aziz, 
2015, p. 34). Within these organisations, there are actors that play 
different roles: passeurs, who handle the transportation of migrants; 
„organisers‟ who deal with logistic issues (for example taking people 
from one collection point to another); intermediaries in the countries 
of origin of the potential migrants whose job is to establish a first 
contact between offer and demand of smuggling services (Altai Con-
sulting, 2013, p. 53)3. In some cases, smuggling organisations evolve 
                                                      
2 The present paper explores the dynamics related to migrants „ smuggling, 
without taking into consideration human trafficking, a much more serious crime 
which implies transporting migrants with the use of force and for the purpose of ex-
ploitation. It is however important to remember that, in many real situations, these 
two forms of illegality are connected and not easy to distinguish (Monzini, Pastore, 
& Abdel Aziz, 2015: 11). 
3 In a news story on human trafficking in Libya, the British Newspaper The 
Guardian reports the following account recorded in the city of Zuwara: „No one has 
the name „smuggler „ written on their chest. Anyone here who has no money can sell 
their apartment, buy a boat, and organise a smuggling trip. By the time of the next 
R. Cortinovis 
92 
into “service providers” agencies similar to tour operators, able to 
offer clients a „package‟ that covers all different phases of their jour-
ney from the country of origin to that of destination (Achilli, 2015).  
Although the extensive use of violence and other forms of typi-
cally criminal actions such as human trafficking and kidnapping for 
ransom is becoming widespread, especially in the current Libyan 
scenario (Monzini, Pastore, & Abdel Aziz, 2015), the pervasive 
character of smuggling activities challenges the validity of a mere 
military approach to the problem, embodied by the „Eunavfor Med‟ 
operation launched by the EU in 2015. On the contrary, as many con-
tributors have already highlighted, it would be beneficial to tackle 
the root causes of migration in partnership with third countries and, 
at the same time, to envisage legal channels for entering the EU terri-
tory, especially for migrants in need of international protection (de 
Haas, 2015).  
 
 
Cooperation with Third Countries: the External Dimension of EU 
Migration Policy 
 
In light of the dynamics outlined in the previous part, it appears clear 
that the management of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea is 
related to the further development and coordination of various inter-
connected policy areas. Necessary components of a comprehensive 
approach to the challenges posed by migration flows include effi-
cient asylum and reception systems, admission policies that can 
maximise immigration benefits for both countries of origin and des-
tination, and policies to contrast illegal immigration that, at the same 
time, can guarantee the respect of human rights of migrants. While 
EU action currently covers all the above-mentioned areas, the fol-
lowing section aims to explore a specific component of EU migration 
governance in the Mediterranean, the so-called „external dimension‟ 
of migration policies. The external dimension includes those EU ini-
tiatives aiming to expand the scope of migration policies outside EU 
                                                                                                                   
trip you „d already have regained half the cost of the apartment. It „s a very easy 
formula. „ (Kinsley, 2015). 
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borders by ensuring the cooperation of countries of origin and transit 
of migration flows.  
The external dimension of migration policies is often associated 
with the concept of „externalisation‟, that is the attempt to export mi-
gration control instruments to third countries (Boswell, 2003). This 
theoretical approach was formulated following a set of policies 
adopted by the EU from the early 90s onward, which were character-
ised by a strong focus on migration control, such as restrictive visa 
policies, carrier sanctions, readmission agreements and joint man-
agement of external borders in cooperation with third countries (even 
if in this latter case, bilateral activities of Member States continued to 
play a central role, as testified by cooperation between Spain and 
Morocco and between Italy and Libya established during the last 
decade) (Lavenex, 2006).  
In recent years, the EU has committed to expanding the reach of 
its external dimension, following the so-called „root causes ap-
proach‟, namely a strategic approach aiming at tackling the push fac-
tors of migration flows. In particular, the Global Approach to Migra-
tion and Mobility (GAMM), firstly adopted in 2005 and then revised 
in 2011, lays down a comprehensive strategy for the development of 
the external dimension of EU migration policy (European Commis-
sion, 2011). The main goal of the GAMM is to face all relevant as-
pects of migration in a balanced and comprehensive way, in partner-
ship with third countries4. This comprehensive approach is also at the 
basis of the European Agenda on Migration adopted by the European 
Commission in May 2015, which aims to define the main lines of ac-
tion in the field of migration to be adopted by the EU in the coming 
years. The Agenda, which is strongly influenced by migration crisis 
unfolding in the Mediterranean Sea, emphases that: 
  
To try to halt human misery created by those who exploit migrants, we need to 
use the EU‟s global role and wide range of tools to address the root causes of 
migration (European Commission, 2015, p. 2).  
                                                      
4 The GAMM is structured on four pillars: legal migration and mobility, irregu-
lar migration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum 
policy, and maximising the development impact of migration and mobility (Euro-




In the last part of 2014 and during 2015, some important initiatives 
were launched in order to strengthen cooperation with the main 
countries of origin and transit of migrants. As described below, while 
the EU focus was initially centred primarily on Africa, due to the 
relevance of migration routes through that continent in 2014, the 
shift of migration flows to the Eastern Mediterranean in 2015 im-
posed the launch of a high-level dialogue on migration with Turkey, 
from which the majority of migrants were now coming. As a result 
of that process, the EU and Turkey finalised in October 2015 a Joint 
action plan, together with a € 3 billion facility to implement the strat-
egy therein envisaged. In particular, the Action Plan foresees a range 
of actions to assist Turkey in supporting the more than two million 
refugees hosted on its territory and to prevent irregular migration to 
and from the country. 
While the relevance of the EU-Turkey deal cannot be underesti-
mated, both in terms of its possible impact on the large refugee popu-
lation involved and for the political issues it raises, the following part 
of this contribution provides a description of cooperation pursued by 
the EU with African partners. Indeed, even beyond the current asy-
lum crisis, it is extremely likely that migration from Africa will con-
tinue to be a major challenge for the EU in the following decades, 
due to not only widespread instability and conflict across the conti-
nent, but also to economic and demographic characteristics of many 




The Rabat and Khartoum Processes 
 
The effort to strengthen dialogue with African countries on migration 
issues was pursued through the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, un-
der the impulse of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
of the EU (from July to December 2014). More recently, in the con-
text of the Valletta Summit on Migration held on 12-13 November 
2015, the EU and African leaders stressed their commitment to use 
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the Rabat and Khartoum Processes as instruments to pursue the joint 
initiatives foreseen in the Action Plan that was adopted in the context 
of the Summit5. 
The Rabat Process, launched in 2006, includes the 28 member 
states of the European Union, the countries of Northern, Central and 
Western Africa, the European Commission and the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS). The goal of the Rabat 
Process is to promote a coordinated and balanced approach to migra-
tion among the partners and in particular to strengthen the synergies 
between migration and development. The Rome Declaration, 
adopted on 27 November 2014 in the context of the 4th EU-African 
Ministerial Conference, had the aim of providing new impulse to the 
Rabat Process. The Declaration is structured on four pillars: 1) or-
ganising mobility and migration; 2) improving border management 
and combatting irregular immigration; 3) strengthening the synergies 
between migration and development; 4) promoting international pro-
tection6.  
In the context of the same EU-Africa Ministerial Conference, a 
new platform for regional dialogue, the EU-Horn of Africa Migration 
Route Initiative, also called the Khartoum Process, was created. The 
Khartoum Process gathers the EU member States and the govern-
ments of Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia. The Joint Declaration launching the ini-
tiative focuses on combatting irregular immigration and human traf-
ficking through an increased cooperation and exchange of expertise 
between police and border control authorities in the countries of ori-
gin and transit7.  
The Khartoum Process was criticised due to its „asymmetry‟: in 
other words, for not addressing evenly the GAMM pillars, in favour 
                                                      
5 See: Valletta summit on migration, 11-12 November 2015. Political Declaration. On-
line: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/  
6 See: Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 
Rome Declaration, 27 November 2014, online: http://processusderabat.net/web/up-
loads/cms/EN-Rome_Declaration_&_Programme.pdf. 
7 See: Khartoum Process, EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, Rome 




of a predominant focus on combatting illegal immigration. Criticism 
was also raised on the choice of having countries like Eritrea and Su-
dan, responsible for systematic violations of human rights and de-
mocratic principles, involved in the dialogue. These circumstances 
led some analysts to interpret the Khartoum Process as an attempt to 
revive the logic of externalisation of migration policies by shifting its 
scope of action further south in the African continent. More specifi-
cally, this move would be made necessary by the collapse of the 
North African regimes on which the EU Member States had previ-
ously relied for controlling migration flows, as a consequence of the 
Arab Spring (Morone, 2015)8. Without entering into the merit of that 
reading, it is nevertheless possible to conclude that, compared to the 
broader platform for cooperation envisaged in the Rabat Process, the 
Khartoum Process is still far from laying down a balanced and com-




Mobility Partnerships and Regional Protection Programmes  
 
Besides an analysis of the programmatic declarations of the Rabat 
and Khartoum Processes, it is necessary to consider the so-called 
„operationalization‟ of the two processes, which means the specific 
available tools, resources, and the actors responsible for their imple-
mentation. To this regard, the Rabat Process emphasises that the co-
operation framework developed at the regional level is functional to 
creating specific tools aimed at increasing bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation9. The next section will illustrate two of the tools imple-
mented by the EU to this end: Mobility Partnerships and, with spe-
cific reference to asylum, Regional Protection Programmes.  
                                                      
8 Bunyan (2015) advances a similar reading of the outcome of the Valletta 
Summit. 
9 See the internet website of the Rabat Process at the following link: http://www. proc-
essusderabat.net/web/index.php/support-projects-activities/infographic-mobility-partner-
ships-and-common-agendas-on-migration-and-mobility-in-the-rabat-process-region. 
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According to the Commission, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) rep-
resent one of the privileged tools to translate the GAMM into prac-
tice (European Commission, 2009). The goal of MPs is to establish 
partnerships with the countries of origin and transit of migration 
flows through concrete initiatives that range from legal immigration 
to migration and development, and to combatting illegal immigra-
tion. MPs have been signed so far with three African countries: Cape 
Verde, Morocco and Tunisia10.  
The mobility partnerships are concluded as non-legally binding 
political declarations subscribed by the European Commission, the 
concerned third country and those EU Member States that have vol-
untarily agreed to take part. Besides the Joint declaration, the part-
nerships include an „Annex‟ that lists the concrete projects that the 
parties commit themselves to carrying out in the different areas of 
cooperation.  
MPs have been criticised because, in spite of what their name 
would suggest, include only limited initiatives aimed at increasing 
mobility in the EU, in particular through the creation of new labour 
migration channels. On the other hand, the partnerships require the 
third country concerned to commit itself to fighting illegal immigra-
tion, primarily by stipulating a readmission agreement with the EU, 
usually in exchange for visa facilitation to the benefit of its citizens 
(Lavenex & Stucky, 2011).  
Regarding asylum, in 2005 the EU launched the Regional Protec-
tion Programmes (RPPs), which are conceived as flexible and multi-
dimensional frameworks of cooperation with the main regions that 
host refugees (European Commission, 2005). In the framework of 
RPPs, a series of projects have been implemented with a view to 
strengthen the asylum systems of target countries, in particular by 
creating new infrastructure and training public officials and NGOs 
personnel dealing with refugees. In the following years, RPPs were 
launched in North Africa (Egypt, Libya and Tunisia), the Great 
                                                      





Lakes region (Tanzania), and in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Yemen 
and Djibouti) (Papadopoulou, 2015). 
In 2013, moreover, a Regional Development and Protection Pro-
gramme (RDPP) was launched in the Middle East, targeting Leba-
non, Jordan, and Iraq, with the objective of supporting those coun-
tries in managing the high number of Syrian refugees they host. This 
last programme is different from the former programmes because of 
its focus on development: in particular, the initiatives therein-
envisaged aim to favour socio-economic integration of refugees by 
providing them with livelihood opportunities. This new approach is 
an answer to the issues that were identified in previous RPPs, in par-
ticular the lack of coordination between development and asylum 
policies and, more fundamentally, the lack of a specific strategic vi-
sion behind the various initiatives included in the programmes 
(Cortinovis, 2015, p. 10). The European Agenda on Migration men-
tioned above includes, among its objectives, the establishment of the 
Regional Protection and Development Programmes also in North Af-
rica and in the Horn of Africa and supplies to this end 30 million eu-
ros for the years 2015 and 2016 (European Commission, 2015, p. 5).  
While the focus on the link between asylum and development of 
the new programmes implies a significant expansion in the range of 
activities they cover, in order to evolve into fully-fledged partner-
ships with the main countries of „first asylum‟, the RDPPs must be 
supported by further investments, both politically and economically 
(European Commission, 2013, p.12). In particular, a first main chal-
lenge to be addressed in the future will be to ensure ownership of 
partner countries in the implementation of the programmes. To reach 
such a goal, however, it is fundamental to strengthen political dia-
logue with third countries‟ authorities and to give a substantive dem-
onstration of solidarity towards those countries, in particular by re-
settling a bigger quota of refugees in the EU.  
A second central challenge will be to avoid overlapping between 
the initiatives pursued in the context of RDPPs and those financed 
through other financial sources, such as the new Trust Fund for Af-
rica, launched in September 2015 and endowed with €1.8 billion. 
The rationale for the creation of this financial instrument is that of 
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gathering resources from both the EU budget and Member States‟ 
donations and setting in place comprehensive strategies aimed at ad-
dressing the root causes of forced displacement, primarily through a 
targeted use of development assistance (D‟Alfonso & Immenkamp, 
2015). In order to achieve that aim, EU policy-makers will have to 
succeed in ensuring coordination between the RDPPs and the Trust 
Funds and, on a larger scale, between the expanding funding in the 
field of asylum and the development funding addressed to African 
countries (Collett, 2016).  
 
 
Conclusion: is the EU Approach Truly Global? 
 
The first section of this contribution described some of the main 
geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics that characterise the mi-
gration scenario in the Mediterranean Sea: in particular, the effects of 
Libyan and of the Syrian wars were taken into consideration. Be-
sides, it was shown that human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea 
is managed by a complex network of actors that is rooted in the 
economies of the countries of origin and transit, a circumstance that 
challenges the effectiveness of a purely restrictive and control-
oriented approach to the problem. This feature, together with the 
“mixed” character of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, 
draws attention to the plurality of the causes that shape the dynamics 
and composition of the flows, highlighting the necessity of creating 
appropriate governance instruments in order to face this complexity 
(Van Hear, 2011).  
In this respect, the EU has committed itself to developing a 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, which aims to create 
long-term partnerships with the countries of origin and transit of mi-
grants. When looking at the details of this approach, with a specific 
reference to the African continent, a basic asymmetry is evident. In 
fact, EU policy-makers have so far accorded priority to initiatives 
aiming to limit migration and combat irregular migration, while less 
action has been taken to create new channels of legal access to the 
EU, for both asylum seekers and other categories of migrants, and to 
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maximise the impact of migration on the development of third coun-
tries. However, a long-term strategy to manage migration in the 
Mediterranean requires balancing this asymmetry: first, through a 
more structured cooperation between the Member States at the EU 
level, and second, by adequately covering all the dimensions in-
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City and Integration Process 
 
Speaking about the Mediterranean these days, it makes us think 
about the boats that pass through it: the dangers of the journey and 
the weariness upon arrival.  
In this paper, I will focus on the difficulties of acceptance and 
integration. Particularly, on the very fruitful construct in the social 
sciences, the community; a concept that is rarely used in terms of 
integration policies. 
We will further discuss on the integration policies which are 
implemented in the place of the second landing which is the city 
(Bagnasco, 2003), and the role that communities play in this regard.  
It is clear that the challenge will unravel the condition of 
everyday life of immigrants. Not so much on dangerous places, the 
arrival, the recognition, but on the laborious path of everyday life. 
                                                 
 F. Cimagalli () 
Department of Law, LUMSA University 




The integration operates where migrants are called to interact with a 
social context that has a certain stability and routine; it is 
characterized by the presence of the immigrants and poses a 
challenge. The city is the subject of this context.  
However, it must be clarified. Ambrosini (2005) stressed that the 
integration of migrants is a complex process and should not be 
considered as the mechanical result of the policies. The integration 
moves along heterogeneous channels, passes through informal 
networks. Integration is a complex, multi-dimensional concept 
extending on the cultural terrain as well as in the economic, trade and 
dwelling. Policies operate in an environment full of experiences, 
conceptions of reality, and objectives (Barry, 1997).  
However, we cannot ignore the role that policies have or may 
have in fostering the processes of social inclusion. Indeed, this 
multidimensional issue, along with the number of factors involved 
and the heterogeneity of real models of integration creates new and 
essential factor to social policy. The spontaneous processes of 
adaptation (often not a real integration) are unpredictable and 
unattended. Sometimes, it provides dark paths, and illegality. 
Occasionally, it is momentary and produces contradictory effects1. 
In this paper, I would like to think about all these matter and 
identify some areas in which you can engage a fruitful work. 
Here are two premises before entering into reflection. 
First, in terms of integration, a considerable part of the literature 
has focused in describing the different models applied in the western 
world (Ambrosini, 2003; 2005). There are four main models 
considered, with the first, being a “temporary” one, associated with 
the German context. It requires the presence of migrants as 
functional to the needs of the economic and productive system. The 
acceptance for entering the country is thus limited to this condition 
and if it would cease the migrant has no reason to stay. 
                                                 
1 In the case of Rome, which we studied in the course of recent research 
(Cimagalli & Saggion, 2010) we noted for example that there are simultaneously 
different mechanisms that promote processes of inclusion. The problem is that these 
mechanisms do not appear to be adequately coordinated so as to engender situations 
of irrationality and waste of resources. 
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The second model is “assimilative” and it is based on the French 
scenario: in this case the integration takes place in the direction of 
the entry of migrants within the host culture. A condition considered 
non-negotiable for the reception is the acceptance of the democratic 
principles and cultural traits by the foreigners. 
The third model is the “multicultural”, which is partially applied 
in countries such as the United States or countries from Northern 
Europe, namely, Sweden and the Netherlands, where in this case, at 
least in the main intentions, it is to devise new forms of 
rapprochement between different cultures and the creation of 
common traits. Also well-known as multiculturalism in the 
experience of many countries, it has not achieved the assumed 
promises but instead has created an unobtainable multicultural fact. 
Several authors have sketched outlines of a more realistic “salad 
bowl”, where you create a harmonious coexistence between social 
groups whose cultural traits are unchanged (Cesareo, 2000). 
Lastly, the Italian case, according to this reading, was marked by 
an “implicit” pattern of immigration because this has not been 
explicitly recognized that long as a phenomenon to be addressed by 
specific policies. Also, because of the “complex of poverty”, 
immigration has not been encouraged nor discouraged that very long 
but has only been included recently in a comprehensive policy 
vision. 
The Italian case, therefore, draws a highly uncertain integration 
model which assimilates different orientations and sometimes opens 
contradictions. 
Obviously, the current integration actually appears different in 
various contexts and in part can only be similar to one of the types 
described above. Moreover, it should be noted that the actual 
integration processes are many and do not appear consistent with the 
model that would characterize a country as a whole all the time. The 
integration is real fluid, multidimensional, and it operates around the 
borders; it overcomes them and redefines them. 
Next, we go over to the second element of the premise. The 
context of integration policies, for many reasons has moved from 
central to the local. The change of center of gravity of social policies, 
F. Cimagalli 
106 
described by many authors (Bifulco, 2015; Kazepov, 2010), leads to 
identify the local level for the development of inclusion policies. 
Mediterranean cities are the new arena of inclusion processes.  
Within the city is where the real integration happens. In this 
context, multiple factors operate such as individuals, social groups, 
local and national institutions which intersect with public and private 
dimensions; cultural and economic dynamic traits. The urban context 
appears vital, and able to generate adaptation paths, and is often self-
directed by the migrants themselves or guided by the reception 
policies. The importance of the local context there suggests 
expanding reflection of a particular fertile concept in the social 
sciences: the community. 
 
 
The Concept of Community 
 
In this context, it seems useful to re-discuss the concept of 
community. “Community” is a category used by classical sociology. 
Authors such as Durkheim and Toennies or Weber used it to describe 
a particular form of social interaction. Obviously, this is not a unique 
and convergent definition. Hillery (1955), in the fifties, has already 
made more or less ninety different definitions of this concept, and 
emphasizes on how they are united by three common characteristics: 
(1) there is a dense network of social interactions, (2) a common 
geographical location and (3) the people who make up the familiar 
relationships particulary, the direct type. 
Unlike the combinations of societarian type, face to face 
relationship, knowing each other, and sharing a collective “we” 
prevails in a community. The community is able to trace what 
Rosenberg calls “a warm circle” around us: it engages identity and 
belongingness in the community (Bauman, 2001). 
Pesenti (2002) identifies four main guidelines in the definition of 
community. The first definition refers to the writings of Toennies  
(1887) and an important part of classical sociology: the community 
as an integrated symbolic place, where a culture of reciprocity 
prevails and in which individual differences are blurred in the 
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significance of the collective dimension.  
The second definition narrows the field of interpretation and 
mainly focuses on the territorial-geographical dimension and thus 
binds the community to the dynamic neighborhood, (Park, 1936) or, 
more recently, founded on the concept of civicness (Putnam, 1993).  
The third definition is more extensive and focuses on the 
symbolic aspects where the community has to do with the production 
of meaning and belongingness. In this sense, freedom and individual 
voluntarism are not confused with collective membership: it is the 
emerging theory in the so-called neo-communitarianism of American 
matrix (Etzioni, 1993). 
Finally, the term is taken up by various authors (Maffesoli, 1988; 
Bauman, 2001) in the post-modern setting and marks the search for 
new allegiances that transcend almost completely symbolic size. The 
community becomes thin, fragmented, and imaginary. 
The concept of community has evolved and changed some 
elements, but has not disappeared. Although many commentators 
emphasize how modernity has radically transformed the community 
balance and use a dichotomous perspective to interpret this change, 
and in spite how authors like Rawls (1971) have traced the lines of a 
progressive liberation of the individual from the community bonds 
that resist only as instrumental ties following the definition of 
individual identity, this does not cease to exist, and to take on new 
forms. 
In particular, we can point out here the line of reflections drawn 
from the American neo-communitarianism (Etzioni, 1993; Bellah, 
1985) which operates an overcoming of the purely local dimension 
of the community by moving to mainly symbolic considerations. The 
community, according to this reading, is a constituent in the 
formation and allows you to locate a common good shared. 
Moreover, the new debate for central reading in post-modern 
concept of modernity is linked to many of the macro-processes that 
characterize the present. The crack of the traditional explanations of 
the world (Lyotard, 1979), the progressive weakening of the outer 
containers, the rapid turn of the mechanisms of the industrial 
economy and the growing sense of uncertainty about the future (De 
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Vita, 1993), have fueled what Bauman (2001) calls as a new desire 
of community. 
The processes of globalization and disorientation generated by 
this fuel the sense of uncertainty and in this framework, the 
community has once again become a key concept that can explain 
contradictory processes. So for example, some authors, in outlining 
the features of globalization, emphasized that instead of simply 
initiating approval processes and disembeddedness (Giddens, 1990) 
from local realities  it has produced new forms of association and 
new connections to the local dimension. The concept of 
“glocalization” (Robertson, 1995) was fulfilled precisely in the joint 
training of community ties and global type of memberships. 
In this sense, albeit in an entirely new way, the community still 
seems to be a valid key in interpreting the processes in place. 
 
  
Community and Social Policies: A Resource or Limit? 
 
The community does not belong to the traditional lexicon of 
social policies. Only in recent times, while it is obvious the crisis of 
the Fordist welfare state, the community emerges in the language and 
practices of the “new” social policies. 
In the traditional welfare, community does not appear as a 
resource. Understood as a set of primary networks, it can provide 
immediate support to the needs of fragile subject, but the support it 
can give appears short and not always effective. 
Furthermore, social policies have fostered a sense of distrust in 
the community because it feeds the boundaries. Bauman (2001) 
writes: “Community means sameness which in turn implies the 
exclusion of others especially those who are considered different”. 
Therefore, social policies have emphasized autonomy of the 
individual and freedom from the bonds of community.  
Traditional social policies place the individual at the center of the 
interventions (Donati, 2011): the individual is called to be rescued 
and placed in a position that emerges from the state of need. An 
individual conceived passively, as a receptor of aid from the welfare 
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system, or actively developed as a subject with capability for the 
activation of the necessary implementation of strategies of 
empowerment.  
In this context, there are few spaces for the community.  
Even policies that focus on promoting the integration of migrants 
are affected by this setting. Policies for migrants adapt to this 
approach even more than other areas. The migrant is regarded as an 
individual with resources and a protagonist of their migratory path. 
Policies, despite their varieties, range from a conception of an “I” 
absolute, free to move between the opportunities that a territory has, 
or that of an “I” standard, flattened into a categorical definition. In 
both cases, it is an invention. 
Yet, both theoretically and at the level of empirical research, it is 
evident that the community has not disappeared.  
For several years the studies on migrant integration processes 
have focused on the role played by the community (Berti, 2005). It is 
increasingly evident that the community plays a significant role in 
the integration of migration processes (Ambrosini, 2003).  This is 
true in two different directions. 
First, the community can represent a break on integration 
processes: retain, bind, and build impassable identity boundaries.  
In the course of research that deals with the mechanisms of 
adaptation and integration of refugees and asylum seekers in Rome, 
some respondents have confirmed this view. 
In some interviews that we place in a recent research (Cimagalli, 
2010), some Eritrean women said: “There is a kind of self-
destruction. They just do not go out of their environment and they do 
not have contact with the host society. They always speak their 
language”. And another: “Collatina be forgotten, in some ways I 
have to free myself. For me it is like a ghetto, as if I were still in 
Eritra. There, the community is unique. It is close compared here that 
is isolated, I cannot change the situation”. 
The community as a closed and impenetrable set does not help 
establish real and lasting interaction with the host environment. 
The quote shows how long has been observed in terms of the 
relationship between the community and integration. The 
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communities not only play a role of facilitators inside, but also as 
barriers to the outside. The ethnic community is impervious from the 
outside, and its members are protected and excluded. This is the 
concrete experience of many multicultural realities that in fact, have 
created a number of “separate enclave”: in this sense, 
multiculturalism becomes multicomunitarism (Touraine, 1997). 
But the question in our view is not so simple.  
The community can also be a resource. It is also true, that many 
studies demonstrate how migrant communities can be a key node to 
start real integration processes. They allow you to equip the 
individual to a wealth of social capital that they can operate with a 
minimum of security in social exchanges circuit. Along this 
direction, the closure of migrant communities is often a sign that 
something is not working on how a given environment is organized. 
It often happens, for example, that the importance of community is 
the result of misguided and ineffective policies, producing processes 
of ethnic segregation. Paradoxically, the importance of the 
community of the ethnic type is fed by the inefficiency of the 
political administration of the city, with the effect of amplifying the 
relations of a “bonding” and often makes them resistant. Thus, in 
many cases, it is clear that they represent a protection for the 
individual and at the same time a barrier to real processes of social 
incorporation. 
The community becomes a real presence, cumbersome and 
difficult to handle. 
What we want to emphasize here is that the community can 
become an indispensable ground work for integration policy.  
Etzioni, in Spirit of Community, reminds us that there is also a 
geographical community. Communities can share not only ethnic 
belongingness, but also culture, values, and perception of a common 
goal. It is clear that the growing complexity of social processes have 
intensified the creation of a new type of community ties. This is not a 
residual phenomenon confined to the segregation of ethnic type. 
Communities across our cities, made  vital, full of ties and sense. 
I previously stated that being ingrained in the community tends to 
mark the boundaries: it is true, however, the new urban communities 
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have developed new ways in which you are freed from forced 
memberships and show greater plasticity. The community 
contributes to the formation of identity, and also builds genuine ties. 
The community, when it is not structured in terms of defense, creates 
trust, and feeds relationship. So, if she is open, it is flexible, 
accessible and can be a great source for the paths of integration. 
Therefore, reception policies should welcome the challenge and 
look at the city in a new way. Integration policies now, need to be 
rethought in terms of their relationships with the communities and 
networks. A real process of integration is only possible if local 
policies are concentrated around the community, conceived as a unit 
characterized by its own culture, values, symbols and relational links 
that are sufficiently stable and coherent, and at the same time with 
certain flexibility. Within this flexibility, the plasticity of the 
community bonds in particular can be used to facilitate concrete 
processes of integration. 
There is no question of excluding the communities, as it is 
sometimes demanded to make social policies, focusing solely on the 
individual and believing that these are the only places of the closure 
which prevents any communication route. Even if all the works are 
left to the communities, an infrastructure for communication and 
exchange can up as a defensive adaptation tools because of the 
absence of a breathable atmosphere. Small strongholds are unable to 
communicate and to look out. Otherwise, a new work with the 
community (Allegri, 2015) is able to actually produce effective 
results. 
It must be considered that there are not only migrant 
communities. The community integration work is also done with the 
host community population. 
Moreover, it must also be considered that the community work 
oriented to the integration of migrants is not only focused on the 
communities “of” migrants. There are other important communities 
like those of the host groups, whose location in the physical and 
social space follows  community routes. According to this 
perspective, the integration, does not happen much “between” 
communities conceived as solids, but “with” communities designed 
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as plastic, penetrable, absorbent. 
An approach of this type can operate with effectiveness and 
efficiency. Working with the community requires getting inside the 
real dynamics to understand the structure of networks and get in 
touch with the significant nodes. The social intervention is not 
abstract and infertile, but binds to the concrete real situations. 
At the same time, an approach of this type allows the best use of 
resources. In working with communities, often it is not about buying 
external resources, but to use those that exist. The action aims to 
create bonds, not to the acquisition of external elements. 
Certainly, the approach mentioned above is not traditional for the 
reception and integration policies. 
First of all, it should be emphasized that it is not the same 
immediate identification of migrant communities. Too often, we only 
automatically tend to believe that forming community contexts only 
because of the same geographical origin (Berti, 2005). Often, the 
“ethnic communities” are imaginary categories made by 
administrators to simply lighten a complicated field. Do not just say 
“Moroccan community”, “Senegalese community”, “the Bengali 
community”. There is an automatic overlap between country of 





The work with the community requires a lot of patience in 
reviewing all the conceptual and operational tools usually used in 
migration policies. 
Therefore, this approach involves three consequences from the 
point of view of the management of the interventions: 
1. A shift of the time axis. Most of the current efforts aimed at the   
integration of immigrants are concentrated around the time of entry. 
The aim of local policies in many cities is the expansion of the 
reception, in terms of seats. With the result that such efforts widen 
the “mouth of the funnel” (Saggion, 2010): the number of people 
entering the care system. But, continuing with the metaphor of the 
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funnel, if it widens the output space, there will be people who 
overflow outside, i.e. in informal systems integration: little-known 
and little controlled. 
The exclusive attention to places of first asylum and non-
consideration of the integration of real flows is one of the causes in 
strengthening the closed type of community processes. The migrant 
is pressed behind the flow of newcomers and does not find the 
opportunity to the realization of every possible project. The 
community serves as a container of such discomfort, but does not 
offer an answer. Otherwise, the work with the community rather 
results in a shift of the axis of the policies. The acceptance (first 
level) and integration (second level) shift the time axis forward. 
2. With the work of a community type, the approach has to 
change from categorical. That is ordered around-type chains on the 
basis of pre-defined needs and attributed to specific categories of 
migrants (men only, women with children, unaccompanied minors, 
etc.) toward the person-oriented approach (Rizza, 2007). The 
communities are not abstract places, nor static. They need the actual 
knowledge of the dynamics of communication networks, the 
relationship of forces, and the symbolic heritage (Cimagalli 2013). 
Working with the community involves a patient personalization of 
interventions, which may not be restricted to operate within static 
categories. The community work is a difficult work to standardize, 
because it works with the complexity (Folgheraiter, 2012). 
3. Similarly, the intervention cannot be concentrated within the 
specific enclosure of “immigration policies”. Work with the 
community, even in this case, requires a new overall approach. 
The community is a mix of sizes: culture, home, work, school, 
food, and so on. Working with communities requires adopting non-
segmental policies, but able to communicate different systems 
(Bifulco, 2015).  
4. The spaces increase. Community is plural. Work with 
communities to step outside concentration, but use the city in broad 
terms to understand the specificities of the neighborhoods, the needs 
of the area and interact with them. The community is not simply 
contained in a territory, she implies ties, networks, a not always 
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predictable work with space.  
Following the teaching of Granovetter (1973), social policies 
must use the strength of weak ties to connect different groups. These 
weak ties are the links that connect different groups and 
communities.  
Too often, migration policies have used theoretical perspectives 
that limit the field of action to established paths. 
Now, the task of social policy is to work around the links more 
than on the individual. Only in this way we can meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the new complex societies. 
The borders of the community can be crossed. The community 
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Boundaries among Genders in the Mediterranean Area: 

















The present work is a reflection on the collective imagination 
built around the ideas of “masculine” and “feminine” within the cul-
tures of the countries bordering the Mediterranean, on the assump-
tion that the concept of “gender” has recently become one of the 
symbols that best expresses what is now conceived by many as a 
clash of civilizations, or between Western and Muslim countries. 
Recent news events – as the case of the women assaulted in Cologne1 
– highlight that the way of thinking about women, and gender issues 
in general, are emblematic of the cultural traits of a country and thus 
constitute some of the elements allowing for the construction of the 
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1 We refer to an event which had great prominence in the media, namely the 
aggression and harassement suffered by around 90 women near the Cologne train 
station during the 2016 New Year’s Eve by a group of foreigners of Arab origin. 
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dividing lines between cultures, arbitrarily distinguishing between 
“evolved” and “backward” ones, thus aiming to establish lines of 
demarcation between “Us” and the “Other”. 
This paper aims to analyse the ways in which Western countries 
help outline the debate on gender differences in the Mediterranean 
area. This debate often reveals the persistence of a certain degree of 
ethnocentrism and the inability of Western countries to take account 
of alternative models emerging in other Mediterranean contexts – 
particularly those of Islamic tradition – often considered culturally 
and morally “backwards” with regard to women’s rights and the 
plight of LGBT individuals. 
As we will see below, with regard to both the status of women 
and homosexuality, in a symbolically interconnected reality – also 
because of the new media – characterized by movements of people 
due to the intensification of migration from the Southern to the 
Western countries, we can no longer apply a compartmentalized ap-
proach to the study of culture, as cross-cultural research does 
(Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Triandis, 1989; Lonner & Adamopulos, 
1997), but rather we should analyse the nodes or convergences be-
tween different perspectives (Mantonavi, 2004)2. In doing so it is 
first necessary to overcome some approximations, namely the ones 
determined within the rhetoric of a clash between civilizations, be-
tween universes that may appear culturally monolithic, but are in 
reality, as said above, for better or for worse, in communication. 
Therefore, this work will aim to explore these approximations, 
through the collective imagination constructed by the West around 
the figure of Islamic women and the place they occupy in their soci-
ety of origin, and – given the ongoing migration processes – in the 
society of immigration, taking into account their traditions, but also 
their need for affirmation. The same goes for the issue of homosexu-
ality, whose debate’s outlines within the Islamic world in the West 
are little known, often represented through stereotypes, and therefore 
                                                            
2 Mantovani (2004, p. 34) carries out a review of this literature that «suggests 
simplistic and rather implausible dichotomies between a monolithic “West” and an 
equally monolithic “Rest of the World”, or between an homogeneous “West” and an 
equally homogeneous “East”». 
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approximate. To do this we must adopt, on the one hand, a cross-
cultural perspective that captures commonalities between cultures in 
the various areas of the world, and, on the other, an intersectional 
perspective, which considers the interplay of factors such as those of 
gender, race, class, in order to counter homogenizing readings of the 
Islamic world and to capture the movements for the protection of 
women’s and LGBT people’s rights now emerging within both the 
societies of origin and those of immigration. Indeed, the risk is to 
strengthen an emerging neo-colonial rhetoric that resorts too easily to 
an essentialized concept of culture, thus not avoiding the naturaliza-
tion of power relations, and causing inequality and discrimination to 
be invariably presented as the effect of natural inferiority, of a short-
coming, of a limit, of a defect in those who suffered them. Naturali-
zation is established, as Corradi accurately states «as an ideological 
need, especially when neocolonial imperialist aggression appears in a 
context influenced by the egalitarian instances characterising the 
1789 Revolution and the labour movement. And it is also a response 
to the movements that, since the end of the 18th century, call for 
égalité (equality) for women» (2009, p. 33). 
 
 
The social construction of gender in the Mediterranean: between 
“Occidentalism” and new practices of domination 
 
Since the beginning of the 90s, and even more extent after Sep-
tember 11, the discourse on women and Islam is paramount in both 
Muslim and Western countries’ policies3. International cooperation 
plans, as well as armed interventions, find their justification in their 
defence of human rights, and of women’s rights in particular. In fact, 
neither the focus on women nor the rhetoric of “liberation” are new 
                                                            
3 The US war in Afghanistan had the initial aim to capture Bin Laden. How-
ever, it then found its reason in the Taliban regime, and particularly in the condition 
experienced by women. Christine Delphy (2008, p. 111) describes this shift as fol-
lows: «After a month of bombing, the Alliance troops entered Kabul. Westerners 
claimed victory and enjoyed the feeling of having dome something nice and good. 
Newspapers publish the picture […] of a woman’s smile and the war thus finds its 
fourth reason: women’s liberation».  
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(or recent), and we can find their traces in many events marking the 
modern and contemporary history of Western countries and of their 
ways of relating to other countries with the aim to dominate and en-
slave them. The colonial past and the policies underlying world 
domination projects have always showed a particular concern for 
women in colonized countries, considered as backwards on this is-
sue. Between the 19th and the 20th century, European perceptions and 
imagination divided the world into a dichotomy: on one side we find 
the West, progress, modernity, the development of science, on the 
other the wild, “primitive” world of the territories colonized by 
European nations that in 1930, according to Loomba (1998) consti-
tuted 80% of the surface of the Earth. As Siebert (2014) explains, 
colonial imagery had a strong sexist component. Not surprisingly, 
the “civilizing mission” of the colonial administrators and Christian 
missionaries largely based its discursive rhetoric on the sexual habits 
and family traditions of Muslims. Women – represented as recluse 
by several walls and veils – was seen as the practical embodiment of 
the oppressive and barbaric Islamic traditions which the East had to 
completely abandon if it wanted to reach the level of development 
acquired by the European civilization (Delphy, 2008). The settlers’ 
attitude towards women was “predatory” and based on the precon-
ception of them being “loose”, as practices of concubinage and pros-
titution were very widespread in the colonies (Perilli, 2008)4. 
Today we are still to overcome this discourse, as it still represents 
the way in which the West looks at the foreigner, the immigrant, 
which in this case is no longer outside of our world, but lives in our 
                                                            
4 For example, in the liberal era in Eritrea it was common practice for Italian 
colonists to take local as companions (madamato), using the local institute called 
demoz, a form of fixed-term marriage contract that ultimately justified violent prac-
tices of domination and abuse of women (in the double sense of gender and race). 
The demoz (different from concubinage, which also existed) set on the spouses a 
binding reciprocity of obligations and duties, which where nevertheless not actually 
applied by the Italian colonizers, who saw in the madamato merely a convenient 
form of coexistence that assured access to domestic and sexual performances but left 
them substantially free from the constraints and responsibilities towards both the 
women and the mixed blood children eventually born in the relationship (Perilli, 
2008). 
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midst, in our society. Indeed, Siebert states that «The ambivalent at-
traction of the indigenous – often black – female body, evoked in 
publications of the era and in the colonial postcards, finds today its 
continuity in the relationships that white European men establish 
with immigrant prostitutes» (Perilli, 2008, p. 295). 
According to Beneduce (2008, p. 511) «Immigrants do not reveal, 
in their blank stare, only the complex political and human dimen-
sions of their situation, but also the density of an unspeakable re-
pressed collective past that is still waiting to be redeemed»5. Indeed, 
a strong ethnocentrism – with xenophobic tendencies – is still rooted 
in European culture, erecting an “Us” opposed to a “Non-Us”. Our 
culture is ultimately built «as a fundamental normative term crown-
ing the whole of humanity’s historical evolutionary process and 
against which every other culture is to be considered only as a pre-
culture, a lack of culture or, so to speak, an abusive culture» (Fer-
rarotti, 1988, p. 36). As we said above, since the Twin Towers attack 
on September 11 and up to the most recent upheavals affecting the 
North African continent with the Arab spring and the formation of 
the reactionary Islamic State ISIS, this reading is presented as a clash 
of civilization and, in Italy as elsewhere, it goes hand in hand with a 
growing diffusion of Islamophobia. As recent researches show, this 
makes it difficult to distinguish between issues related to immigra-
tion per se and those concerning Muslim populations in particular: 
«The greater visibility in the public space of the latter, either through 
outward symbols of religious affiliation, or by explicit request for 
recognition, such as, for example, the construction of places of wor-
ship, triggers ideological and cognitive mechanisms that tend to coa-
lesce around the whole anti-immigration speech» (Alietti et al., 2014, 
                                                            
5
 The past, called upon also by Siebert (2014), requires us to reconsider not only 
the events leading to nazi-fascism, but also our colonialist period, in order to under-
stand the close connections existing between past events and current migrations (and 
their characteristics). The scholar claims that occurred a colonial fracture, a ten-
dency to forget on the part of some European countries that dealt only partially with 
their colonial past: «The widespread lack of a sense of guilt or shame over the 
crimes committed in the past in the name of a supposed racial superiority is a fertile 




p. 9). The heated debate that followed the ban on wearing the veil in 
France in 2005, and the recent events in Cologne are examples that 
allow us to grasp the workings and persistence of this logic – ethno-
centric and neocolonialist at the same time – where gender is once 
again a symbol to distinguish the civilizations bordering the Mediter-
ranean – between the “advanced” ones and those less so – in order to 
dominate and subject them. 
 
 
Intersectional and postcolonial perspectives in gender studies: To-
wards an Islamic feminism? 
 
With the intensification of migration from the Southern Mediter-
ranean countries to Europe, interest in the intertwining of gender and 
race issues has found new impetus. Foreign nationals from countries 
with different cultural and religious traditions introduce practices 
regarding gender identity that pose many dilemmas for the European 
countries. Theorists of universal rights and of cultural relativism ar-
gue over what should be the rights guaranteed to Muslim women. 
The former accuse the latter of sacrificing women to patriarchal sub-
jugation in the name of the defence of cultural traditions and the plu-
rality of cultures. Defenders of cultural relativism respond to criti-
cism by arguing that the concept of equality by which women’s is-
sues has generally been addressed is the result of an idea of rights 
built around a subject which is far from being sexless, neutral, with 
neither colour nor social membership. Within this confrontation 
emerges a racism no longer referring to skin colour, but rather to the 
supposed incompatibility between Islamic and Western culture. We 
can therefore understand why the concepts of “gender” and “gender 
relations” constitute important aspects in order to grasp the state of 
maturity of the ongoing integration processes. In the name of human 
rights, equality, the principle of “equal opportunities”, the West 
represents itself and stands as a place of freedom, unlike the Islamic 
world – of which very little is actually known – identified as a place 
of oppression for both women and other kinds of minorities, such as 
LGBT individuals. 
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Within feminist theory, new arising currents of research are intro-
ducing the tools offered by postcolonial studies, analysing the situa-
tion experienced by foreigners, in particular the questions raised by 
gender identity and sexual orientation as aspects through which new 
forms of power and subjection can be expressed in the host countries 
(Masullo, 2015a). These studies point out how migrants’ gender and 
sexuality highlight the persistence of a domination and alteration 
model typical of the colonial era, emphasizing the social identity al-
location mechanisms used by Western societies, that follow essen-
tialist visions of the ethnic and sexual identities of migrants, that is of 
a social status considered as inferior and undesirable (Roy, 2012). 
This research trend highlights the persistence of a “colonialist” 
rhetoric referring not only to the most obvious economic and politi-
cal order inequalities between developing and industrialized coun-
tries, but also to the discursive practices on the Other, that is, to the 
persistence of a structural domination and the discursive or political 
suppression of heterogeneity and subjectivity (Roy, 2012). The latter 
aspects are particularly clear in the French debate following the af-
faire du foulard6, which can be considered to this day one of the 
most emblematic episodes of the way Western countries have met 
the demands of Muslim women. 
The veil which, in its many forms7, is seen in the eyes of Western 
women as the symbol of oppression of Muslim ones, takes on quite 
another meaning for those scholars who identify themselves with 
post-colonial criticism.  
                                                            
6 In January 2004 the French Government announced for the following month 
the implementation of a law adopted by the Parliament by an overwhelming 
majority, whose first article reads: «In primary, secondary, and high schools, signs 
and clothes ostentatiously manifesting the religious affiliation of students are 
forbidden» (Mangtovani, 2004, p. 141). The law was intended to resolve a long-
standing dispute, resulting in the expulsion of some students that despite contrary 
indications from the of the teachers had worn the veil, in defiance of the institution’s 
rules. 
7 They range from the Iranian chador or the Turkish carsaf, which cover the 
woman from head to toe, to the Afghan burqa, which also covers the face leaving 
only a dense lattice allowing the woman to look without being looked at, to the 
niquab which leavs free only the nose, to the hijab, a kind of foulard covering a 
woman’s hair and shoulders.  
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Mohanty (2009) considers the analytical categories used by 
Western feminists to read the experiences of Muslim women to be 
based on assumptions of privilege and on an ethnocentric universal-
ism. These are not secondary aspects because, as the scholar herself 
says: «research is never merely some simple “objective” knowledge, 
but it is also a discursive practice that has a political impact» (Mo-
hanty, 2009, p. 150). The difficulty lies in considering “sex-based 
differences” on the basis of an idea of patriarchy and male domina-
tion as a constant and monolithic characteristic, whatever the consid-
ered cultures. This vision tends to homogenizing and overlooking the 
variety of contexts, so that patriarchy and male chauvinism oppresses 
all women from the countries in this area of the world. And when 
this “difference from the Third World” arises, Western feminists 
seize and colonize the constitutive complexity of women’s lives in 
these countries. Muslim women are systematically imagined as vic-
tims (of men’s violence,of the colonization, of the Arab family sys-
tem, of economic development), and their image as created by these 
contexts hinders the formation of a coalition between Western femi-
nists and those who struggle in other parts of the world (Mohanty, 
2009). 
Post-colonial theory, by contrast, suggests an analysis of cultural 
practices within the social contexts in which they originate. Indeed, 
on the issue of the veil, it refers to the various meanings that this 
practice can take for a Muslim woman: «The veil can be imposed on 
a woman by her family or her clan, or it can be independently chosen 
by woman as a marker of identity. It can be felt as a religious obliga-
tion, or it can be adopted as a symbol of belonging to a group. It can 
be experienced as a form of decent appearance in public spaces or as 
a defence of women’s modesty (...) female combinations and behav-
iours in Western societies sometimes appear disturbing or confusing 
to the extent that Muslim women may feel the need to differentiate 
themselves from them» (Mantovani, 2004, pp. 141-142).  
These voices, belonging to non-Western cultures, blame Western 
feminists for overlaying their point of view to that of Muslim women 
and despising the meaning they give to their lives.  Thus is born an 
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Islamic feminism8, opposed to considerations – such as Susan Okin’s 
(1999) – highlighting that religion is largely responsible for the bad 
status of women in traditional cultures, as it controls and represses 
women through its founding myths and cultural practices9. By con-
trast, scholars of Islamic feminism reject the opposition between 
multiculturalism and women’s rights, as this conception stems from 
both a reified vision of cultures and a strong prejudice against for-
eign ones: «if some of them do not share the feminist perspective, it 
would be wrong to say that they are victims of a culturally generated 
false consciousness and that they need to be freed by well-
intentioned foreigners. This would be an arrogant and offensive atti-
tude, denying them the very equality that we claim to bring» (Parekh, 
1999, p. 72). 
The aim is thus to reconcile Islamic values and feminist demands, 
arguing that the emancipation of women should not necessarily be 
achieved by abandoning their culture in favour of Western values 
and a given universal idea of women’s rights: some institutions or 
roles that appear to be forms of oppression or discrimination, such as 
wearing the hijab, could instead be identity forms and practices able 
to increase women power in their communities or families. 
Thus we can witness, on the one hand, an attempt at disassocia-
tion from Western feminism and the “oppression rhetoric”, and on 
the other a process of cultural renewal carried out by Muslim femi-
nists with regard to those religious laws and rules not granting 
                                                            
8 Those who are called Islamic feminists, not always accept this label, given that 
the concept of feminism is a distinctive product of Western history. Others reject it 
because they claim to be part of the battles of the universal feminist movement, and 
do not believe it necessary to refer to Islam, even if they are practicing Muslims 
(Pepicelli, 2009).  
9 According to Susan Okin (1999), multiculturalism is harmful to women, as the 
attention to the rights of cultural minorities «in order to be compatible with the 
foundations of liberalism, should aim at the welfare of the members of these groups, 
there are no excuses to accept that their self-appointed leaders – who are invariably 
older males – represent the interests of all members. Unless women – and more 
specifically young women (as older women often cooperate with the strengthening 
of gender inequalities) – are fully represented in negotiations on the groups’ rights. 
Women’s interests may be more damaged than promoted by granting these rights» 
(Susan Okin, 1999, p. 24). 
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women equal rights. As Valentine Moghadam explained, this is «a 
Koran-centred reform movement by Muslim women with the linguis-
tic and theological knowledge to challenge patriarchal interpretations 
and offer alternative readings in pursuit of women’s advancement 
and in refutation of Western stereotypes and Islamist orthodoxy 
alike» (2004, p. 14). This is a global movement, it is not rooted in 
one country or the other, it has spread around the world, in the East 
and West alike. As Salih (2007) points out, the borders between 
Muslim women’s activist groups are porous and many women move 
in between different types of rhetoric and strategies, highlighting the 
complex and even contradictory nature of this issue. 
The exploration of these areas of study is critical, as the identified 
strategies highlight the somewhat reductionist view used by western 
feminist theory to look at these women’s reality and their ability to 
take their destiny into their own hands. 
The contemporary debate juxtaposes, on the one hand, “secular” 
feminists, aware of a certain oppression affecting women, and, on the 
other, Muslim feminists – which may or may not be defined as femi-
nists – whose core aim is to achieve gender equality in society, that 
they not only see not as valid within Islamic realities, but even as 
called for by the very Islamic religion (Salih, 2007). Islamic femi-
nists believe that women’s problems can be attributed in part to their 
attempt to match the men, while they suggest “complementarity” 
rather than equality between the sexes. For these militants the reali-
zation of the Islamic society as a whole will benefit women. Secular 
feminists, on their part, argue that Islamic feminism is an oxymoron. 
They quote international conventions and women rights as human 
rights, and they affirm that religion should be confined to the private 
sphere (Ali, 2012). While many secular feminists think that family 
codes should be based on international agreements, for Muslim and 
Islamists feminists the tools for their reform already exist in some 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence. According to Islamic feminists, 
like Iranian Ziba Mir-Hossein (2006), Islam recognizes all rights to 
women and supports gender equality, but over the centuries exclu-
sive male elites have imposed tight distorted interpretations of sacred 
texts and supported patriarchy in the name of the Koran. Islamic 
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feminists argue that today, in order to affirm women’s rights, it is 
necessary to fight Islamic orthodoxy and return to the original mes-
sage of Islam which guarantees gender equality. 
Summarizing, secular feminists emphasize how in Europe a wide-
spread multiculturalist rhetoric has led to the progressive marginali-
zation of secular and progressive voices in the Islamic world (and in 
Europe as well). According to Salih (2007), in some cases, the need 
to produce counter-discourses counterbalancing Orientalist represen-
tations stemming from a growing and dangerous Islamophobia, has 
ultimately led to committing to completely uncritical visions, even 
with regard to deplorable aspects of Muslim societies and regimes. 
 
 
Homosexuality and neocolonialism: from International Gay to 
homonationalism 
 
What said above on Muslim women can also be extended to in-
clude homosexuality, which is punished by law in some countries 
and has become emblematic of the closure of the Islamic world to-
wards gender diversity. Intersectionality – an analytical tool devel-
oped under black feminism to give voice to subjectivities other than 
white and middle class ones (Masullo, 2015a) is very useful to show 
how the representation of homophobic discrimination tends to over-
look the experiences of LGBT migrants from overseas territories not 
only as gay and/or lesbian, but also because of their skin colour 
(Daveness, 2015). 
In his recent book, Global Gay, Martel (2014) reviews the situa-
tion concerning the criminalization of homosexuality in Africa, 
showing that «Africa is a continent where homophobia is too often 
the norm: almost forty countries have laws prohibiting homosexual 
intercourse between consenting adults in twenty of these abuses on 
homosexuals are frequent. In about twenty of them abuses on homo-
sexuals are recurring. Finally, in four African Muslim countries, ho-
mosexuality is still punishable by death (Mauritania, Northern Su-
dan, northern Nigeria , and some parts of Somalia)» (Martel, 2004, p. 
177). Currently, according to the French scholar, we are witnessing a 
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tightening the laws against homosexuals, parallel to the decriminali-
zation movement supported by UN Member.  
In these contexts homosexuality is generally described as a phe-
nomenon introduced by the West and tied to its immoral and disso-
lute lifestyle, which the Arab world had known as a result of the 
colonization process, and recently as a result of media globalization 
(Coppola, 2014). 
According to the data of the report “Fleeing Homophobia”, every 
year in Europe 10.000 LGBT foreigners apply for international pro-
tection for sexual orientation and gender identity, but the situation 
differs greatly between the countries of Northern Europe and the 
European countries bordering the Mediterranean (Jansen & Spijker-
boer, 2011). Within the LGBT movement, many associations deal 
with welcoming foreigners applying for asylum; however, it is pre-
cisely this issue that, as a recent study points out, often highlights the 
persistence of some stereotypes about LGBT individuals from Is-
lamic countries (Masullo, 2015b). Migrants sharing this ethnic, na-
tional, and religious belonging are often seen as carriers of homo-
phobic conservatism, which shows, for example, in their difficulty to 
freely “experience” themselves as locals do. This is because often 
some of their difficulties are not recognized, such as those experi-
enced in a society where foreigners can undergo multiple forms of 
discrimination, related not only to sexual orientation, but also to eth-
nicity and class. The very process implemented to ensure the recog-
nition of asylum rights to the foreigner, for example, is based on the 
imposition of a moral contract that leads to accept the “common val-
ues” and at the same time on the implied rejection of the foreigner’s 
culture, considered as emblematic of gender oppression (Roy, 2012). 
Although even in Western countries homosexuals do not enjoy the 
same citizenship rights as heterosexuals, and there are many situa-
tions in which sexual orientation leads to discrimination, the gay mi-
lieu reproduces negative and homogenizing representations of the 
migrant’s culture. A recent research by Davennes (2015) highlights 
the difficulties in holding together in the same political gesture – es-
pecially within LGBTQIA associations’ federations – the dual identi-
ties of gay and lesbian victims of racism because they are blacks or 
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mixed-race individuals, constantly ascribed to the exoticism of their 
extra-continental origin or to the issue of immigration. According to 
Prearo (2015, p. 14) «Raceblindness, the blindness to wards “race” 
of dominant activists thus results in a form of marginalization that, 
within LGBTQIA militancy, states a more general logic of reproduc-
tion of racist domain models, affecting also sexual minorities». 
Precisely as a reaction to this blindness and to this tendency to-
wards giving a rather monolithic reading of Islamic culture and relig-
ion, are born alternative points of view (and movements) within the 
moderate Islamic world. These movements, by proposing more rights 
and equality for homosexuals, are trying to overcome the supposed 
incompatibility between Islam and homosexuality existing in both 
Western and Eastern collective consciousness. Khaled El-Rouayheb 
(2005) , in his book Before Homosexuality, tracing the reasons for 
the supposed incompatibility between homosexuality and the Arab-
Muslim world, describes through a re-reading of history the tolerance 
and openness of the Arab-Muslim world towards pre-modern gender 
diversity and non-normative sexual orientation, which has been lost 
as a result of colonial domination policies. 
Also Joseph Massad (2007), in his book Desiring Arabs, develops 
a systematic analysis over the centuries, not of spiritual traditions, 
but of literature and poetry in the Arab-Muslim world, the novels and 
medicine treatises. Massad’s analysis of the evolution of sexual and 
political identities in the Arab-Muslim world criticises what he calls 
“the international gay lobby”10. According to this author, since the 
80s, but particularly during the 90s, the international gay, echoing 
American neo-colonialist policies, implemented «an incitement to 
the discourse on sexuality» (it is not by chance that Massad used this 
expression, coined by Foucault (2013) in his book The History of 
Sexuality) in order to categorize and distinguish sexual identities, 
which until then had been quite blurred within Arab countries. As a 
reaction to this “mission” of “liberation” and “modernization”, the 
policies and ideologies opposed to sexuality and “deviant” sexual 
                                                            
10 This expression designates the various associations for the advocacy of LGBT 
rights, NGOs for the defence of human rights, and Western scientific societies 
engaged in supporting these causes.  
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practices – such as sodomy – have become more repressive. Accord-
ing to this scholar, the current repression against homosexuals in 
these countries is seen as the reproduction on a global scale of the 
cause of “Western” homosexuals11.  
Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle (2013) is instead less critical in his 
book Homosexuality in Islam, where he highlights the movements 
that, within the Islamic and Western societies, through a re-reading 
of sacred texts – the Koran and the hadith (prophetic traditions) in 
particular – demonstrate that Islam, as opposed to common thinking, 
recognizes and supports gender equality. The author reiterates that 
over the centuries a small male elite imposed distorted interpretations 
of sacred texts and sustained patriarchy in the name the Koran. 
As Coppola (2014, p. 29) points out «Today more than ever to re-
flect critically on issues concerning Islam is very difficult. Usually 
we tend to reduce the complexity of this religion into clichés and 
stereotyped categories of thought; we tend to order the varied Mus-
lim world according to improper codes and language; we judge Islam 
through western culture guidelines, forgetting that the paths and the 
historical evolution of the West, on the one hand, and of the (Middle) 
East, on the other, have been quite different». This aspect is not only 
one way – from the Western world towards the East – but also bi-
directional, as, in response to Orientalism, Occidentalism is estab-
lishing itself – in Campanini’s (2007) words, a kind of Reverse Ori-
entalism12. Just as Orientalism did, this Reverse Orientalism aims at 
highlighting the diversity of the Western world from the Arabic and 
Muslim world. According to Coppola (2014, p. 185) «Reverse Orien-
talism emphasizes the diversity of the Western world by using ex-
periences, attitudes, lifestyles, as well as political, economic and so-
cial peculiarities of the West». 
                                                            
11 For a more detailed analysis of the texts, see Rebucini (2014).  
12 The term Orientalism appeared for the first time in France, in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, and since then it has taken on different meanings. On the one 
hand, «it denoted the Western invention of the East, with particular reference to the 
Muslim world, while on the other it encased, in a much wider sense, the various 
attitudes of the West towards other East and South Asian cultures, religions, and 
societies» (Coppola, 2014: 185). 
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More recently, in his 2007 book Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir 
Puar develops the concept of “homonationalism” in order to under-
stand how the mainstream lesbian and gay movement not only stifled 
the radically anti-neoliberal LGBT movements, but also how it be-
came an effective tool for the advancement of US imperialism. Ac-
cording to Kouri-Towe (2012), homonationalism talks about the 
ways in which Western powers put into circulation certain kinds of 
ideas about other cultures (such as the Arab or Islamic ones), in order 
to produce an image of the West as culturally, morally, and politi-
cally advanced and superior. Homonationalism focuses in particular 
on the ways in which the rhetoric on gender and sexual rights acquire 
a central role in contemporary forms of Western hegemony. 
Following this lead, Hilary King (2014) recently highlighted the 
instrumental use of the rhetoric on sexual rights by the US, who built 
an image of themselves as a progressive country, morally superior to 
the states with different laws and legislations regarding LGBT indi-
viduals. As an example of this rhetoric, the researcher examines the 
speech given on 22 March 2014 by the US vice president, Joe Biden, 
at the gala opening of the Human Rights Campaign in Los Angeles. 
According to King, reaffirming the commitment of American foreign 
policy on LGBT rights, Biden claims to be a promoter of human 
rights, denouncing how hatred towards LGBT individuals can no 
longer be justified under the pretext of cultural norms. But his speech 
showed a short-sighted use of the expression “cultural norms”, not 
considering those cultures which have been hampered, deprived or 
transformed by imperialism and colonial power13. Moreover, his 
speech does not mention the “cultural norms” of the United States, 
the discrimination still suffered by many gays and lesbians in this 
country, whose heteronormative culture is still very strong. Far more 
serious, in King’s opinion, is the fact that Biden, when considering 
the LGBT identity, does not take into account the intersections be-
                                                            
13 For example, he harshly criticizes (and rightly so) Uganda for its laws 
punishing people for “aggravated homosexuality”, but he does not say that they were 
passed with the help of American evangelical Christian groups, that worked 




tween race, gender, class, and ethnicity, reducing everything to a 





The Islamophobic climate currently characterising all European 
countries is likely to increase, also due to the pressure caused by the 
high number of refugees coming from those Mediterranean countries 
now at war – such as Syria. In addition, we must consider the recent 
bombings at the heart of Europe, first in Paris and then in Brussels, 
in the name of ISIS. Under the pressure of these events, every ele-
ment can be exploited in the geopolitical (and mass media) rhetoric 
of the clash of civilizations. As the above analysis points out, the 
gender dimension called upon by this rhetoric shows new colonialist 
and imperialist purposes. 
The Cologne attacks carried out by a group of immigrants, and 
particularly the following debate in both politics and the mass media, 
highlight once again the subordination of women, considered as 
stakes in the global civil war tactics game, or as victims that Western 
males have to defend from the attacks of those coming from the 
countries where women are subject to a systemic sexism. And yet, as 
Natalia Aspesi (2016) points out: «Western women are not safe any-
where, in the squares they are assaulted by immigrants, but the gang 
is often made up of locals, and they must be careful even in their 
own home». Therefore, neither the status of women, nor that of for-
eign homosexuals can be considered as tools for distinguishing be-
tween cultures, between the more and less developed ones. This hap-
pens for purposes of mere ideological opportunism, in order to sup-
port anti-migration policies so widely discussed today in almost all 
European countries. 
This logic, which uses gender issues as a key to demarcate 
boundaries between cultures, can lead to dangerous abuses if brought 
to its extreme. Recently there was a heated discussion following the 
publication of a sex manual for migrants (Zanzu) by the German 
Ministry of Health, with the aim of helping health workers and for-
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eigners to interact on the topic14. However, beyond good intentions, 
there were critics who linked this sudden “interest” for the sex lives 
of migrants to the events in Cologne. In short, the risk is to reproduce 
a stereotypical view of the Other and its culture using the same ar-
gumentative strategies of the colonial past (Siebert, 2014). 
The above analysis allowed us to describe how the outlines of the 
gender debate in the Mediterranean are often based on meanings that 
do not do justice to the cultures of the countries surrounding it, espe-
cially those belonging to the Arab Muslim world, where gender and 
gender relations take on different configurations, which can not be 
simplified through monolithic representations of Islam. It is no 
longer acceptable to marginalize – depicting them as extremist and 
fundamentalist – the vast amount of existing subjectivities and the 
extremely diverse movements within them, that, in their practices as 
well as in their speeches, state full compatibility between their cul-
ture and religion and the principles of gender equality. 
On the contrary these configurations need to be recognized so as 
not to incur again in “raceblindness” and racist domination models, 
now once more widespread through Europe, and more generally in 
the West, which continues to represent itself as the home of human 
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In the context of Malta’s Valletta 20181 commitment to maxim-
ise, popularise and ‘Europeanise’ its cultural spaces, the chapter ex-
amines the role of national museum spaces in the contemporary era 
of cultural hybridisation, liquidity (Bauman, 2000) and mobility. 
Devoting attention to the proposed MUŻA (Mużew ta’ l-Arti – Art 
Museum) and its artefacts, as well as other museums and displays, 
the paper examines how museums can become truly democratic 
spaces. By democratic spaces we mean places with which people can 
identify and which allow them to contribute to their narratives and 
cultural production, besides critically engaging with curatorial 
choices. In this regard, we are suggesting a non-conventional 
approach to reading and appreciating artefacts in a museum, one that 
allows for a less hierarchical reading, and valorises communal, social 
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class, religious identity and environmental perspectives. Ours is an 
attempt at enabling works to ‘speak’ to contemporary concerns. We, 
however, recognise the need to avoid giving these works any false 
sense of ‘universality’. 
The predominance of knowledge as a critical factor in economic 
growth raises one politically-loaded and ethically-challenging issue: 
what and whose knowledge is being recognised, valorised and offi-
cially affirmed and who is providing the arbitrary decisions regard-
ing the selection of cultures and knowledges?  
Literature questioning whose knowledge counts posits the need 
for a knowledge democracy involving curatorial intermediaries, well 
prepared to engage in authentic dialogues with their publics. Writing 
in 2006, Boaventura de Sousa Santos goes one step further by 
making a case for ‘ecologies of knowledge’, emphasising the need to 
embrace excluded knowledges from ‘the other side of the line’.  
In 2003, Borg, Cauchi and Mayo foregrounded colonial 
appropriation and exoticisation of ‘other’ knowledges when 
analysing institutions such as the National Maritime Museum and St 
John’s Co-Cathedral. They argued, in this regard, that, while local 
museums have become more pedagogically appealing, there is a need 
for the democratisation of Maltese curatorial experiences. Decisions 
need to be more community responsive, genuinely democratic and 
reciprocal. This democractic vision is urgent in view of Valletta 
2018’s commitment towards community participation and in view of 
the recurring critiques of various editions of European Capitals of 
Culture (EcoC). Writing in 2013, Garcia and Cox noted that, in 
general, while cities are interested in popularising participation, the 
strategy used in the process is often patronising, centralised and 
tokenising in its approach. It is to the potential for ‘ authentic voices 
from the margins’ that we now turn. We focus on one site, the Na-
tional Museum of Fine Arts, which is currently in its initial stages of 
conversion to MUŻA.  
A perceptive essay by Columbia University Professor, Mark C. 
Taylor tackles our modern day obsession with ‘speed’. This obses-
sion has its social ramifications, not least road accidents such as the 
fatal one we both witnessed in 2002, on one of Los Angeles free-
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ways, that was symptomatic of living in a place where everyone 
needs to be somewhere else in five minutes time to survive on the 
Capitalist fast lane (Mayo, 2006). Taylor declares that “the cult of 
speed is a modern phenomenon” and cites Filippo Marinetti, author 
of the Futurist Manifesto, who declared: “We say that the world’s 
magnificence has been enriched by the beauty of speed” (cited in 
Taylor, 2014, p. 36).  
 
 
Fig. 1 - Antonio Sciortino (1879-1947), Speed – National Museum of Fine Arts, 
Malta 
 
Futurists, Marinetti and Speed! This immediately brought to mind 
a collection of sculptures in the Valletta Fine Arts collection which 
will most likely be transferred to the new MUŻA premises. It is very 
difficult not to think, in this context, of the gradual intensification of 
movement in Antonio Sciortino’s (1879-1947) sculptures starting 
with the ballet and tennis court rhythms and culminating in the ulti-
mate ‘turbo-like’ speed of horses. In full flight, these horses capture 
the adrenalin rush of fierce competition. The Sciortino sculptures can 
provide the focus of a contemporary discussion around the modernist 
or postmodernist obsession with speed (Fig. 1).  
Prodded by imaginative prompts or what Freire would call ‘hinge 
themes’, by whoever is conducting the discussion, the reflections can 
easily lead to a consideration of how art and the artistic styles, to 
which wilfully committed artists or ‘unsuspecting’ ones were attract-
ed, reflected a change in values occurring on a wide scale. These 
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values continued to be reinforced, not least following “the transition 
from mechanical to electronic technologies” which made speed in-
crease significantly. In Mark C. Taylor’s view, these values might 
have allowed capitalism to thrive but now threaten its future and the 
future of the planet itself. The earth is made to operate on rhythms it 
cannot sustain, to its own detriment and that of those who directly 
make it function thus (e.g. those who employ the means to make it 
operate in this unsustainable manner e.g. use of chemicals) (Ibid.). 
‘Things of beauty’ can still provoke a whole series of disturbing 
questions. In a genuinely democratic public environment, these type 
of questions would be allowed to emerge as the work of art becomes 
an object of investigation, conjuring up ideas which can be regarded 
as forms of resistance to the dominant narratives.     
Similarly worthy of investigation, in this manner, are the many 
landscapes and vedute of bygone Malta, some hearkening back to the 
18th-early 19th century. Among the latter are landscapes of the Nea-
politan Gerolamo Gianni (1837-1895). A typical example would be 
Gianni’s depiction of ‘Tarxien (Tarscien) House’ (Fig. 2) viewed 
from a distance. Mental juxtapositions involving Gianni’s bygone 
landscape and images of contemporary sites can easily raise issues 
concerning the vanishing rural spaces of the Maltese islands.  
Clear demarcations between town/village and countryside are no 
longer existent, the most tangible outcome of a construction-driven 
economy. This Maltese way of ravaging planet earth is symptomatic 
of a ‘mind set’ through which the environment is seen not as some-
thing in which one is rooted and with which one lives in harmony but 
as an object of manipulation. Extraction and control are the key 
words. Stimulating debates about the ravaging of planet earth be-
comes all the more urgent in an age when public spaces are globally 
being subjected to commodification and speculative encroachment. 
A potential debate along these lines, stimulated by Gianni’s painting, 
can underline art’s potential as a vehicle for resistance to Capital-
ism’s extended reach into one time public spaces or ‘commons’.   
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Fig. 2 - Gerolamo Gianni (1837-1895), Tarxien (Tarscien) House – National Muse-
um of Fine Arts, Malta 
 
Paintings such as the earlier one by Gianni also connect with con-
temporary reality through juxtaposition between past and present. So 
do the ‘bourgeois’ depictions of the ‘quaint’ kampanjol (peasant) 
(see Bartolo, 1993), by Edward Caruana Dingli (1876-1950), espe-
cially when juxtaposed against the more dignified rendering, in the 
same collection, by Antonio Barrera (1889-1970), of fishers at work, 
once again in the context of primary production.  
The latter can raise issues concerning the dignity of work, the 
eventual organisation of the working class and the present losses of 
this social class’s hard-earned gains, as its members and their repre-
sentatives are forced to adapt to ‘Capitalist realism’ (there is no al-
ternative) (Fisher, 2009), and precarious living. ‘Social Realist’ 
paintings of the nineteenth century, and their neo-’social realist’ ver-
sions of the twentieth, with their clear depiction of basic living, pro-
vide stark reminders of the vulnerability which has been the staple of 
labouring class life. This condition reappears in the precarious nature 
of job availability in the present day economic scenario which is 
primarily services-oriented. Then there is the illusion of some de-
classé members of the former middle class: they still cling to the 
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conviction, reflected in their consumption tastes, that they share their 
family’s original class location, when the hard hitting reality is that 
they probably possess more formal education than their parents but 
cannot hope to enjoy the latter’s standard of living. This failure to 
understand one’s class location militates against any form of ‘class-
consciousness’. It is the ‘class-consciousness’ to which the ‘social 
realist’ painters of France, including communards such as Gustave 
Courbet (1819-1877), appealed. This appeal might have been echoed 
by Barrera, in the same Valletta collection, a century later. 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Valentine de Boulogne (1591-1632), Judith and Holofernes – National Mu-
seum of Fine Arts, Malta 
 
The same museum collection offers fine opportunities for con-
temporary discussions in its sections representing earlier artistic pe-
riods. A conversation by one of us with the current Curator of Fine 
Arts, Sandro Debono, focused on what has traditionally been regard-
ed as the Museum’s finest gathering of paintings and sculpture – the 
Counter-Reformation driven seventeenth-century collection of 
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bloody, violent depictions, with the emphasis on martyrdom, stoi-
cism and heroic acts. Prominent is the mythical figure of Judith, first 
shown decapitating Holofernes (Fig. 3), in the gory depiction by 
Moise Le Valentin or Valentin de Boulogne (1591-1632).This was 
an overworked theme during the period, the most prominent exam-
ples being Caravaggio’s rendering of the subject and Artemisia Gen-
tileschi’s version at the Capodimonte Museum in Naples. There is 
also Judith’s triumphant display of the severed head in another paint-
ing (Fig. 4), this time by Mattia Preti (1613-1699)2.  
 
 
Fig. 4 – Mattia Preti (1613-1632), Triumph of Judith – National Museum of Fine Arts, Mal-
ta 
 
“Isn’t that Jihad?” the Curator quipped. Acknowledging that dif-
ferent Muslims would dispute the proper meaning of Jihad, we feel 
that the Curator touches on an important point as far as relevance to 
contemporary communities is concerned. We are exposed to media 
representations and possibly falsifications of the meaning of ‘Jihad’. 
                                                            
2 The Museum houses his largest collection anywhere with no less than 16 
works on view. 
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Discussions around this theme foreground the notions of suffering 
and violence as recurring features of religious extremism. References 
can be made to periods when the new Protestant Reformation ration-
ally called into question the Vatican’s authority, with its perceived 
deceptions (e.g. plenary indulgences) and corruption at its core, and 
to the present day when political vacuums (Iraq, Syria and Libya), 
perceived widespread Arab and Muslim humiliation (Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib), and value disorientations lead to different forms of 
militant religious commitments. The latter include resorting to reli-
gious fanaticism and militarism in the form of Isis, Al-Qaeda, Boko 
Haram and Shabab. The latter also include actions of lone ‘gung-ho’ 
Neo-Nazis and selfdeclared ‘Christians’ such as Anders Behring 
Breivik3 with his massacre of 77 people, many of them children, in 
Norway. How do these images of fanatic faith affirmation, as mani-
fest through seventeenth-century art, including theatre (with their fill 
of gory ‘Senecan’ elements), and throughout the ‘body politic’ itself 
(see Lyons, 2015), connect with present day sensitivities? Of course, 
we must emphasise the importance of aesthetic discussions - elegant 
cold colouring as in Le Valentin, powerful design, superb sense of 
composition, tenebroso effects, over-all ‘bravura’ and, in many, Ca-
ravaggist, or Dutch-Caravaggist paintings, artificial shafts of light 
(Matthias Stom, c 1600-after 1652). All these heighten the dramatic 
intensity of the scenes. (Mayo, 1997, p. 18) We would argue that, if 
steered carefully, the discussions can also enhance the paintings’ 
contemporary relevance, striking a chord with visitors and their so-
cial and individual preoccupations. 
Needless to say, twentieth-century paintings, including those fall-
ing under the rubric of ‘Sacred Art,’ strike even more sonorous 
chords. Giuseppe Schembri Bonaci (2008) leads us in this direction 
with his study on twentieth-century artists Willie Apap (1918-1970) 
and Emvin Cremona (1919-1987). We would explore here how 
paintings affirming Catholic religious faith preyed on the sensibility 
                                                            
3 He is reported to have blamed, on internet postings, Europe’s left-wing parties 
for destroying the continent’s Christian heritage by allowing mass immigration of 
Muslims. CBS News February 18, 2013 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-look-
back-at-the-norway-massacre/. Retrieved 11 April 2015. 
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of not only contemporary but later artists in a country where ‘Sacred 
Art’ in a traditional figurative idiom continued to hold sway well into 
the twentieth century.  
The museum at the core of the MUŻA project is just one type of 
museum among the many different types of museums available or 
likely to be set up on the island. It raises a number of issues which 
render it relevant to our times and enable it to resonate with a 
particular ‘structure of feeling’(Williams, 1961, pp. 64-88) emerging 
from the society in which we live. We feel, however, that the one 
type of museum which needs to emerge in the various localities of 
Malta and Gozo, that can be truly representative of different cultures 
existing within their surrounding communities, and to which national 
museums such as MUŻA can contribute, would be the community 
museum. We would argue that the country needs museums of this 
sort, although we do come across the occasional display of, say, the 
Birgu War Museum that connects with people’s daily lives4. A mu-
seum about the city of Valletta is being developed at the refurbished 
Fort St Elmo. One hopes that it will eventually begin to reflect the 
lives of ordinary citizens (a People’s Museum) and not simply those 
who ruled the islands from their position of privilege - colonial, ec-
clesiastical or otherwise. The display and its activities would hope-
fully reflect life in the different quarters throughout the city and be 
complemented by similar museums in other localities throughout 
Malta and Gozo. These museums can be exemplars of ‘history from 
below’, enjoying wide communal ownership. Local councils should 
play an important role in setting up their community museum. We 
would recommend budgetary provisions for such a cultural develop-
ment which would be part and parcel of the same council’s develop-
ment of community cultural and education projects. We would sug-
gest that extra funding is provided for the latter programmes. It is 
these museums which would hold out the promise for becoming truly 
popular sites of cultural resistance, contestation and renewal. There 
is, of course, a constant battle to be fought against monopolization 
(by a select few), ossification and exclusionary ‘social capital’ that 
                                                            
4 We thank Vicky Ann Cremona for bringing the Birgu War Museum to mind 
and highlighting its connections with the lives of ordinary people. 
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might well foreground the interests of some and marginalise the in-
terests of many others. Community organisations and local councils 
are not to be romanticised. A community museum, on the lines just 
suggested, strikes us as being overdue. If rendered dynamic and gen-
uinely inclusive, it would serve as an antithesis to the dominant nar-
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Early school leaving is considered a notable obstacle for the 
economic development and the social inclusion all over Europe. In 
that respect, there is a joint effort of European countries to develop 
policies of remediation and prevention that may reduce the negative 
impact of early school leaving for supporting smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. 
Sociological literature on early school leaving is quite extensive. 
It relates early school leaving to socio-economic status, social class, 
school effects as well as individual agency (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1977; Coleman, 1966; Lamb et al., 2011; NESSE, 2010). 
Accordingly, early school leaving is considered as a measurable 
effect of many social, educational, individual variables. By drawing 
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on mobile sociologies of education (Landri & Neumann, 2014) in 
this paper I would like to contrast two ways of dealing with early 
school leaving: a tactical approach aiming at „harm reduction‟ and a 
strategic approach that assumes a holistic view on transforming the 
school and the ecology of education practice (De Certeau, 1990). I 
will describe the practice of tackling early schooling as an 
assemblage of knowledge, people and educational technologies that 
enacts „early school leaving‟, responds, and modifies it in different 
ways. To describe these practices in detail I will illustrate two ways 
of tackling early school leaving emerging in a program funded by 
Comenius Regio Project “A care for every child”, in 2012-2014, 
aimed at reducing early school leaving high risk for children living in 
some highly deprived socioeconomic territories of Albacete in Spain 
and Naples in Italy. 
The project focuses on irregular attendance in compulsory school, 
here considered a „warning signal‟ for early school leaving. „Irregular 
attendance‟ raises several questions: What are the causes of 
intermittent school attendance? To what extent, does it relate to early 
school leaving? In which ways may the school and the ecology of 
education practice be mobilized to combat the intermittent 
attendance? How are discourses, policies and practices associated to 
address the intermittent school attendance? How do they relate to 
early school leaving? To give some replies to these questions the 
paper introduce and discuss a case study on school attendance in the 
first cycle of education that has been produced by comparing the 
reality of two schools located in two particularly disadvantaged 
remote areas: “Virgilio 4” school in the Scampia district of Naples 
and “La Paz” school in the district of La Milagrosa, the most 
degraded suburb of Albacete in Castilla - La Mancha.  
The paper draws methodologically on “practice-based studies” 
(Bruni & Gherardi, 2007; Landri, 2007; Gherardi, 2008) and take the 
context and the interactives between the actors (human and non-
human) who “live” as fundamental under investigation. The data 
collection occurred through: a) literature review; b) analysis of 
“intermittet” attendance rates; c) the critical review of institutional 
documents (regulations, guidelines etc.); d) direct research through: a 
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focus group with head teacher and teachers; depth interviews with 
the head teacher, teachers, parents, students, actors of no-profit 
associations. Elsewhere, the analysis of these sets of data explicitly 
draws on the methodology of grounded theory (Cardano, 2003). 
Working hypothesis was: the decrease or the increase of the 
intermittent school attendance depends on complex action nets that 
develop among students, families, schools, social services, and the 
work of no-profit associations in a specific geographical area. 
The case study conducted here is not aimed at defining the 
conditions of reproducibility and generalization of the empirical 
results, but at the dialogic debate between the different experiences 
and at the identification of ideas and actions that impact schooling 
paths positively or, on the contrary, negatively. Therefore, the goal of 
the research is not the definition of an intervention model, but the 
search for processes, trajectories and innovative measures in 
educational paths that promote school attendance. 
 
 
School Attendance in the Perspective of Practice-based Studies 
 
The analysis focuses on intermittent school attendance as non-
canonical situated practice, that “deviates” from the paths defined 
regular since the early segments of education, then a potential field 
of risk. 
Like any other social phenomenon school attendance is not con-
figurable as intimate action, the result of individual choices and ac-
tions, but rather as a situated sociocultural practice, emerging from 
the dynamic of the interactions that develop between the social and 
institutional actors, who are both involved in the construction of the 
local education system. 
It follows that school attendance is formed as an effect of a net-
work of actions-interactions rooted in the practices and in carrying 
them out (Gherardi, 2008, p. 22) of the local education system. In the 
perspective of the Actor-network theory (Latour, 1998) it can be said 
that it is closely interconnected and it interacts with other everyday 
life practices (it is intertwined with family practices, informal educa-
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tion practices, non-formal education practices, leisure practices, prac-
tices of peer group socialization, etc.) 
 
 
Generative Practices of Irregular School Attendance at Scampia 
 
The field research on the generative conditions of irregular 
attendance showed a web of closely interrelated practices that relate 
to the structural context in which the school is situated, to the family 
background, to the institutional conditions concerning the operation 
of the school organization and the actions of the other institutional 
actors. The strong persistent degradation prevailing in the local 
context is recognized as the cornerstone onto which all others graft. 
Among the factors that relate more specifically to the practices 
inherent in the family background the conditions of economic 
poverty and social exclusion faced by the marginal underproletariat 
acquire a prominent position. These are the drop out families, 
numerous cores compared to the city average in which different 
conditions of discomfort often rooted in the family history 
accumulate: parents who lack education, family and youth 
unemployment, overuse of mothers‟ family chores, early pregnancies 
and consequent conditions of psychological distress of the mother, 
fathers in prison. They all provide a growth environment strongly 
deprived from the economic, cultural and relational-affective aspect. 
Organizational practices relating to domestic activities, activities 
of material subsistence and family care, the rhythms of the sleep-
wake cycle, visiting fathers in prison, interrupt school attendance in a 
more or less repeated measure. Often in these contexts children are 
involved in domestic and family care activities, how to do the 
housework, look after younger siblings or help fathers work outside 
the home. 
From a symbolic cultural perspective, strong distrust in 
institutions and the lack of recognition of the value of education in 
the local culture assume great significance. 
Other generative practices of intermittent attendance concern 
more specifically the courses of action and the devices within the 
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school system (austerity policies and progressive reduction of 
financial and human resources, the system of relationships, rules, 
institutional practices, curricula, etc.). 
In the lower secondary school there is a strong disconnection 
between the educational needs of children and the ability of the 
school to attract and keep them involved. In particular, there was 
little continuity and ability to forge links between the different 
segments of education, deficit of continuity and orientation in the 
transition from primary school to lower secondary school. 
In particular, the focus is on the lack of ability of the educational 
institution to produce innovation in educational practices. Students 
do not feel involved in the teaching practices, often distant and 
separate from the experiences in other contexts of everyday life 
(Lipari, 2012). Languages, technology and artifacts through which 
the teaching is realized do not have relevance and significance. The 
school offers a standard of education (school curricula, contents, 
languages and standardized assessment procedures) in which the 
focus on results - in the spotlight of the evaluation system - demeans 
the essential attention to the learning process and the difficulties that 
arise during schooling, to the gaps of communication, to the critical 
events that occur in the history of each individual student. 
 
 
The Enforcement Actions: a Dissipative Educational System 
 
The field research focuses on the contextual factors that relate to 
the role and actions of the other institutions of the territory and the 
weak integration capability in the construction of the system of local 
interventions. In particular, the various stakeholders interviewed 
stressed the Social Services‟ lack of intervention and taking-over 
capacity. 
“Virgilio 4” school triggered dynamics of collaboration with 
different actors of no-profit associations. However, several 
constraints affect the structuring ability of sedimented widened 
action networks: firstly, insufficient enhancement and integration of 
such bodies in the system of local social policies. Mostly the 
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relationships between the various institutional and social services 
involved appear contingent to project activities that are developed 
through the European Structural Funds, confined in a space/time 
bound to the availability of financial resources that do not affect the 
school routine. The associations are fighting for the material 
subsistence of the employed structures and operators. This latter 
factor in particular, is a focal point that generates conflicting 
competitive dynamics, in which elements of unfair competition 
sometimes prevail. Secondly, the absence of a pedagogical matrix 
and a methodology that frames a strategy of intervention and 
common goals. Associations‟ educational activity does not affect 
school activities. It follows a marked fragmentation and a weak 
capacity to build networks of permanent preventive actions which 
reveals the institutional arrangements for monitoring and mere 




Containment Devices of Irregular School Attendance 
 
As for the devices that promote school attendance, the field 
research showed actions of discomfort containment which are 
configured as tactics of incremental adaptation which are not 
integrated into an overall strategic action. 
Among these devices, first compulsory education which generally 
acts as a coercive factor and then school transport as a facilitating 
factor for disadvantaged pupils who live far from the school. 
The didactic laboratory and the extension of school time are the 
most effective devices in terms of attractiveness and educational 
success. During the period 2009-2012 the stabilization of the 
teaching staff, the testing of new didactic tools and methodologies 
have produced positive results in primary school attendance. In 
particular, in the fifth grade 7 pupils who had been failed several 
times for occasional absences finally passed. 
In addition to these factors, then, informal practices of non 
repressive-punitive containment supporting the class group in 
Tactics or strategies? The Governance of Early School Leaving… 
155 
conflict situations, which are unbearable by the individual teacher. 
The headmaster‟s office serves as the “place of decompression” of 
the tensions, through the intervention of the headmaster who 
exercises containment action. 
Another important device is the involvement of families in school 
life that is delivered through the birth of an association, created by a 
small group of parents, which aims to provide support to school 
activities and to promote school-family meetings. However, the 
action capacity of the association compared to the amplitude of the 
issues and to the social complexity that characterizes the educational 
background appears very limited. 
 
 
“La Paz” School: the School at the Center of an Experience of 
Social Life Regeneration 
 
“La Paz” school is located in a district called La Milagrosa that 
even with a lower population density presents social problems which 
appear very similar to those of Scampia: very high rates of youth 
population, high concentration of disadvantaged population, mainly 
of Gypsies and immigrants, high levels of illiteracy and 
unemployment, concentration of low-profile business activities. “La 
Paz” public school is smaller than “Virgilio 4” school (about 300 
students); it includes mainly students in conditions of economic 
disadvantage, with an immigrant gypsy origin, which is a reflection 
of the social multiethnic reality of La Milagrosa. 
Similarly to what was observed in Scampia, the analysis on the 
absenteeism causes conducted by the Spanish partnership highlights 
the significance of the situations that relate to the district 
background. The states of family poverty and illiteracy were 
recognized as the first generative factors of irregular attendance in 
primary school. In the growth and education path these conditions 
interact with the personal characteristics and practices that relate to 
the operation of the school and in general to the relationship that the 
student develops with the school environment. 
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Based on these empirical acquisitions during the school year 
2005-2006 the educational project of “Learning Communities” has 
been implemented. It has profoundly transformed the old school CP 
“San Juan”, today “La Paz” school, innovating the organizational 
structure and educational practices. In 2010, “La Paz” has become an 
integrated educational centre which includes the different orders of 
compulsory education (early childhood, primary and secondary) plus 
adult education which is not mandatory. A unique experiment in the 
Spanish region that has made it possible to triple enrollment rates 
and reduce school absences by 10%. 
 
 
The “Learning Community”: Rebuilding Social Fragmentation 
Starting from Education 
 
Unlike “Virgilio 4” school, “La Paz” school is part of an urban 
regeneration project aimed at overcoming the socio-economic 
inequality and promoting the mediation of social conflicts that 
characterize the Milagrosa district. It is a holistic strategy that has a 
scientific matrix, studies and research by CREA, an academic 
institution in Barcelona, which has generated many international 
experiences. 
The theory behind the practice of the educational and 
organizational practice of the Learning Community descends from 
the active pedagogy of Paulo Freire who developed the dialogic 
perspective in education. 
In this perspective, the school is not a fixed structure, but an open 
material body under construction. It is conceived as a public space in 
which you learn to live together. Each individual institutional social 
actor becomes the protagonist of the construction of the local 
education system. Cooperation between different actors constitutes 
the essential factor of cultural innovation and development of 
educational practices (Elboj Valls & Fort, 2014). 
In this theoretical perspective a strategic partnership has been 
built in the La Milagrosa district; it promotes the meeting of the 
different players and different expertice, and integrates forms of 
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intervention, the educational ones and those concerning social 
services. 
So it has been developed a complex web of policy involving the 
different actors in the system of local governance, the institutions of 
the municipality of Albacete, associations, parents and relatives of 
the children who attend the school. In this context, the school has 
become the public space, the engine of the change and cultural 
development of the communities residing in the district. 
A model of learning community has been implemented; it is 
characterized by symmetrical relations between the different actors 
involved. The dialogic perspective transforms the traditional vertical 
organizational structure of the school in a horizontal configuration in 
which government bodies can not be reduced to the leadership and to 
the school board, but converge in a management body involving all 
educational stakeholders, “the joint committees”. A key feature of 
this organizational structure is the managerial autonomy: the 
recruitment of teachers and the executive is through the presentation 




Education as a Process of Awareness and Social Cohesion 
 
Through the holistic approach of the learning community 
strategies to cope with the difficulties of integration and social 
conflicts are concerted. In particular, in the strategies to combat 
school absenteeism the involvement and participation of the family is 
a crucial factor to promote the recognition of education as a value, 
the interest and the need to build relationships, the need to work 
together to encourage education investment and children‟s 
educational success. 
Unlike what has been observed in the case of Naples, the 
methodology of the “learning community” applies new educational 
practices that emphasize active learning, cooperation and solidarity, 
taking into account the needs, motivations and the reality of the 
learner, emphasizing the logic and knowledge of the learner, 
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enhancing dialogue as a strategy for the construction of horizontal 
relationships among teachers, children, parents, social workers, 
emphasizing teamwork, research and collective production. 
In this perspective actions of rapprochement, understanding and 
cooperation with families have been developed, including “family 
meetings”, “literary dialogic meetings”, “interactive groups” to 
encourage school attendance and the reflection on the experience of 
?learning?. Participation is understood as a practice of 
empowerment, or as a cultural and political practice that is activated 
in an idea of school as a public space for exchange, dialogue and 
shared action in building an educational space for children, but also 
social and political culture for the La Milagrosa district and the city 
of Albacete (Arendt, 1994). They are therefore devices that generate 
practices of social and cultural transformation of the local context. 
In particular, participation in meetings opens to new forms of 
social and collective interaction aimed at improving the social 
relations outside the school. These are meetings where you activate a 
process of discussion, investigation and analysis of everyday 
situations involving teachers, pupils, parents and social workers, a 
process of reflection on the problems and the individual and 
community facts, of the social economic cultural environment, not 
only to understand more the reality of the district, but to deal with 
situations, to act and transform reality in a Community perspective. 
In this perspective, the families do not configure only as carriers 
of questions but also as co-builders together with the other actors of 






The analysis of the empirical documentation showed that school 
attendance can be related to a variety of variables that characterize 
the local system of education and create an ecology of educational 
practices that can be more or less attractive and inclusive. A complex 
web of practices concerning the background of the neighborhood, the 
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family sphere, operations that relate to the Governance of the school 
and, more generally, the institutional context in which the school is 
work together to determine the disengagement of young people: a 
gradual withdrawal, non self-realization and non reflection in school 
reports, preluding to early departure from training circuits. 
With regard to actions to combat irregular school attendance the 
two cases observed highlight the opportunities inherent in the 
construction of models of intervention that integrate the action of the 
various actors involved in the construction of the local system of 
education. 
In “Virgilio 4” school we observed a unfinished concatenation of 
devices that has limited the phenomenon. The narrowness of public 
policies and the weak capacity of integration of the different 
institutional players in the construction of the system of local 
interventions had no effect on the structural causes of the 
phenomenon attributed to the backgruond. Containment, custodial, 
disciplining practices lead the children back in educational settings 
without affecting environmental practices that generate the 
occasional absence. The absence of a pedagogical matrix and a 
common methodology to the different actors that make up the local 
system of education generates educational practices which are still 
bumpy, not very dialogic, sometimes even conflicting. Thus, the 
image of a fragmented frayed network emerges, where the school is 
crossed by processes of decomposition and social fragmentation. 
However, “La Paz” school appears to be a case in which the 
school has become the focal point of a process of “empowerment” 
that integrates the actions of the various players in the area by 
creating a “practices of community” (Gherardi, 2008) that could 
affect significantly the phenomenon of school attendance. The re-
birth of the school develops within an overall change of the district 
which the families, associations and institutions of the municipality 
of Albacete take part in. In particular, adult education is the 
cornerstone underpinning the generative process of inclusion and 
social cohesion, the learning community is built which at the same 
time becomes a teaching community. Parental participation in 
various devices implemented in the school produces awareness and 
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subjectivity of knowledge, that is the emergence of the personal 
dimension of the subject and actor, able to change directly, through 
their own actions, the experience of daily life. In this way, education 
shapes our political action, that is, the subjective capacity to help 
build the local system of education. So, it becomes possible to build 
the new dynamics of sharing and educational practices aimed at the 
younger generation can have a significant impact on the ability to 
recognize the value of education, as a fundamental resource for the 
individual and social development. 
In the Spanish case observed the pragmatic collective dimension 
of individual agency emerges, or his being, his building also in the 
educational public relationship, in a social interactive dimension of 
training. The role and importance of the school environment as a co-
major player emerges along with other institutional and social actors 
of the system of local governance in building the capacity to aspire 
the change (Appadurai, 2004), or the ability to imagine and wish for 
the change, acquire the power to influence the living conditions of 
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This book resulted from a rich collaboration among sociologists of 
different nationalities and reflects on Mediterranean as a strategic 
element to overcome the current crisis in Europe, becoming an incen-
tive for the review of European policies and providing a solid founda-
tion for the growth of a true European cultural heritage and knowl-
edge, then passing it on to future generations. This book represents 
an attempt to go beyond the “boundaries” and this means rethinking 
the current idea of Europe and of the Mediterranean. The knowledge 
and cultural values of the Mediterranean can be the driving force to 
overcome the impasse of which Europe cannot free itself. 
Therefore, while some chapters strive to formulate more general 
categories, others deal with the concrete situated reality. We expect 
this reflection to produce a refreshing outlook on Mediterranean. 
The book is organized in three parts, which dialogue with each 
other: “Mediterranean and Culture”, “Mediterranean and Migrations” 
and “Mediterranean and Life-world”. 
